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ABSTRACT 
Time perception is often thought of as arising from a centralised 
mechanism. Recently, there has been a shift away from this perspective, 
with evidence showing that adaptation to particular visual properties at 
specific locations and stimulus predictability affects perceived event 
duration, implying that sensory systems carry out duration processing. This 
thesis investigates the following three questions: (1) Does adaptation 
induced duration compression affect other visual processes? (2) Can 
sensory systems encode duration using their basic response properties? (3) 
What is the relationship between predictability, perceived duration and 
neural response to a visual stimulus? The first question was investigated 
using a visual illusion called Flash-Lag, commonly thought to possess a 
fixed time component. After pilot investigations comparing psychophysical 
techniques, results from a behavioural experiment show that adapting to a 
high temporal frequency stimulus reduces the time component of the Flash-
Lag illusion, implying a role for duration in positional and/or motion 
computations. We demonstrate that a model using labelled lines and the 
varying temporal responses of neurons can encode the duration of a 
temporally normalised input. The model exhibits effects similar to those 
observed in the literature, including adaptation induced duration 
compression, central tendency and perceived duration scaling with the 
magnitude of various stimulus properties. Finally, a new paradigm is 
developed to test if stimulus duration decreases with stimulus predictability. 
Although behavioural results show no effect of predictability, event related 
fMRI shows significant differences in BOLD signal. Area MST demonstrates 
reduced response to expected events in a duration judgement task, but not 
an orientation judgement task, suggesting response is reduced by 
predictability, dependent on the task. These results show that duration may 
be encoded in sensory systems and is used in perceptual tasks. 
Furthermore, it is proposed that duration is estimated using ramping or 
climbing activity within neural populations in the dorsal visual pathway. 
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1. CHAPTER ONE - BACKGROUND 
 INTRODUCTION 
Time perception and its basis in the brain is a broad and complex topic 
and the timescales humans and other animals operate on are extremely 
variable. From the precise millisecond timing of spikes fired from individual 
neurons, through to circadian rhythms controlling the wake-sleep cycle over 
the course of a day and onto the ability to conceive of events many months 
and years into the past or imagine ourselves along similar timescales in the 
future. The ability to operate on such wide timescales requires a range of 
different brain functions. Circadian rhythms are driven by autonomous 
cellular and molecular mechanisms (Dunlap, 1999). While the timing of 
spikes is crucial in audition for the detection of interaural time differences 
(Wagner & Takahashi, 1992), these time differences are perceived 
‘indirectly’ as auditory locations rather than differences in timing. 
Structures such as the hippocampus have been identified as important in 
the storage and retrieval of long-term memory (Corkin, 2002), but again 
this can be considered a less directly perceived quantity of time.  
The material covered here will concentrate upon the timescale of sub-
second to second duration required for perception, cognition and action, 
where, arguably durations are a sensory property of a stimulus, as opposed 
to being indirectly coded  from other attributes or more 
cognitively/semantically encoded. Informed by studies on both human and 
animal behaviour this area has historically been the domain of ‘central 
clock’ models. Such models provide the first focus for discussion before 
concentrating on the experimental results concerning the visual perception 
of time on these shorter (not more than a couple of seconds) timescales. 
Discussing this work will lead onto identifying the research questions that 
will form the motivation behind the experimental and theoretical work 
carried out in the rest of this thesis. 
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 CENTRALISED MODELS OF TIMING 
 INTERNAL CLOCK 
A mechanism commonly proposed to account for the perception of time 
is the internal clock (Gibbon, Church, & Meck, 1984; Treisman, 1963). The 
internal clock consists of a central pacemaker emitting pulses typically 
according to a Poisson distribution so over a given time period the same 
amount of pulses occur, although not equally spaced), which transmits to an 
accumulator counting the pulses to give a measure of time. When learning a 
task where an explicit measure of duration is behaviourally relevant the 
learnt duration is stored in long-term memory for future reference. By 
comparing this learnt duration to the current or a more recently acquired 
duration from the accumulator stored in short-term memory, a decision can 
be made to guide behaviour appropriately (Figure 1-1). While originally used 
to explain animal behaviour (Church & Gibbon, 1982) pacemaker-
accumulator model also have been applied to human timing (Wearden, 
1991), though human judgments appear more variable, possibly due to 
effects of attention and arousal.  
Figure 1-1: A block diagram showing the clock model typically used to explain time 
perception in humans.  
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The internal clock model was extended by Treisman, Faulkner, Naish, 
and Brogan (1990) to include effects of attention and arousal. This model is 
made up of a central pacemaker with multiple, task-specific control units 
that receive input from the central pacemaker, which transforms the input 
from the pacemaker to an output - a timing signal tuned to a particular task 
or sensory domain. As each control unit’s output is task specific, the timing 
signal can change in response to the requirements of the task or directed 
attention, whilst overall arousal levels can speed up or slow down the 
internal clock depending on the prevailing environmental and organism 
states. It has been used to explain various experimental findings in human 
sensory time perception, showing that perceived duration is affected by 
attention (Seifried & Ulrich, 2011), arousal (Stetson, Fiesta, & Eagleman, 
2007) and body temperature (Wearden & Penton-Voak, 1995). Some have 
used attention to explain why the first event in a sequence appears to last 
longer than subsequent events that are of the same length (Rose & 
Summers, 1995) or, why an unexpected or ‘oddball’ stimulus appears to last 
longer than a non-oddball stimulus (Tse, Intriligator, Rivest, & Cavanagh, 
2004). These results are interpreted using internal clock models as a change 
in control unit tick speed or a speeding up of the central clock. There is also 
evidence showing that faster moving stimuli appear to last longer (Brown, 
1995), suggesting stimulus properties could also speed up the internal clock. 
This claim was backed-up by Kanai, Paffen, Hogendoorn and Verstraten 
(2006), who control for spatial frequency, pinning the velocity temporal 
expansion effect onto the temporal frequency of the stimulus and propose 
an event related timing mechanism, so that stimulus duration is estimated 
by the rate of change of the stimulus. Clock models affect perceived duration 
by tuning their tick rate to the environment so that an environment where 
events are occurring rapidly requires a faster clock rate to discern when 
events happen. This leads to more ‘ticks’ from the timing mechanism over 
the same actual duration causing the temporal expansion effects observed 
and an increase in perceived duration. Other stimulus properties such as 
size (Xuan, Zhang, He, & Chen, 2007), brightness (Bowen, Pola, & Matin, 
1974; Brigner, 1986) and magnitude in general (Alards-Tomalin, Leboe-
McGowan, Shaw, & Leboe-McGowan, 2014) have also been shown to 
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change perceived duration. While these phenomena cannot be attributed to 
the event related mechanisms, attention can be drawn to differences in 
stimulus properties (Bernardino, Cavallet, Sousa, & Galera, 2013; Camgoz, 
Yener, & Guvenc, 2004; Proulx, 2010), so they may be explained in terms of 
attentionally driven increases in internal clock speed. 
 SCALAR EXPECTANCY AND WEBER’S LAW 
One of the more dominant theories arising from the central clock 
approach is Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET) proposed by Gibbon (1977). 
SET is a model of time perception stating that time across all modalities is 
measured against a centralised clock that uses a pacemaker with a variable 
tick rate changing on a trial-to-trial basis (Church & Gibbon, 1982). This 
explains why time perception appears to be unified across senses and that, 
on average, accurate measures of duration can be made, with the variability 
of such estimates scaling with the estimates’ mean duration. This feature of 
timing is termed, the scalar property, which is an example of Weber’s Law. 
Weber's law is a long established property of sensory perception whereby 
the sensitivity of the sensory system to differences in stimulus properties is 
inversely proportional to the magnitude of the stimulus property. As 
sensory systems are noisy processes (Faisal, Selen, & Wolpert, 2008), 
sensory judgements are variable across different presentations of the same 
stimulus. The variability can be computed by taking the standard deviation 
of a number of judgements and dividing by the mean judgement, giving the 
Weber fraction: the ratio between the stimulus property magnitude and the 
variability. If Weber's law holds then this ratio should be approximately 
constant across a range of stimuli with differing magnitudes as when the 
magnitude increases, sensitivity decreases in proportion and more 
variability in judgements is observed. SET was originally informed by 
studies on non-human primates, performing a task where they learn they 
have to respond a particular amount of time after stimulus onset to receive a 
reward rather than immediately afterwards. The distribution of the delay of 
these responses for this task follows Weber’s law, i.e. the scalar property 
(Figure 1-2). Gibbon (1977) posits the animals in these experiments have an 
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internal representation of time provided by the internal clock mechanism to 
explain the animal’s ability to perform the task.  
 
 
Figure 1-2: Graphs showing Weber’s law in Scalar Expectancy Theory expressing the scalar 
property labelled anticlockwise. a) Shows the distribution of timing judgements for a shorter 
duration (red) and a duration twice as long (blue), where the distribution of longer duration 
judgements is twice that of the shorter duration as according to Scalar Expectancy Theory. 
b) Shows a computationally generated example set of duration judgements (judgement: 
black cross) following Weber’s law, as the duration increases so does the variance in the 
judged durations, the blue line shows equality. c) Gives the Weber fractions (σ/µ) for the 
example data shown in b) demonstrating that the Weber fraction is approximately constant 
(~0.1) across all the durations. 
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 IS SCALAR EXPECTANCY A FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTY 
OF TIME PERCEPTION? 
Gibbon (1977) also proposed the existence of multiple timing 
mechanisms over different timescales, claiming that behavioural data shows 
an abrupt change in Weber fractions across shorter (<1.5s) and longer 
(>1.5s) durations, implying two different mechanisms i.e. different clocks 
with different variability for the two different timescales. However, the data 
presented to underpin this claim are from a meta-analysis across 
experiments using different animal species with different methodologies, so 
this could be an artefact of various experimental factors. Lewis and Miall 
(2009) performed experiments collecting duration judgements from human 
participants across a similar range of durations to Gibbon (1977), finding 
some suggestion of a difference in Weber fractions between durations of less 
than and greater than 3s. However, fitting the data at above and below 3s 
with two different regression models and comparing this to a single model 
for the whole data set did not produce a significantly better fit, indicating 
that this difference is not necessarily due to separate mechanisms. While 
there may be separate mechanisms for different durations, they do not show 
differences in Weber fractions.  
One other result of Lewis and Miall (2009) is that Weber fractions are 
not constant but instead are inversely proportional to perceived event 
duration. Other studies find that the scalar property does not hold for 
shorter durations of less than 0.3s (Wearden, Edwards, Fakhri, & Percival, 
1998) or that Weber fractions decrease initially, then increase with duration 
(Bizo, Chu, Sanabria, & Killeen, 2006) or increase with duration (Grondin, 
2010b). As Weber’s law traditionally provides the basis for SET and internal 
clock models these findings poses significant theoretical challenges. It is 
possible to accommodate some of these results without modifications, for 
example Bizo et al., (2006) and Wearden et al., (1998) could be interpreted 
to show a breakdown of Weber's law at extremes where the internal clock 
mechanisms are not capable of consistent measurement. The Lewis and 
Miall (2009) claim is more difficult to explain, especially given their result is 
a conceptual replication of Gibbon (1977) in humans as opposed to animals 
with a cleaner, less variable dataset, though they may simply show a 
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difference between human and other animals’ perception of time. This is a 
problem for those who support SET as common, cross species timing 
mechanism. Staddon and Higa (1999) argue this has long been a problem 
for the internal clock model, as its use of a Poisson pacemaker, where there 
is variation in the exact time each clock ‘tick’ occurs, does not explain the 
scalar property of time. Over increasing durations, the noise would cancel 
out, leading to a decrease in the Weber fraction with duration, which is 
observed by Lewis and Miall (2009). Church (1999) states the Poisson 
pacemaker’s noise is not responsible for the scalar property and suggests it 
is a strength of the model, as it does not require a pacemaker with a specific 
tick output distribution. The subject of pacemaker noise and the scalar 
property is noted in Church and Gibbon (1982), who instead explain the 
scalar property as resulting from drift in the mean clock rate, creating trial-
by-trial variability. While originally used as a fundamental property of time 
perception and clock models, there is considerable evidence suggesting that 
SET does not always hold. Instead, it depends on various aspects of the 
environment and experimental task, which casts doubt on the claim that the 
scalar property of timing is fundamental aspect of time perception, thus 
undermines one of the original foundations of central clock models (Gibbon, 
1977). This was addressed by Church and Gibbon (1982) with the use of a 
Poisson timer with the presence or absence of clock-rate drift, which means 
the pacemaker-accumulator model can be made to follow or not follow the 
scalar property depending on the particular variables used, so does account 
for occasions where the scalar property is not observed in behaviour. 
Therefore, it is not possible to falsify this model based upon the scalar 
property of timing so the lack of consistency in measuring the scalar 
property is not fatal for clock models in itself but cannot be used to support 
them either. 
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  NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE FOR CENTRALISED 
TIMING  
One clear prediction from internal clock models is that timing is a 
centralised process and therefore it should be possible to localise brain 
areas responsible for time perception. Initial work suggests the cerebellum 
as a key structure in temporal perception (Ivry, Spencer, Zelaznik, & 
Diedrichsen, 2002) as patients with cerebellar lesions or other cerebellar 
atrophy have difficulty in timing actions with short (<1s) (Ivry, 1996; Ivry & 
Keele, 1989) and longer (400ms to 4s) delays (Mangels, Ivry, & Shimizu, 
1998). Neuroimaging experiments also show cerebellar activation in an 
interval comparison task (Jueptner et al., 1995; Mathiak, Hertrich, Grodd, & 
Ackermann, 2004). The extent to which timing is associated centrally with 
the cerebellum has been debated (Harrington, Lee, Boyd, Rapcsak, & 
Knight, 2004; Ivry & Spencer, 2004) and numerous studies show that 
multiple areas are associated with interval timing.  
Single cell electrophysiology shows  an increase in spike rate in 
anticipation of an event in macaque LIP (Janssen & Shadlen, 2005), cells in 
motor and premotor areas show estimation of temporal intervals before 
performing an action (Lebedev, O'Doherty & Nicolelis, 2008). Cells in 
prefrontal cortex also show temporal properties, with time interval related 
activity (Constantinidis, Williams, & Goldman-Rakic, 2002). There is also 
evidence from neuroimaging; Coull, Vidal, Nazarian, and Macar (2004) and 
Macar, Coull, and Vidal (2006) show BOLD increases in a number of areas 
with increasing attention to time, including pre-supplementary motor and 
right frontal areas, making up a corticostriatal network. Frontal areas also 
show activity related to timing, as does the striatum and thalamus (Hinton 
& Meck, 2004).  
With this literature, there appears to be a shift away from the proposal 
that timing is solely a function of the cerebellum. However, one issue, 
particularly with neuroimaging studies showing large networks as being 
involved in timing is that it is difficult to separate brain areas that are 
involved in other processes such as attention, decision making and memory, 
which are required in time perception tasks, from those that may be 
involved in pure time perception. During a time perception task in a study 
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Rao, Mayer and Harrington (2001) examine the BOLD time course to 
separate out the roles of different brain areas in interval timing. Early onset 
of BOLD activation in basal ganglia, right inferior parietal cortex and 
bilateral premotor cortex is claimed to indicate these regions are active in 
time perception, while later activation of the cerebellum during interval 
timing tasks implies its involvement in non-timing tasks such as movement 
planning and execution. Late activity in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
in a duration comparison task and not a pitch comparison task suggests its 
involvement in time interval comparisons. Another fMRI study (Livesey, 
Wall, & Smith, 2007) aims to isolate areas purely responsible for timing. 
This is performed by comparing BOLD response between a hard and easy 
timing task to remove those areas more involved with other processes such 
as attention and memory as the harder task places greater demands on such 
functions. Results show small areas of the supramarginal gyrus, the 
confluence of the inferior frontal gyrus and anterior insula as well as the 
putamen in the basal ganglia to have significant BOLD response in both 
tasks. So, a much smaller number of areas are revealed as responsible for 
pure timing than in some of the previous studies. However, the role of the 
anterior insular may be acting as a decision maker rather than directly 
involved in timing (Kosillo & Smith, 2010).  
Of particular interest in Livesey et al., (2007) and Rao et al., (2001) is the 
inclusion of activations in basal ganglia, which is theorised as having a 
crucial role in timing tasks (Nenadic et al., 2003). Parkinson’s patients have 
also been identified as a special population that show deficits in time 
perception (Harrington, Haaland, & Hermanowitz, 1998). The pathology of 
Parkinson’s disease involves reduction in the production of dopamine in 
areas of the midbrain including the basal ganglia (Bernheimer, Birkmayer, 
Hornykiewicz, Jellinger, & Seitelberger, 1973). It has been proposed that the 
dopamergic system has a role in time perception (Rammsayer, 1999). GABA 
is another neurotransmitter that may influence timing (Meck, 1996) as 
GABAergic neurons influence timing and pattern of cell firing in the 
neostratium (Tepper & Bolam, 2004), which includes the putamen. Other 
research has identified correlations with increased GABA in visual cortex 
and underestimation of duration in sub-second interval time perception 
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(Terhune, Russo, Near, Stagg, & Cohen Kadosh, 2014). This evidence may 
seem to suggest that the basal ganglia performs central timing functions. 
However, one proposed role of the basal ganglia is its involvement in 
executive function and decision-making (Hazy, Frank, & O'Reilly, 2007; 
Packard & Knowlton, 2002). Therefore, a non-centralised view of timing is 
that the basal ganglia integrates information from multiple systems that are 
involved in a timing task as part of the decision making process. The fact 
that areas within the basal ganglia often appear to be activated in time 
perception task and not other areas can be explained as, depending on 
factors such as the task and modality, different information from different 
brain areas and networks is used to make decisions and guide behaviour. 
For example for longer durations (several seconds and longer), frontal and 
prefrontal areas involved in working memory are activated (Hinton & Meck, 
2004) and tasks that require orientation of attention in time show activity in 
parietal and pre-motor areas (Coull, 2004; Coull et al., 2004; Macar et al., 
2006).  
While there has been considerable progress in identifying areas and 
neurotransmitters involved in time perception and data showing individual 
neurons responding to elapsed time in different areas, the consensus of this 
research is that there are multiple areas and systems involved in time 
perception. The underlying theme of these results suggests the use of 
multiple functions including attention, working memory, motor planning 
and perceptual systems in timing, implying that duration perception is not 
processed by a single, centralised mechanism but involves functions that are 
performed across networks in the brain. Thus, this research shows a shift 
away from centralised explanations of timing. Though there are some 
caveats to this argued by Ivry and Schlerf (2008) who claim non-centralised 
models have difficulty explaining cross-modal transfer, for which there is 
some evidence. For example,  participants show improvements in timing 
action when trained using a perceptual timing task that lack a time critical 
motor component (Meegan, Aslin, & Jacobs, 2000). Central clock models 
have proven to be a powerful tool in conceptualisation of results, 
particularly in behavioural measures, of time perception but there is little 
evidence supporting a single, central area acting as a timer that one would 
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expect in a strict interpretation of the internal clock models previously 
discussed.  
 CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN INVESTIGATING THE 
PERCEPTION OF TIME 
An implicit assumption of centralised timing mechanisms, whether an 
internal clock or other model, is that they take a Cartesian approach to the 
problem of conscious perception. This can be understood using the 
Cartesian theatre analogy. All sensory information is projected on a screen 
in a theatre where there sits a homunculus observing the screen and 
perception is considered to be what the homunculus sees. This does not 
solve the problem of perception, it just shifts the question to how does the 
homunculus perceive? Thus, this explanation creates an infinite regress. 
The central clock implies that there is a central reference point for the 
perception of time so acts as the homunculus in the theatre. It may be 
argued that the central clock does not imply an infinite regress as it 
attempts to describe the mechanism, thus provides some explanation of the 
perception of time, taking a weaker Cartesian stance, but does not remove 
the concept of a perceptual ‘end’.  
However, another problem remains; in sensory systems, there is a 
divergence in processing. Different sensory properties are processed in 
increasingly separate areas and it is not clear where these converge, which is 
a problem for centralised models of timing that would require such a 
convergence. It might be tempting to think that a distributed view of timing 
would automatically avoid some of the pitfalls here. While not referring 
directly to time perception, one example of an explanation that attempts to 
explain sensory perception using a distributed sensory system is provided 
by Zeki (2003) and Zeki and Bartels (1999). They use the concept of micro-
conciousness, where each property is encoded separately in a distinct area 
and each area produces its own independent conscious awareness of the 
property being encoded. Each individual micro-conscious area is distributed 
in time as well as space so some visual properties are processed faster and 
perceived sooner than others are. This means visual properties are not 
represented according to a centralised process. While this argument can 
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make a convincing case without automatically assuming that there is a 
single, unified conscious ‘process’ within the brain, in attempting to explain 
consciousness, it makes the same pitfalls as centralised explanations. It does 
not explain what consciousness is, just that it is made up of smaller, 
localised micro-consciousnesses, which begs the question, what makes 
these, micro-conscious? Is each micro-conscious made up of yet smaller 
nano-consciousnesses, and so on? Clearly, this does not get around the 
problem of infinite regression. That different micro-consciousness process 
properties which reach awareness at different times is also a problem, it 
implies a final end-point for perception, similar to the homunculus in the 
Cartesian theatre. It is clear these problems are not exclusive to central 
clock models or other centralised timing mechanisms. Therefore, it is not 
safe to assume that proposing a distributed scheme can get around the 
conceptual issues apparent in centralised timing explanations. Therefore, 
this needs to be a consideration when formulating alternatives to 
centralised mechanisms. The next section of this review will focus on results 
from experiments investigating the visual perception of time, which a 
central clock cannot explain. 
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 PERCEPTION OF SHORT DURATIONS IN THE 
VISUAL SYSTEM 
 EFFECTS OF ADAPTATION ON VISUAL DURATION 
In the previous sections an event related clock model of visual timing, 
proposed to account for results in visual experiments showing faster moving 
objects are perceived to last longer (Brown, 1995), was described. Kanai et 
al., (2006) show that this duration expansion effect is due to increased 
temporal frequency of the stimulus. An event related clock accounts for 
these findings as the tick rate increases in response to a more rapidly 
changing stimulus, effectively increasing temporal resolution of the visual 
system allowing for more precise temporal precepts. However, results from 
Johnston, Arnold, and Nishida (2006) demonstrate a decoupling of 
temporal frequency adaptation and perceived duration. They show 20Hz 
adaptation reduces the perceived duration and temporal frequency (TF) of a 
grating stimulus but 5Hz adaptation increases perceived temporal 
frequency, but does not cause an increase in perceived duration, which the 
event related model would predict if the tick rate were dependent on 
perceived temporal frequency. The fact that the adaptor may attract 
attention cannot explain the effect either, as attending to a stimulus 
generally results in it being perceived as longer (Brown, 1995; Mattes & 
Ulrich, 1998). Further work adapting to contrast (Bruno & Johnston, 2010) 
and luminance (Ayhan, Bruno, Nishida, & Johnston, 2011) also suggests 
that the visual system does not use an event related (TF dependent) timing 
signal to measure duration.  
The magnocellular layer in the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) is an area 
of the thalamus that makes up part of the pre-cortical visual pathway and 
receives input from the retina. It is sensitive to high temporal frequency and 
low contrast stimuli, saturating at higher contrast levels (Xu et al., 2001). 
Therefore, it is likely adaptation to stimuli with these properties reflects 
changes in the response of M-cells that make up the magnocellular layer. It 
is claimed (Bruno & Johnston, 2010; Johnston et al., 2006) these results 
provide evidence that contrast gain control in M-cells (Solomon, Peirce, 
Dhruv, & Lennie, 2004) plays a role in visual time perception. This is a 
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process where adaptation to a high temporal frequency or a high contrast, 
transient stimulus, causes a subsequent reduction in M-cell contrast 
response. This results in these cells becoming more sensitive to fine changes 
in high contrast stimuli. As adaptation to both high temporal frequency and 
high contrast stimuli affects perceived duration, this implies duration is 
encoded in the Magnocellular layer in LGN, so duration or processes that 
influence duration perception are represented in the early visual system.  
Further evidence shows a compression of time with stimuli presented 
immediately preceding or early into a long horizontal saccade (Morrone, 
Ross, & Burr, 2005). Saccades also elicit a suppression of the magnocellular 
pathway (Ross, Burr, & Morrone, 1996), which implicates a similar 
mechanism to that used to explain the visual adaptation findings. One other 
aspect of saccades is the remapping of receptive fields in LIP around 
saccades (Colby & Goldberg, 1999) and, as already discussed the finding 
that LIP neurons also appear to encode duration (Janssen & Shadlen, 2005; 
Leon & Shadlen, 2003). Overall, this research implicates LIP and the 
Magnocellular pathway in visual duration perception.  
There is debate regarding the use of contrast gain in LGN M-cells as an 
explanation. Burr, Tozzi, and Morrone, (2007) have replicated the result of 
Johnston et al., (2006) but claim that when changes in perceived speed due 
to adaptation are factored out, there is no retinotopic, only spatiotopic 
adaptation. They propose that duration adaptation occurs in MT and MST, 
citing fMRI evidence from their own lab of spatiotopic maps in these areas 
(d'Avossa et al., 2007) however this finding is contentious and attempts to 
replicate this have not found such maps (Gardner, Merriam, Movshon, & 
Heeger, 2008). A counter claim from the same lab as the original fMRI 
study (Crespi et al., 2011) argues that visual attention is necessary for the 
spatial coding of visual stimuli, hence the difference in results between 
d'Avossa et al., (2007) and Gardner et al., (2008). The behavioural findings 
of spatiotopic specificity of duration adaptation in Burr et al., (2007) have 
also been subject to debate. Bruno, Ayhan, and Johnston, (2010) dispute the 
existence of  a spatiotopic duration mechanism, arguing that the speed 
matching of stimuli in Burr et al., (2007) to show duration affects factor out 
in retinotopic co-ordinates does not hold up. In a reply Burr, Cicchini, 
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Arrighi, and Morrone (2011) state that Bruno et al., (2010) do measure a 
spatiotopic duration compression but of a smaller magnitude than they did 
previously, which they put down to fewer participants and different 
instructions given to them. Other work previously mentioned, shows 
contrast adaptation (Bruno et al., 2010) and luminance (Ayhan et al., 2011) 
affecting duration, which both implicate retinotopic, lower level 
mechanisms, contrary to Burr et al., (2007). While it is possible that as 
parietal areas appear to encode position egocentrically/spatiotopically as 
lesions lead to hemispatial neglect (Driver & Mattingley, 1998) and these 
maps are attentionally selective, it is odd why the retinotopic effects should 
disappear. 
 A contribution of Burr et al., (2007) is to suggest that visual duration is 
computed across multiple stages in the hierarchy of the visual system 
including cortical areas which is expanded upon in further work (Morrone, 
Cicchini, & Burr, 2010). Experimental evidence for this view comes from 
Curran and Benton (2012), who use moving random dot and plaid stimuli to 
activate motion sensitive cells in the cortex, particularly in MT+ (Dubner & 
Zeki, 1971), which are directionally selective when adapting to motion (Kohn 
& Movshon, 2004; Krekelberg, Boynton, & van Wezel, 2006). The findings 
show duration adaptation only when the adaptor moves in the same 
direction to the adapted stimulus, demonstrating that duration perception 
is processed cortically as well as pre-cortically and appears to be retinotopic 
(Latimer, Curran & Benton, 2014). No matter, which view, retinotopic, 
spatiotopic/egocentric or perhaps both, depending on attention, is correct, 
the fact that duration perception is affected by sensory adaptation in the 
particular area of the visual field where the adaptor is positioned suggests 
that duration is encoded locally in a similar manner to other visual 
properties. Evidence also suggests both pre-cortical and cortical areas are 
involved in duration perception demonstrating that visual duration is not 
computed by an event-based clock at a single processing level but is instead 
computed across the visual hierarchy with contributions at multiple levels. 
The implication that the Magnocellular pathway and/or medial temporal 
areas are involved may broadly localise time perception to the dorsal stream 
(Goodale & Milner, 1992). 
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 THE EFFECT OF TOP DOWN PROCESSES ON DURATION 
 
Sensory adaptation is not the only process that can influence perceived 
time. Other factors can play a part, for instance, highly emotional/arousing 
events such as falling from a tower (Stetson et al., 2007), are reported to last 
longer. Increases in body temperature also result in increases in perceived 
time (Wearden & Penton-Voak, 1995). As mentioned previously, time is 
reported to change with attention so that increased attention results in 
increases in perceived duration (Thomas & Weaver, 1975). Splitting 
attention between temporal and non-temporal tasks results in a decrease in 
perceived duration (Grondin & Macar, 1992).  
One behavioural paradigm that has been shown to affect perceived 
duration is the oddball paradigm and is explained using cognitive 
mechanisms such as the effects of attention and expectation as opposed to 
bottom up sensory adaptation. The oddball paradigm is where the 
participant is presented with a succession of stimuli where one stimulus or 
more within the stream are unexpected, termed the ‘oddball’. One example 
of the oddball paradigm in vision is where a low probability ‘oddball’ 
stimulus appears unexpectedly in a stream of high probability stimuli. Upon 
each trial, a series of stimuli are presented, all of which are the same 
stimulus except one different or ‘oddball’ stimulus, inserted at a random 
position toward the middle of the series. This experimental design has a 
duration effect where the oddball is perceived to persist longer in vision as 
first reported by Rose and Summers (1995). This oddball duration effect is 
Figure 1-3: Oddball paradigm showing oddball and debut relative temporal expansion effects. 
All stimuli are displayed for the same amount of time, but the debut and oddball stimuli are 
perceived to last longer relative to the other stimuli in the sequence. 
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illustrated in Figure 1-3 along with the debut effect, where the first stimulus 
in a series is perceived to last for a longer duration (Pariyadath & Eagleman, 
2012).  
Tse et al., (2004) show that the oddball stimulus appears to persist in 
vision for approximately 10% longer than the expected stimulus, where the 
actual stimulus duration is greater than 120ms. This effect is consistent for 
oddballs defined by different visual properties such as colour, shape and 
velocity and holds for auditory tones. Tse et al., (2004) explain the effect in 
terms of a central clock in that attention increases the tick rate of an internal 
clock, resulting in a perceived increase in subjective time (Treisman et al., 
1990). Tse et al., (2004) also claim that the lag between offset and 
attentional orientation explains why this effect does not apply to stimuli of 
durations shorter than 120ms as this is not enough time to direct attention 
to the stimulus. Pariyadath and Eagleman, (2007) expand upon this finding, 
showing that time does not expand during stimulus presentation of an 
oddball in all aspects. When an auditory tone is played at the same time as 
the oddball, participants do not report the tone to have a lower frequency. 
The same result was found when the visual stimulus was made to flicker at 
10Hz, there was no change in the temporal frequency of the perceived 
flicker, meaning the temporal expansion effect is one of duration alone and 
does not carry over to rate-of-change judgements. As the effect does not 
carry across different judgements, this suggests the internal clock 
mechanism can only be used for duration judgements, not rate-of-change. 
Another test of the internal clock model carried out by Pariyadath and 
Eagleman (2007) uses oddball stimuli with increased emotional salience, 
comparing these to emotionally neutral stimuli. Treisman et al., (1990) 
claim the internal clock rate increases with arousal and attention, predicting 
a difference in oddball temporal expansion effects between stimuli of 
differing emotional salience as these would increase either arousal, 
attention or both. No effect is found by Pariyadath and Eagleman (2007). 
Thus they suggest instead that the effect is driven by stimulus 
unpredictability; hypothesising that perceived duration is inversely 
proportional to the predictability of the stimulus.  
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Pariyadath and Eagleman (2007) reinforce this idea by showing that the 
first stimulus in a sequence of identical images also shows an oddball effect 
and by showing one of three different numerical sequences; where the same 
number is repeated (e.g. 1,1,1,1,1), an incremental sequence (e.g. 1,2,3,4,5) 
and a scrambled sequence (e.g. 1,4,2,5,3). They find an oddball effect with 
both the sequential and repeated presentations but not the scrambled, 
demonstrating that a sequence of visually dissimilar stimuli related by only 
abstract properties exhibits temporal expansion when expectations are 
violated. This result is backed up by a further study (Schindel, Rowlands & 
Arnold, 2011)that uses Troxler fading; a gradual reduction in perceived 
brightness of a persistent visual stimulus caused by low-level neural 
adaptation (Martinez-Conde, Macknik, & Hubel, 2004). It shows that the 
oddball is always perceived as brighter than the standard, no matter which 
eye it is presented to and the effect is stronger when shown in different eyes 
for both repeated and persistent initial presentations of the standard. If 
temporal expansion is caused by low-level adaptation, the same underlying 
mechanism that causes Troxler fading, then the oddball temporal expansion 
effect should exhibit a similar pattern to perceived brightness. However, it 
does not. Temporal expansion only occurs with flickering (i.e. a stimulus 
repeated over time), not persistent initial presentation of the standard and 
there is no significant difference depending on eye of presentation. This 
provides clear behavioural evidence disassociating oddball temporal 
expansion effects from low-level adaptation mechanisms, clearly showing 
that the oddball temporal expansion effect is separate to the effects of 
adaptation described in section 1.3.1. Pariyadath and Eagleman (2012) show 
that the temporal expansion of the oddball is influenced by the number of 
repetitions and the difference in orientation between the standard and 
oddball that scales in a way that was consistent with a predication error 
signal.  
The consensus is that the subjective temporal expansion observed in the 
oddball effect is not a result of sensory adaptation but one of top down 
cognitive processes of attention (Tse et al., 2004) or expectation (Eagleman 
& Pariyadath, 2009; Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2007; Pariyadath & Eagleman, 
2012; Schindel et al., 2011).  
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It is also argued (Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2007; Pariyadath & Eagleman, 
2012) that the duration expansion of unexpected events is directly related to 
neural suppression. This is observed as a decrease in ERP magnitude in 
EEG experiments (Pazo-Alvarez, Cadaveira, & Amenedo, 2003) and when 
using fMRI as a reduction in BOLD signal (Grill-Spector, Henson, & Martin, 
2006; Larsson & Smith. 2012) on subsequent presentations of a stimulus 
relative to the initial presentation. This may provide a way of linking 
duration perception directly to neurophysiology, which in turn could 
provide insight into the neural mechanism behind duration perception. This 
work is of particular relevance as predictability takes a central role in some 
recent theories of brain function (e.g. Friston, 2010), which claim that the 
brain optimises encoding based upon an internal model so that events 
predicted by the internal model beforehand are encoded more efficiently. 
This avenue of research may then provide a way to link duration effects, 
neural suppression and more general theories of brain function. 
  DOES DURATION PERCEPTION HAVE OTHER 
FUNCTIONS? 
The previous sections cover a range of literature on time perception 
representing the current ‘state-of-the-art’ on the topic. An influential model 
of time perception is the central clock model with its foundations in the 
scalar property of timing. However, the scalar property does not appear to 
be as hard a rule as first thought and there is little neurophysiological 
evidence for a centralised timing mechanism. Instead, there appears to be a 
wider distributed network of timing. Focusing more on visual perception of 
time over shorter (generally sub-second) durations, clock models do not 
appear to account for low-level adaptation effects nor higher-level 
expectation effects. This leaves a significant gap in knowledge on time 
perception in explaining why the sensory perception of time is altered by 
adaptation to particular visual properties and expectation, what 
mechanisms are behind the time sense and what the neurophysiological 
correlates of time perception are. The focus will now shift to examine the 
research questions that arise from this body of research and the specific 
literature surrounding them, as they will make the focus of this thesis.  
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We have seen that sub-second durations are susceptible to distortions, so 
a question arising from this is why do these distortions exist? A good 
starting point for any such question is to examine the possible evolutionary 
advantages of such distortions. So how does the inclusion of a mechanism 
coding duration in the perceptual system assist an organism’s survival? 
When an organism perceives an object in the world, the information the 
perceptual system gathers needs to be useful in inferring its effect on the 
organism’s survival. So such questions as, ‘Is the object a threat?’, ‘A food 
source?’, ‘A potential mate?’, ‘Another organism I can co-operate with?’ and 
so on are the type that the organism needs answering. It is important for the 
perceptual system to provide answers to these questions. So how does time 
perception fit into this? While implicit time in motion is useful, motion 
perception does not rely on explicit measures of space or time. Two flashes, 
separated in space and time but at too small a distance or timing difference 
to be distinguished, are perceived as a single moving object (Exner, 1875). 
The key conclusion from adaptation studies on duration perception (Section 
1.3.1) is there are separate mechanisms for temporal frequency, which 
involves an implicit, not an explicit measure of duration, and time. What the 
explicit measure does is inform how long an object has been present in the 
visual field and it is not immediately clear how this would be of benefit 
behaviourally.  
Therefore, from a purely perceptual view an explicit measure of time is 
not obviously critical to survival. One hypothesis is that the duration 
mechanism has ‘piggy backed’ onto other mechanisms to give a crude 
estimate on the few occasions where it is required. The estimates produced 
by such a mechanism distort easily when neurons that have a primary 
purpose other than encoding duration are adapted. Another possibility is 
that other processes require a measure of duration for more survival critical 
features of the environment such as in the timing of action and that 
duration changes caused by adaptation may serve useful functions. One 
such possibility is that visual duration is used in timing of actions, which is 
explored in the following section.  
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 DURATION ADAPTATION AND ANTICIPATORY ACTION 
TIMING 
A possibility investigated by Marinovic and Arnold (2012) is that visual 
time perception influences precise timings required for anticipatory action. 
They measured the effects of fast (68.4 rpm) and slow (5.7rpm) rotating 
motion adaptation over five rotation circles on perceived speed and 
duration of a single rotation circle (34.2 rpm). They found these match the 
results of Johnston et al., (2006), where the faster speed shows duration 
and speed compression, analogous to 20Hz temporal frequency adaptation 
and the slower only shows speed adaptation, analogous to 5Hz temporal 
frequency adaptation. Further experiments show adaptation to cause 
mismatches between actual and perceived onset of a round object moving 
along a circular path. Fast speed adaptation causes the object to appear 
earlier in time in a position behind the actual starting point, while after slow 
speed adaptation, the object  appears ahead of the starting position. The 
moving object is perceived forward or backward in time at onset after slow 
and fast motion adaptation respectively by approximately 50ms in both 
instances. Johnston et al., (2006) measure stimulus onset to be earlier after 
both 5 and 20Hz adaptation but this is not reported as significant. This is 
smaller (<20ms) than that reported by Marinovic and Arnold (2012) and  
the slower speed adaptation (equivalent to 5Hz adaptation) in Marinovic 
and Arnold (2012) has the opposite effect to the fast speed (20Hz 
equivalent), so the changes in onset time reported in Johnston et al., (2006) 
are not the same as the effect here.  
To test if changes in duration map onto changes in timing of actions, a 
final experiment requires participants to view either a fast or slow adapting 
stimulus as before, then they are asked to indicate when a round object 
moving in a circular path, in the same area as the adapting stimulus, passes 
between two markers. A fast moving adapting stimulus in the same 
direction as the test stimulus sped anticipatory actions, whilst slow moving 
adaptation in the same direction slowed anticipatory action. This result is 
down to changes in perceived motion after adaptation but not duration, as 
the fast adapting stimulus causes the round object to slow down and the 
slower adaptor causes it to speed up. Marinovic and Arnold (2012) conclude 
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that anticipatory action time and perceived visual duration have separate 
mechanisms to compute temporal measures as action timing changes in line 
with an increase in perceived speed but not perceived duration, showing 
that adaptation based duration compression is not carried over to timing of 
action.  
Another study (Tomassini, Gori, Burr, Sandini & Morrone, 2012), claims 
to show that duration compression of a tactile stimulus caused by 
adaptation to tactile motion disappears when participants make voluntary 
movements, suggesting that actions reset temporal biases induced by 
adaptation, which might be applicable to Marinovic and Arnold, (2012). 
This does not provide evidence that duration adaptation does not affect 
other mechanisms beyond the perception of duration itself, thus does not 
provide any insight into why adaptation to particular visual properties 
changes perceived duration. However, it does add further evidence against 
central clock models, as with a central, multimodal timer, distortions should 
be common across different modalities. 
 MIGHT DURATION COMPRESSION CAUSED BY 
ADAPTATION AFFECT VISUAL PROCESSES? 
If there is no effect on action timing, perhaps duration is used in 
mechanisms processing visual properties. This might also explain why 
adaptation to particular visual properties changes perceived duration as 
these changes might prove advantageous in creating a more informative 
percept of the environment. Such a process must be reasonably robust and 
have a temporal dependence. The Flash-Lag illusion, discovered by Mackay 
(1958), later rediscovered and quantified by Nijhawan (1994) is 
characterized by an erroneous perception of a moving object’s spatial 
position at the time of a brief visual event such as a flash. As such, it gives 
insight into mechanisms responsible for the perception of space and motion 
and their interactions. This erroneously perceived displacement increases 
with the moving object’s speed linearly within a certain range (Nijhawan, 
1994; Wojtach, Sung, Truong, & Purves, 2008). Dividing distance by speed 
gives a measurement of time, in the Flash-Lag illusion this temporal 
component is consistently measured at around 80ms and is fairly robust 
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(Durant & Johnston, 2004). So why does this effect exist? In the visual 
system, there is a delay of about 100ms between photons hitting the retina 
and perceptual awareness of the object reflecting the photons. Encoding and 
transmitting information about the object causes this delay (Nijhawan, 
2002). This presents the visual system with a problem if the object in 
question is moving as it moved to a new location in the world by the time 
the brain perceives it. This error is significant; for an object that is moving 
at a velocity of 20mph (~ 9ms-1) the error will be 90cm. As this is plainly not 
the case otherwise, actions like catching a ball would be impossible, the 
visual system must then have mechanisms to compensate for these 
perceptual errors. The Flash-Lag illusion can be interpreted in terms of such 
mechanisms and as it appears to be an illusion with a temporal component, 
it gives insight as to how estimates of time might be used in visual system. 
 WHAT CAUSES THE FLASH-LAG ILLUSION? 
There are a number of explanations for the Flash-Lag illusion, Nijhawan 
(1994) hypothesized that the erroneous offset in the Flash-Lag illusion is 
caused by motion extrapolation in the visual system. At the time of the flash 
the position of the moving object is extrapolated ahead in space, so what is 
perceived is a prediction of where the object is, not its physical position. 
Later, it was observed that motion after the flash, not before, generates the 
Flash-Lag illusion (Whitney & Murakami, 1998; Brenner & Smeets, 2000), 
debunking this, though alternative extrapolation models have been 
proposed (Khoei, Perrinet, & Masson, 2014) that account for this.  
Whitney and Murakami (1998) argue that each visual property (motion, 
colour etc.) has its own, largely autonomous and independent process for 
perception (Zeki & Bartels, 1998) in a ‘race to awareness’. So the percept 
that arrives first is perceived to happen the earliest,  in the case of Flash-Lag 
motion is processed faster than the flash. This latency difference 
explanation hinges upon a regress to a point of awareness at the process’ 
end-point, where the exact mechanism of racing to consciousness is left 
unexplained as discussed in Section 1.2.5. 
Krekelberg and Lappe (2000a) explain the Flash-Lag illusion as a 
positional averaging error, where the moving object’s position at the time of 
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the flash is computed by integrating position over a temporal window after 
the time of the flash. So the moving object’s perceived position is shifted 
along its motion trajectory.  
Eagleman and Sejnowski (2000) argue for a postdictive explanation of 
Flash-Lag whereby, the unexpected appearance of the flash causes the visual 
system to reset its predictions about visual objects. The perceived relative 
position of the moving object compared to the flash is computed using 
information about the moving object after the event, the appearance of a 
flash, to calculate what happened in the immediate past. This causes a shift 
in perceived position of the moving object, in a similar manner to the 
integration explanation.  
Each explanation uses time in some manner to explain the Flash-Lag 
effect, with either a temporal window (motion integration and postdiction), 
difference in processing time (latency delay), or predicting forward in time 
(extrapolation). 
 USING FLASH-LAG TO FIND A FUNCTIONAL ROLE 
FOR EXPLICIT DURATION 
There is little consensus as to the mechanism behind the Flash-Lag 
illusion (e.g. Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2007; Krekelberg & Lappe, 2000b; 
Patel, Ogmen, Bedell, & Sampath, 2000). However, one thing is clear. Each 
explanation (extrapolation, attentional shift, latency delay, integration) all 
agree that there is a temporal component of Flash-Lag. This is either the 
amount of time the bar is predicted forward in time, the amount of time 
taken to shift attention from one object to another, a difference in 
processing time of the two objects or a temporal window after the flash 
where the position is averaged in extrapolation, attentional shift, latency 
delay, integration respectively. This means if an adaptor, known to 
compress duration (e.g. 20Hz flicker), is presented before showing the 
Flash-Lag stimulus, this might have an effect on the time component of the 
Flash-Lag illusion.  
The obvious prediction from the literature would be that the Flash-Lag 
time component would shrink in line with the duration compression effects 
(Bruno & Johnston, 2010; Burr et al., 2007; Curran & Benton, 2012b; 
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Johnston et al., 2006). However, the position of a moving object has been 
reported to shift along its trajectory after 20Hz adaptation (Hogendoorn, 
Verstraten, & Johnston, 2010) so any effect of duration on Flash-Lag is not 
clear-cut. Evidence showing that a measure of duration is responsible for 
changing the Flash-Lag illusion would implicate explicit duration coding in 
motion and position computations within the visual system. This would 
show explicit duration estimation has a functional role outside of pure 
duration perception measures and must be encoded explicitly in the visual 
system. The next step would be to investigate how duration might be 
encoded in the visual system. 
 FURTHER MODELS OF DURATION PERCEPTION 
As the previous sections describe, there is a general trend in time 
perception research that indicates event duration is not computed by 
centralised clock mechanisms but is instead computed using a wide network 
of brain areas and represented in sensory systems alongside other visual 
properties across multiple stages in the their hierarchy. As such duration as 
computed in sensory systems is influenced by the stimulus properties 
(Alards-Tomalin et al., 2014) and functions such as adaptation (Johnston et 
al., 2006), attention (Mattes & Ulrich, 1998) and expectation (Pariyadath & 
Eagleman, 2007). Other models of duration perception have been proposed 
based upon this idea that duration is encoded as an emergent property of 
processing in sensory systems. Two of the more influential are the neural 
energy hypothesis (Eagleman & Pariyadath, 2009), whereby subjective time 
is encoded within one or more components of neural activity that correlate 
with perceived duration of an event and the use of state dependent networks 
to encode duration (Buonomano & Maass, 2009; Karmarkar & Buonomano, 
2007). Each of which shall now be discussed in more detail.  
36 
36 
 
 NEURAL ENERGY 
Arising from research on oddball durations (section 1.3.2), where an 
unexpected stimulus is perceived to last longer, and evidence showing a 
reduction in neurophysiological activity associated with expected versus 
unexpected events influenced the proposal made by (Eagleman & 
Pariyadath, 2009) that duration is encoded by the amount of neural activity 
associated with an particular event. Time, encoded in this way can be 
represented at any point in the visual system where a representation of a 
stimulus exists thus is encoded at multiple stages in the processing 
hierarchy. Such a framework aims to explain changes in perceived time 
caused by adaptation, as perceptual adaptation can broadly be considered to 
cause reductions in the firing rates of neural populations encoding a 
particular stimulus property.  
The neural energy hypothesis can also explain other effects of time 
perception, such as the shortest duration required between two flashes to 
perceived them as separate is larger than flicker fusion threshold in a 
stream of flashes (Herrick, 1974). This can be considered a manifestation of 
the oddball duration effect. As each individual flash in a stream is 
predictable, the duration of the flash in a sequence is reduced, leaving a 
larger perceived gap between them to make the separate flashes in a stream 
more easily discernible. The first flash in a pair of flashes does not exhibit a 
perceived reduction in each flash’s duration, as no expectation is created, so 
no reduction in perceived flash duration occurs.  
Other effects are explained in a similar manner to flicker fusion. These 
include the time shrinking effect, where a second stimulus is perceived to be 
shorter in duration than the first (Nakajima, Ten Hoopen, Hilkhuysen, & 
Sasaki, 1992), where the appearance of the first stimulus creates an 
expectation so the perceived duration of the second stimulus is reduced, 
similar to the debut effect in Pariyadath and Eagleman, (2007). The stopped 
clock illusion; where a second hand of a clock is perceived to linger longer 
than subsequent ticks (Yarrow, Haggard, Heal, Brown, & Rothwell, 2001), is 
also suggested as similar as the first ‘tick’ is perceived to last longer. 
Increases in magnitude of perceptual properties such as size, brightness and 
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numerosity are claimed by Eagleman and Pariyadath (2009) to correlate 
positively with perceived duration and result in increased neural activity.  
It has also been proposed that the properties of time, space and number 
are encoded using a common magnitude mechanism (Walsh, 2003) where 
magnitude is represented in the parietal cortex (Bueti & Walsh, 2009). This 
would help explain why properties such as time, size, brightness etc. would 
influence perception of each other. As Eagleman and Pariyadath, (2009) 
state, currently neural energy hypothesis has not yet been expressed as a 
formal model nor has a specific foundation in neurophysiology and as such 
needs further work to develop the hypothesis. 
 STATE DEPENDENT NETWORKS  
It has been proposed that temporal information can be encoded 
intrinsically in recurrent neural networks that exist everywhere in the brain, 
where the interconnectivity between the neurons in such a network means 
the response of the network to a particular input evolves over time 
(Buonomano & Merzenich, 1995). In such a network properties that change 
in response to the stimulus (e.g. spike rate), provide variables to encode 
information. Each variable is represented as a single dimension that 
combine to make up a multidimensional space where a single point within 
this space represents the combined state of each variable within the 
network. This network state is used to encode information. For example, 
there is one point in the network space that encodes input X and another for 
input Y so the network is able to discriminate between two types of input. 
The importance of the theory described in Buonomano and Merzenich 
(1995) is that they show a neural network made up of integrate and fire 
model neurons can discriminate between different durations separating two 
inputs i.e. there is a network state that encodes input X followed by input X 
100ms later and another where input X happens 200ms after the original. 
State dependent networks have been proposed as a general timing 
mechanism (Buonomano & Maass, 2009; Karmarkar & Buonomano, 2007). 
An important property of these state dependent networks is the inability 
for the network to switch instantly to its default resting state as, by their 
nature, they rely on the temporal dynamics of the network to encode 
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duration. This dependence on the initial state of the network prior to any 
input to code duration places limitations on this method of encoding time. 
Buonomano and Maass (2009) and Karmarkar and Buonomano (2007) 
show that this property is reflected in behaviour by demonstrating that the 
presence of a distractor appearing at unpredictable times increases 
variability in interval discrimination which does not occur when the 
distractor appears at a predictable time. This is predicted by state 
dependent network models as a distractor acts as additional input into the 
network and would therefore change the network state. In cases where the 
distractor appears at the same time, the state of the network changes in the 
same way every time, therefore the duration encoded is internally 
consistent. With an unpredictable distractor the network state alters 
differently upon each trial, therefore duration comparisons are less 
consistent. This property may also explain adaptation effects described in 
Section 1.3.1. The adapting stimulus changes the way a population of 
neurons responds to subsequent stimuli, affecting the state of the network 
and thus, perceived duration. In fact, any mechanism that changes how 
neurons respond to stimuli, such as attention, expectation and even the 
exact properties of the stimuli themselves could potentially affect perceived 
duration, so it is plausible that state dependent networks could be used to 
explain duration effects discussed in Section 1.3. 
State dependent models are a computationally efficient way of encoding 
duration within local networks of neurons responding to the same stimulus 
property in sensory systems and provide an intriguing alternative to central 
clock models. One problem is that computationally, they are almost too 
good. It may be possible, with sufficient training and optimisation of 
network parameters for state dependent networks to extract information 
about almost any property of the stimulus. Therefore, it may be difficult to 
falsify them, beyond the lack of an instant reset previously discussed. The 
fact that an unpredictable distractor increases variability in interval 
discrimination highlights a vulnerability in this type of encoding scheme as 
it demonstrates state dependent networks are sensitive to variations in 
input i.e. noise. Since noise exists at every level in sensory systems (Faisal et 
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al., 2008), this presents a serious limitation in these models, though this 
may be overcome with future modifications to the model. 
 A PREDICT AND COMPARE CLOCK 
Internal clocks (Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon et al., 1984; Treisman et al., 1990; 
Wearden, 1991) and event related clocks (Kanai et al., 2006) cannot explain 
the adaptation effects on perceived time described in Section 1.3.1. These 
adaptation effects implicate early visual mechanisms in the magnocellular 
pathway (Solomon et al., 2004). Johnston (2010) proposed a content 
dependent clock based upon the temporal filter properties of early visual 
neurons (Hess & Snowden, 1992; Johnston & Clifford, 1995) which contains 
at least two, possibly three temporal filter channels, one low pass and one or 
two band pass filters. Johnston (2010) describes how these filters can be 
used to predict the luminance of the current stimulus either backward or 
forward in time. A clock can be built by storing a forward prediction in time 
then cross correlating the stored component with the current visual input. 
When the cross correlation output peaks, this produces a ‘tick’, the ticks are 
counted by an accumulator to get a measure of duration. Adapting the band 
pass filter which peaks at around 15-20Hz using a 20Hz flickering adaptor 
Johnston et al., (2006) induces a phase shift in the output of the band-pass 
filter, equivalent in the model to magnocellular output (Benardete & 
Kaplan, 1999). This has the effect of shifting the forward prediction further 
along in time meaning it takes longer for the cross correlation between the 
predicted and current visual input to peak, leading a longer duration 
between each tick. Fewer ticks mean a shorter perceived duration, thus 
demonstrating how selectively adapting the magnocellular pathway might 
affect perceived duration.  
There are some unresolved stages in this model, such has how the 
forward prediction is stored, how the cross correlation peak is detected and 
where in the visual system these processes might be performed. This model 
does show how a clock mechanism can be built on top of other mechanisms 
and how adapting these mechanisms might change the functioning of a 
clock. Johnston (2010) also states that this type of predict and compare 
clock mechanism can exist outside the early visual system using other 
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mechanisms, so forms the basis for a distributed view of timing throughout 
the brain. As this makes use of predictive mechanisms, this means that 
prediction/expectation and time may be inseparably linked in the brain.  
 A POSSIBLE NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL SIGNATURE OF 
DURATION IN VISION 
Pariyadath and Eagleman (2012) argue that the temporal expansion of 
unpredictable events is related to the repetition suppression of BOLD 
signal, thus supporting the neural energy hypothesis - where subjective 
event time is represented in the brain by the amount of neural activity 
associated with a particular event. There are several proposed causes of 
repetition suppression. Fatigue: where neurons responsive to a stimulus 
monotonically reduce their response upon repeated presentations of the 
stimulus. Sharpening: where the neurons most responsive to a stimulus 
retain their response on repeated presentations but those moderately 
responsive become less so. Facilitation: neurons respond faster to stimulus 
repetitions initially producing a strong response that quickly reduces 
compared to the initial stimulus presentation. BOLD response has a 
temporal resolution of seconds, so it gives an average of neural response 
that, over time, is reduced for repeated stimuli. Both fatigue and sharpening 
are bottom-up processes that facilitate metabolically and computationally 
efficient processing, while facilitation is often framed in terms of predictive 
coding with the neuronal firing rate representing an error signal: the 
difference between bottom-up sensory input and top-down expectations. As 
repeated stimuli are expected, top down signals effectively cancel bottom up 
input (Grill-Spector et al., 2006). 
The hierarchical organisation of sensory systems with recurrent top-
down feedback to lower levels lends itself well to processes like facilitation 
listed here. Bottom up sensory signal from sense organs provide a driving 
input. At various stages in the hierarchy, the sensory signal is subject to 
processing so various properties of the environment can be explicitly 
represented within the system. These representations can be used to make 
predictions about future sensory input, which are fed back to lower levels in 
the hierarchy. One role of these lower stages is to compute the error 
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between the prediction from higher levels and the sensory input, which is 
fed forward to the higher levels. This error signal is used to update the 
representation of the world, so increasingly accurate predictions can be 
made in future.  
This process is formalised using empirical Bayes (Friston, 2005) and has 
been referred to as the free energy principle. The central claim regarding 
this is that one important, if not the most important role of neural systems 
is to construct accurate representations of the environment that minimise 
the amount of ‘free energy’, defined as the upper bound for the surprise 
(negative log probability), and so free energy can be considered the 
prediction error within the system (Friston, 2009, 2010). In summary, there 
are multiple viable theoretical explanations for repetition suppression 
positing both top-down and bottom-up mechanisms.  
Summerfield et al., (2008) investigate the nature of repetition 
suppression in an fMRI experiment, finding evidence for repetition 
suppression as an encoding of error signal. They present trials where two 
faces are shown. These faces are either two different images of the same 
person for (repeated trial) or images of two different people (different trial). 
These were shown in two separate blocks with different frequencies so that 
in one block repeated trials appeared more and the other different trials 
appeared more often. Additionally, depending on the block, the participant 
is cued to expect two of the same or two different faces. The BOLD signal, 
averaged across the fusiform face area (FFA) shows that repeated trials 
invoked a smaller response than different trials. In comparing BOLD 
response for the two trial types across blocks shows a decrease in BOLD 
when the trial type was expected relative to blocks where it was unexpected, 
showing evidence of an error signal.  
Larsson and Smith (2012) conducted a follow up fMRI study inducing 
suppression of BOLD by fMRI adaptation as well as repetition suppression 
through expectation, by repeatedly showing stimuli over four seconds to act 
as an adaptor. Furthermore, the experiment manipulates attention using a 
distractor. This study shows significant suppression across multiple visual 
areas in both conditions where attention is manipulated but shows 
significantly more suppression where attention is focused compared to 
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when attention is distracted. This implies that when attention is diverted the 
observed repetition suppression is a bottom-up effect, not the effect of 
repetition on expectation, and when participants attend to the task the 
repetition suppression is due to both bottom up adaptation and top down 
expectations, so multiple mechanisms contribute toward repetition 
suppression of BOLD in fMRI. This is an important finding as it shows the 
effect of expectation is task dependant and separable from low-level 
mechanisms. As the effects of stimulus specific adaptation and probability 
rule based expectation are separable it implies that there are at least two 
mechanisms that contribute to BOLD suppression, so it is possible that 
more than one, if not all of the mechanisms discussed by Grill-Spector et al., 
(2006) contribute to BOLD suppression. This has implications for the 
hypothesised link between repetition suppression and perceived duration: is 
the temporal expansion effect observed using the oddball paradigm due to 
bottom-up, top-down repetition suppression or both?  
The research already discussed in Section 1.3.2 indicates that top down 
suppression created by expectations is responsible for the temporal 
expansion effect in oddball. If the temporal expansion effect is associated 
with repetition suppression it must be repetition suppression induced by 
perceptual expectation, not adaptation. This provides a potential link 
between the effects of repetition suppression induced by expectation and 
perceived duration which if confirmed would show a neurophysiological 
signature of duration. The proposed mechanism for this is facilitation, 
where the reduction in BOLD for repeated stimuli is a reduced error signal 
which is the result of perceptual expectations being met.  
If it can be shown that duration is associated with repetition suppression 
of BOLD, it would also implicate particular predictive mechanisms in 
duration perception. Predictive mechanisms require a hierarchical system 
(Friston, 2005) with top-down feedback generating and passing down 
predictions as well as bottom-up sensory input. The effect of prolonged 
sensory input has been studied using adaptation (Section 1.3.1) effectively 
investigating the effect of bottom up input on perceived duration so the 
oddball paradigm and repetition suppression provides a method to 
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investigate the contribution of stages further up the hierarchy and top down 
feedback to duration perception. 
 SUMMARY 
Three questions have been highlighted in this review of the literature on 
time perception and will be investigated in this thesis. The first is do 
perceptual measures of duration have functional roles within the visual 
system? Secondly, how might neural systems encode duration? Finally, are 
there neurophysiological correlates of perceived duration in the visual 
system? Each of these questions shall require different paradigms to 
investigate. The functional role of duration in vision is explored using 
behavioural experiments using a visual adapter previously shown to 
compress perceived duration. A computational model is developed to show 
how neural systems might encode duration. The aim of this is to investigate 
if basic properties of neurons and neural systems can be used to encode 
duration in a distributed manner across sensory hierarchies and might exist 
in early sensory areas. Finally a study using both behavioural and fMRI 
experiments is performed to look for neural correlates of perceived 
duration. Overall, this thesis presents a multi-modal investigation of crucial 
questions in field of visual time perception and in particular the mechanism 
for encoding visual perception of time. 
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2.  CHAPTER TWO - CONTRASTING 
PSYCHOPHYSICAL METHODS FOR 
MEASURING DIFFERENCES IN THE FLASH-
LAG ILLUSION 
 INTRODUCTION 
A central finding of Johnston et al., (2006) is that the explicit perception 
of duration can be adapted separately from the perception of temporal 
frequency (TF), which may be interpreted as an implicit duration measure. 
Further experiments show that perceived duration is also affected by 
adapting to high contrast (Bruno & Johnston, 2010), luminance (Ayhan et 
al., 2009) and motion (Curran & Benton, 2012; Marinovic & Arnold, 2011), 
so explicit duration detectors must share common mechanisms with the 
encoding of these  visual properties. These mechanisms have been theorized 
to be localized in the Magnocellular pathway of LGN (Bruno & Johnston, 
2010; Johnston, 2010; Johnston et al., 2006) and dependent on contrast 
gain adaptation in M-cells (Solomon et al., 2004). Marinovic and Arnold 
(2011) show that adaptation to motion, which compresses perceived 
duration does not change action timings, so this adaptation and the 
resulting change in judgments of explicit duration does not have a 
functional role in guiding movements.  
The question asked in this and in Chapter 3 is why does explicit duration  
share common encoding mechanisms with these visual properties? I.e. is 
explicit duration used for further computations within the visual system or 
does it piggy back onto other mechanisms because it is not as important to 
have an accurate estimate of duration as other visual attributes? Perhaps, 
for the rare occasions when an explicit duration judgment is required, the 
visual system computes an estimate of duration from other visual properties 
thus, adaptation of these other properties also affects perceived duration.  
It was decided to examine this question using an effect known as the 
Flash-Lag illusion. This is characterized by an illusory displacement of a 
moving object’s position in the direction of motion relative to the position of 
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a flash (Nijhawan, 1994). When both the flash and a moving object are 
aligned exactly an observer perceives them to be misaligned, with the 
moving object positioned further along the direction of motion than it is in 
reality, this is shown in Figure 2-1. Note the object is moving in a linear path 
as opposed to circular path or rotating, which is often the case. The reasons 
for this are discussed later in Section 2.3. 
 
Figure 2-1: The Flash-Lag illusion. A flash (a) appears and the moving bar is perceived at 
(b) along the direction of motion (indicated by the arrow), when it is actually at (c) with an 
illusory displacement offset (d)that scales with the speed of the moving object. 
 
The proposed mechanisms that cause Flash-Lag are fiercely debated and 
are discussed previously in Section 1.5.1. As each involves a temporal 
component, for the purposes of this study the argument over which provides 
the best model of the Flash-Lag Illusion is moot. The objective is to see if 
adaptation induced duration compression changes this time component in 
some way that would indicate that perceived duration is used in other visual 
mechanisms.  
As Flash-Lag changes with object speed, it is likely that a change in 
perceived speed caused by TF adaptation (Hess & Snowden, 1992; Smith & 
Edgar, 1994) also affects the Flash-Lag illusion. Therefore, adapting to TF 
could change the Flash-Lag illusion irrespective of whether or not TF 
induced duration compression occurs, as TF adaptation changes perceived 
speed. It is necessary to measure the perceived change in speed in order to 
factor out its effect when measuring the effect of duration compression on 
Flash-Lag. Before conducting the experiment, it is important to show it is 
possible to separate the effects of adaptation on the Flash-Lag illusion, 
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which is demonstrated in Section 2.2. The rest of this chapter will detail the 
methodologies used to measure the Flash-Lag illusion, first examining 
different stimulus designs to test that they cause the observer to perceive a 
Flash-Lag effect comparable to previous reports in literature. This will then 
lead to a comparison of psychophysical techniques for efficiently evaluating 
the effects of adaptation on Flash-Lag. Once a suitable methodology has 
been established, this will be used in Chapter 3 to measure the effect of 
temporal frequency adaptation on Flash-Lag. 
  PREDICTING EFFECTS OF TEMPORAL FREQUENCY 
ADAPTATION ON FLASH-LAG 
Motion perception can be considered based upon two or three TF 
channels (Hess & Snowden, 1992; Smith & Edgar, 1994) where motion can 
be computed as a ratio of these channels (Smith & Edgar, 1994). Adaptation 
to a particular TF causes a relative reduction in sensitivity of one channel 
that has a repellent effect on perceived speed, so relatively faster moving 
objects are perceived to be even faster while slower objects are perceived to 
be slower still. As Flash-Lag is dependent on perceived speed of a moving 
object this means it is likely adaptation to TF will change the magnitude of 
the Flash-Lag illusion as well as any potential effects on the Flash-Lag time 
component. 
Johnston et al., (2006) show an effect on duration after 20Hz TF 
adaptation only and an effect on perceived TF after both 5 and 20Hz 
adaptation. Since this work is based upon the duration compression effect 
reported by Johnston et al., (2006) it makes sense to use the same 
adaptation conditions. From which arise several different possible 
scenarios. If there is an effect at 20Hz and not 5Hz, this suggests it is change 
in the temporal component of Flash-Lag, not perceived speed causing the 
observed effect. However, this is not conclusive as the null 5Hz effect could 
be an artefact of TF adaptation similar to Smith and Edgar (1994) where the 
TF of the adaptor and adapted stimulus are closely matched so there is little 
adaptation. Alternatively, if there is an effect at both 5 and 20Hz adaptation 
on Flash-Lag this might mean there are effects of both perceived duration 
and perceived speed. In both cases, there needs to be a second experiment 
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measuring the change in perceived speed so this can be factored out. If there 
is a significant difference in Flash-Lag after 20Hz adaptation and not 5Hz 
that cannot be explained by speed effects alone then this provides evidence 
of an effect of duration on the temporal component.  
It is possible to show this quantitatively. Taking the data from Johnston 
et al., (2006) it is possible to estimate the perceived speed and duration 
effects caused by TF adaptation on Flash-Lag by distance, speed, time 
relationships. Here, distance relates to the Flash-Lag illusion magnitude, 
speed is the speed of the moving object and time is the Flash-Lag time 
component. The results of Johnston et al., (2006) where 5Hz adaptation 
increases and 20Hz adaptation reduces perceived TF (Smith & Edgar, 1994) 
broadly predict 5Hz adaptation should increase Flash-Lag while 20Hz 
adaptation reduces it, assuming Flash-Lag is dependent on perceived speed. 
The duration compression caused by 20Hz TF adaptation would suggest 
that it should shorten this time component by approximately 25% as 
Johnston et al., (2006) report, leading to a reduction in Flash-Lag. The 
alternative possibility is that the temporal component of Flash-Lag expands 
after adaptation, which while counterintuitive to Johnston et al., (2006), is 
observed as an effect of 20Hz TF adaptation on the perceived position of a 
moving object during a study by Hogendoorn et al., (2010).  
Like speed, we can make predictions for the effect of adapting duration 
on Flash-Lag by using speed, distance, time equations, based on either 
duration compression or expansion. The time component of Flash-Lag is 
calculated by Distance/Speed using the same data as the speed prediction. If 
the effect of 20Hz adaptation on Flash-Lag is a compression of the temporal 
component, which reduces the Flash-Lag illusion, this is the same direction 
as the expected effect of the reduction in perceived speed caused by 
adaptation.  
Therefore, the goal of this experiment is to measure the effects of 5Hz 
and 20Hz adaptation on Flash-Lag and perceived speed then to compare the 
pattern of adaptation between the two measures in the adaptation 
conditions and a control condition. The predicted effects of these are shown 
in Figure 2-2. If there were a significant deviation between the two, this 
would be a suggestion that 20Hz TF adaptation is changing the time 
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component of Flash-Lag. TF adaptation has different effects on different 
speeds (Smith & Edgar, 1994). When adapting a particular speed using a 
particular TF, this might result in little change on perceived speed due to 
the TF of the adaptor being closely matched to the speed of the moving 
object. Thus, at least two speeds are required to observe a range of speed 
adaptations, whereas duration adaptation should remain the same. 
Figure 2-2: Data is taken from Wojtach et al, (2008). Predicted change in Flash-Lag caused 
by 5Hz and 20Hz adaptation. 5Hz adaptation is only expected to increase perceived speed 
of the moving bar, which should cause an increase in Flash-Lag magnitude as Flash-Lag 
scales with speed. 20Hz adaptation is expected to adapt speed but might adapt the time 
component of Flash-Lag also, causing either a compression or expansion effect. 
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 MEASURING FLASH-LAG: STIMULUS DESIGN 
The experiment requires a consistent and accurate measure of the Flash-
Lag illusion so the experimental stimulus must be designed and tested to 
make sure it produces a consistent, and large enough illusion. The aim of 
the experiment is to measure change in the time component of Flash-Lag 
after temporal frequency adaptation by measuring the magnitude of the 
Flash-Lag illusion. Based upon previous work (Johnston et al., 2006), it is 
anticipated that should there be an effect on the time component of Flash-
Lag that this will be a fractional reduction of the time component of 
approximately 25%. As Flash-Lag magnitude scales with speed, the faster 
the speed of the moving object the greater the magnitude of the Flash-Lag 
illusion, which would mean the larger any post-adaptation reduction of 
Flash-Lag would be in absolute terms. To measure a large Flash-Lag the 
stimulus needs to display the flash a large displacement away from the bar, 
so the experimental set up needs to accommodate this as well. 
However, we need to take into account an implication of Weber’s Law, a 
commonly reported property of sensory systems, that with increasing 
magnitude of a sensory property, errors in judgements also increase 
proportionally. For this experiment, it is likely there is a point where 
increasing speed of the moving object stops becoming helpful as the 
variability in participant responses will outweigh benefit from increases in 
the Flash-Lag magnitude for measuring any change in absolute Flash-Lag 
magnitude.  
The Flash-Lag illusion is robust and there exists a variety of different set-
ups that have been used successfully by a number of different researchers. 
In fact, there is evidence showing Flash-Lag is cross modal (Alias & Burr, 
2003). Some examples of common stimuli include a rotating bar with the 
flash appearing at opposite sides of the bar, the stimulus originally used by 
Nijhawan (1994) and other setups using rotating stimuli, such as the 
annulus and disk stimuli used by Eagleman and Senjowski (2000) produce 
reliable Flash-Lag illusions.  
These rotating stimuli do produce consistent Flash-Lag illusions and a 
rotating bar and flash setup was successfully used to investigate the 
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temporal nature of the Flash-Lag illusion (Durant & Johnston, 2004). These 
stimuli are limited in the Flash offsets that can be shown, and the speed of 
the moving object is limited (in Durant & Johnston, 2004 the speed at the 
outermost edge was 5.7°s-1) and are not suitable for the purposes of this 
experiment. So which set ups are best for measuring high speed Flash-Lag? 
Wojtach et al (2008) use a set up with mirrors and stimuli projected using 
lasers for very high spatial precision to measure Flash-Lag accurately at 
much higher speeds than previous experiments. We do not require the full 
range of speeds in  Wojtach et al (2008), but we will also use a linear, rather 
than rotating or circular bar path, this will allow a suitable range of offsets 
given the bar speed. The object path will be horizontal as, on a 4:3 ratio 
screen this is allows the longest path possible, required as we want to reduce 
the predictability of the flash and bar appearance points in space as 
predictability appears to reduce Flash-Lag magnitude (Namba & Baldo, 
2004; Murakami, 2001). Similar set ups have been used before to 
investigate whether Flash-Lag occurs because of motion before or after the 
Flash (Nijhawan 2001). This set up allows for a consistent retinal speed 
across the length of the bar and an offset that is measured in visual distance 
rather than the angle of the bar. In later versions, we will see that flash and 
bar can be presented at the same distance from fixation. Due to the need to 
find the best set up that provides a large Flash-Lag effect using a high object 
speed that does not show too much variability, the stimulus design needs to 
be developed and tested before the full experiment takes place.  
Another consideration for the final experiment is at least two speeds are 
required as TF adaptation has differing effects depending on the speed of 
the test object (Smith & Edgar, 1994). The possibility remains open that 
temporal frequency adaptation will have different effects on Flash-Lag 
depending on the speed of the moving object within the illusion. As 
discussed in Section 2.2 this could help tease apart any differing effects on 
the speed and the time component of Flash-Lag, so could prove useful. Or 
perhaps 20Hz temporal frequency adaptation, a stimulus that drives 
predominantly Magnocellular input (Xu et al, 2001) may have a greater, or 
exclusive effect on Flash-Lag using high speed stimuli that also drives 
Magnocellular response. The rest of this section is motivated by the need to 
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develop a stimulus set up that can produce a reliable and consistent Flash-
Lag illusion with a high speed moving object and decide upon which two (or 
more) speeds the final experiment will use. Once a suitable stimulus has 
been found it will be tested with an adaptor to check if it produces reliable 
pilot results with adaptation. Later on, this chapter will move on to 
investigating psychophysical techniques for measuring Flash-Lag and 
perceived speed in the most efficient, unbiased way.  
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 FIXED PARAMETERS 
Participants are required to fixate throughout the experiment upon a 
centrally positioned red circle (0.5° diameter) with a mid-grey background 
(63 cdm-2). Each trial consisted of a white moving bar of size 0.33 x 0.66°, 
luminance: 124 cdm-2 that appeared on one side of the screen and moved 
horizontally toward the opposite side (path length 8°). At a point along the 
bar’s trajectory a flash appeared (radius 0.33°, luminance: 124 cdm-2, 
duration time 10ms/1 frame) and the participants judged if the bar was to 
the left or right of the flash when the flash appeared, in a two alternative 
forced choice design. The exact position of the flash, relative to the bar 
varied according to a Method of Constants (MoC) procedure, randomly 
chosen one each trial within a range of -1.5 to 2° with 0.5° steps. The exact 
appearance and disappearance position of the bar and flash position on 
screen was randomly jittered 1° trial to trial, so that it was impossible to 
predict exactly when and where the flash would appear. This setup meant 
that the participant could not predict in advance of onset where the flash 
would appear and where the bar would be in relation to the flash, while 
keeping the flash and bar reasonably close to central fixation. It also 
separates the flash and moving object in space, as opposed to an annulus 
and disc configuration that might lead to perceptual grouping confounds. 
 MEASURING FLASH-LAG MAGNITUDE 
In this section, to measure the effect at each speed, each flash position is 
repeated multiple times (specified in each section), to generate a percentage 
judgment of where the participant perceived the bar to be relative to flash 
for each offset. A logistic psychometric function is fitted to these data where 
the 50% point is taken as the point of subjective equality (PSE), giving a 
measure of the illusion, whilst Section 2.4 details the use of adaptive 
methods to measure Flash-Lag. 
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 EQUIPMENT  
Stimuli were displayed on a linearized display Sony Trinitron monitor in 
a darkened room using a resolution of 800600 pixels and refresh rate of 
100Hz with a Cambridge Research Systems (CRS) ViSaGe system controlled 
by Mathworks MATLAB v7.5.0. Participants viewed stimuli with aid of a 
chinrest at a distance of 57cm from the screen, giving responses on a CRS 
CT6 remote button box with a CRS VET eye tracking system used to check 
fixation. Data analysis was performed using Mathworks MATLAB v7.5.0. 
Participants were the author and supervisor for initial piloting.  
 FIRST FLASH-LAG PILOT 
 
Figure 2-3: Stimuli for the first Flash-Lag pilot: a) shows central fixation and the appearance 
and disappearance positions (X) of the moving bar which are both jittered by 1°. B) shows 
the position of the flash relative to the moving bar, which is jittered by 2°.  
 
Figure 2-3 shows a diagram of the initial pilot stimuli used. The vertical 
centre of the bar is 2° above the centre of fixation and the vertical centre of 
the flash is 2° above that of the bar. Flash-Lag was measured for two speeds: 
9.1°s-1 and 18.2 °s-1, chosen as these speeds should elicit a measurable effect 
(approx. 0.75° and 1.5° respectively with a 80ms time component typical for 
the Flash-Lag illusion (e.g. Nijhawan, 1994; 2002; Wojtach et al., 2008)). 
The bar moved from right to left. Each Flash-Lag illusion measurement was 
carried out once to produce a single psychometric function. The results in 
Figure 2-4 show the psychometric functions for the two speeds measured 
for a single participant. Each function forms a sigmoid from 0 to 100% 
response rate, which demonstrates the participant is responding sensibly 
and the range of Flash-Lag offsets is suitable for the task. This was fitted 
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used the logistic function in Equation 2-1 (where the fitted function y is a 
function of the observed data x where α is PSE and β is slope) using a 
Newton-Gauss algorithm implemented by the MATLAB nlinfit function.  
Equation 2-1 
𝑦 =
1
1 + 𝑒
− 
𝑥−𝛼
𝛽
 
The first results with the author as observer are shown in Figure 2-4. The 
fitted function for the faster speed shows a shallower gradient, meaning 
there is more uncertainty in the judgments, which is expected at higher 
speeds due to Weber’s law. However, the PSEs (9.1°s-1: 0.3°, 18.2°s-1: 0.1°) 
for both show no effect or possibly a very small Flash-Lag at the slower 
speed. Much smaller than expected with a 80ms time constant (9.1°s-1: 
~0.75°, 18.2°s-1: ~1.5°). It is not possible to get an accurate estimate of 
Flash-Lag from a single measure from a single participant, but since this 
first attempt produces an effect that is much smaller than expected, it 
suggests the setup is not producing a strong illusion and not fulfilling the 
requirements laid out in Section 2.3, thus prompting changes in the 
stimulus.  
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Figure 2-4: Responses showing the position of the bar relative to the flash (negative 
means flash is positioned ahead of the bar) and responses indicating when the bar was 
judged ahead of the flash. Psychometric functions are shown for a single participant for two 
bar speeds 9.1°s-1 and 18.2°s-1. Both speeds show a barely distinguishable Flash-Lag that is 
much smaller than commonly reported. 
 SECOND FLASH-LAG PILOT: TWO DIRECTIONS OF 
MOTION 
The experiment is changed to show the bar in both right to left and left to 
right motion paths to avoid motion adaptation, which may have affected 
previous results. Bar direction is interleaved in each block and the offset 
range is increased to +/- 2° with 0.5° steps. Otherwise, the stimulus is the 
same as shown in Figure 2-3 and described in Sections 2.3, 2.3.3 and 2.3.1, 
except the start and end-points for right to left motion are reversed. Only 
the 18.2°s-1 condition is shown. The two main experimenters were the 
participants in this experiment. Figure 2-5 shows the shape of the 
psychometric function, indicating that the range is suitable. Only one of the 
two participants shows a Flash-Lag effect (participant 1:-0.5, participant 2 
shows a Flash-Lead of 0.3), though this is much smaller than expected 
(~1.5°), indicating that, further changes are required.  
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Figure 2-5 : Psychometric functions and for the mean and standard deviations (n=4) of 
the data collected plotted as the position of the bar at the time of the flash versus the 
percentage the bar is judged ahead of the flash for a particular offset where a shift toward the 
negative indicates a Flash-Lag illusion. a) Participant 1 shows a significant Flash-Lag effect, 
but smaller than expected. b) While participant 2 (right) shows no effect, if anything is 
exhibiting a slight Flash-Lead effect in the opposite direction to Flash-Lag. 
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 THIRD FLASH-LAG PILOT: CHANGING FLASH 
POSITION  
 
Figure 2-6: This shows the Flash-Lag stimulus design for the third Flash-Lag Pilot. a) The 
main change is the bar can now appear either side of fixation as marked using X. The distance 
the bar travels has increased to 20° from 8° and the jitter to 2° from 1°. b) shows bar and 
Flash with the Flash position jitter increased to 4° from 2°.  
 
A possible explanation for the previous results is that the current 
arrangement, where both the flash and bar appear on the same side of 
fixation, encourages the participant to track the bar or shift fixation above 
the fixation point. Tracking the moving object by smooth pursuit removes 
the Flash-Lag effect (Nijhawan, 2001). A saccade to above fixation could 
also modulate the Flash-Lag effect as saccades are reported to compress 
perceptions of time and space (Morrone et al., 2005). At this point, we had 
no eye tracking to confirm this so this was set up using a CRS eye tracker so 
gaze could be checked via visual inspection of the traces.  
A redesign of the stimulus overcomes this by having the flash and the bar 
on opposite sides of the fixation point instead of both above it (Figure 2-6). 
Therefore, the optimum strategy for the participant is to fixate in the centre 
to judge the position of both flash and bar equally well. A further change is 
the range of flash offsets which are set to +/- 4° and the bar path distance 
increased to 20°, with the start and end points jittered by 2° allowing 
greater speeds to be used to accommodate the larger Flash-Lag magnitude. 
 This set up will be tested for three different speeds 18.2, 27.3 and  
36.4°s-1. The aim of adding two faster speeds is to see if this will produce a 
larger Flash-Lag illusion. The side of fixation the bar appears on is 
randomly selected for each trial and counter-balanced. The centre of the 
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flash is now positioned 2 degrees vertically from the centre of fixation and 
each speed is now repeated for 12 trials so the four combinations of bar 
position (above or below fixation) and direction (left to right and right to 
left) are each shown 3 times. Other parameters are the same as Section 
2.3.5.  
The results are shown in Figure 2-7Error! Reference source not 
ound.. An increase in speed results in a shallower psychometric function 
slope to the point where the 36.4 °s-1 speed condition does not drop below 
30% ‘bar ahead of flash’ response rate indicating the range of offsets do not 
extend far enough. The results show the flash offsets are suitably set to 
measure the effect for the other two speeds. Naïve, less practiced 
participants may not have as steep a sinusoidal function as this so it would 
be prudent to extend the range of flash offsets. The PSEs for each speed 
(1.6°,2.0° and 2.8° for 18.2°s-1, 27.3°s-1, 36.4°s-1 respectively) demonstrate a 
Flash-Lag effect, which is comparable to the expected illusion magnitude in 
literature given an 80ms time component (1.5, 2.2, 2.9° for 18.2°s-1, 27.3°s-1, 
36.4°s-1 respectively). This is a statistically significant Flash-Lag as shown 
by one-sample t-tests (18.2°s-1: T3 = 22.266, p < 0.001. 27.3°s-1: T3 =11.166, 
p < 0.01. 36.4°s-1: T3 = 6.780, p < 0.01.). Flash-Lag is significantly different 
across the differing speeds, as shown by repeated measures ANOVA (F3, 6 = 
5.52, p < 0.05). Overall these data show this methodology can produce a 
robust Flash-Lag effect comparable with previous reports for all speeds and 
an accurate estimate of psychometric function for 18.2 and 27.3 °s-1 speeds 
thus, fulfilling some of the objectives set out in Section 2.3 and provides the 
basis for the Flash-Lag experiments carried out in this and Chapter 3.  
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Figure 2-7: Psychometric functions and standard deviations (n=4) showing percentage of trials 
the bar is judged ahead of the flash for the bar’s position relative to the flash. Both motion 
directions are collapsed, so a shift toward the negative indicates a Flash-Lag illusion. Each graph 
shows a different speed, which all show significant flash-lag effects. a) shows 18.2°s-1 speed, b) 
shows 27.3°s-1 speed and c) shows faster 36.4°s-1 speed.  
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 ADDING TEMPORAL FREQUENCY ADAPTATION 
Figure 2-8: This shows the Flash-Lag stimulus with an adapting stimulus a) the adaptor 
covering the whole width of the screen appears in both the 5Hz and 20Hz adaptation 
conditions but not the control b) Shows the positions the bar starts and stops in c) shows 
bar and Flash with the Flash position jitter.  
For measuring Flash-Lag with adaptation two changes were made, firstly 
the range of flash offsets was increased from 4 to 5° to make sure the full 
psychometric function is fully sampled and to shorten the experiment the 
number of repetitions is reduced to 8 and the flash offset step size is set to 
1°. To adapt the Flash-Lag stimulus a squarewave grating (2 cycles per ° of 
visual angle) with a sinusoidal counterphase luminance flicker (Luminance: 
41 - 82cdm-2, Michelson contrast: 0.333) is used. This is set as counterphase 
flickering to avoid luminance after-effects and squarewave to avoid areas 
where no luminance change occurs, and thus no adaptation. This is shown 
in Figure 2-8.  
Participants fixate as before and the grating appears centred in the 
middle of the screen on fixation for an initial 15s adaptation with 5s top up 
between trials to match Johnston et al., (2006). After adaptation, the Flash-
Lag stimuli appear as in Section 2.3.6. There are two adaptation conditions 
5Hz and 20Hz, making up three conditions altogether with the no 
adaptation control condition.  
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Figure 2-9: Shows measured Flash-Lag effects for two participants across all conditions. 
Flash-Lag magnitude is shown as a positive value, different to previous figures showing 
psychometric functions where a Flash-Lag is shown as negative. Bar grouping organised by 
speed. Both participants show similar changes because of adaptation with both 5 and 20Hz 
reducing Flash-Lag except participant 1 for 5Hz. 
 
Results of adaptation for two participants are shown in Figure 2-9. The 
Flash-Lag effect for both participants in the control condition compares well 
to that expected with a 80ms time constant (participant 1 18.2°s-1:1.6° 
27.3°s-1:2.0° participant 2 18.2°s-1:1.4° 27.3°s-1:2.1° and expected 18.2°s-1: 
~1.5 27.3°s-1: ~2.2). The pattern of change across the two participants shows 
adaptation reduces the magnitude of the Flash-Lag illusion with the 
exception of 5Hz adaptation at the 18.2°s-1 speed for participant 1. The effect 
of adaptation is significant for participant 1 across both speeds (18.2°s-1: F3, 6 
= 7.00, p < 0.05. 27.3°s-1: F3, 6 = 4.44, p < 0.05) but not participant 2 
(18.2°s-1: F3, 6 = 3.07, p =0.10. 27.3°s-1: F3, 6 = 0.78, p < 0.22). There are no 
significant contrasts, indicating it is a combination of the adaptation effects 
at both 5Hz and 20Hz causing the significant difference for participant 1. 
These data show two things. First, there is some indication of an effect of 
adaptation on Flash-Lag as shown by the significant results for participant 
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1, however though participant 2 shows similar trends in the results these are 
not significant, meaning that any effect on Flash-Lag may only be 
observable across a group.  
Table 2-1: Shows the results from Section 2.3.7 using MoCs to measure the Flash-Lag 
illusion 
PPT 1 2 
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 MEASURING FLASH-LAG: ADAPTIVE METHODS TO 
MEASURE EFFECT SIZE 
The problem with the experiment so far is that to measure Flash-Lag 
across a range of speeds with TF induced flicker it will take 1 - 1.5 hours per 
condition, totalling up to 9 hours for the Flash-Lag experiment, depending 
on the number of flash offsets and repetitions required. This is not a 
reasonable demand on participant’s time. An adaptive psychophysical 
method would reduce the number of trials the experiment requires. In this 
section, we test two adaptive methods: the Psi method and a simple 
up/down staircase as well as bootstrapping a single psychometric function 
to test if errors can be estimated rather than measured.  
The Psi method (Kontsevich & Tyler, 1999) uses a range of pre-defined 
psychometric functions as a Bayesian Prior and indicates the likelihood that 
each function matches the real psychometric function. It chooses the 
independent variable value that is estimated to most reduce the entropy, 
and thus be most informative for the next trial estimating the function. It 
can accurately measure the PSE within 60 trials (MoC: 288) making it 
possible to measure Flash-Lag for all conditions in under two hours.  
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To determine the correct prior and the overall suitability of the Psi 
method it must be tested to see if it converges on a similar PSE to MoC. A 
psychometric function fitted to method-of-constants stimulus data is used 
to generate responses (with a 5% guess rate) input into the Psi method 
algorithms to estimate the PSE. This estimate can be compared to the MoC 
estimate testing if the Psi method can theoretically provide comparable 
estimates of Flash-Lag. Participant 1’s control measure psychometric 
functions are used to test the Psi method, the results of which are shown in 
Figure 2-10. The Psi method prior consists of a range of logistic functions 
(Equation 2-1) with PSEs ranging between -4° to 4° in 0.5° steps and a 
gradient range set as 0° to 32° with steps of 4°.  
Upon visual inspection of the Psi method estimate plots (Figure 2-10), 
they converge upon the experimental PSE within 30 trials (estimates, 
18.2°s-1: 1.63° 27.3°s-1: 2.07° actual, 18.2°s-1: 1.6° 27.3°s-1: 2.0°) and 
remained stable throughout. The entropy, a measure of uncertainty in the 
PSE estimate, also showed an overall decrease, indicating the algorithm was 
able to measure PSE with increasing accuracy with more trials. This is also 
observed in the standard error of the PSE estimate, which decreases with 
increasing number of trials. This demonstrates that with a simulated 
observer producing responses based upon experimental data the Psi method 
produces an accurate measure of the Flash-Lag illusion. 
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Figure 2-10: Flash-Lag estimates using Psi method for a simulated participant using MoC 
data for two speed conditions. Black lines show estimates from the Psi algorithm with 
dashed showing the MoC PSE. Blue shows the error estimate. Green shows the estimate 
entropy with red circles showing the flash-offset shown chosen by the algorithm. Both show 
convergence of the estimated PSE with the MoC PSE and a reduction in the error estimates 
and entropy. 
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 PSI METHOD: MEASURING THE FLASH-LAG ILLUSION 
Using the same experimental set up as Section 2.3.7, Flash-Lag is 
measured for two speeds, 18.2°s-1 and 27.3°s-1, across three adaptation 
conditions, control, 5Hz and 20Hz adaptation for a single participant 
(author). The Psi method is implemented as before, with the exception that 
the number of trials is reduced to 30 and instead of one, two are run 
concurrently and randomly interleaved. With a single estimate, it is not 
possible to know if the Psi method is accurate or if it has found a local 
minimum in the error of the PSE estimate, so does not accurately estimate 
the PSE. Using two concurrent PSE estimates reduces this problem. If both 
PSE estimates differ drastically, this is indicative of one or both estimates 
representing a local minimum. The final estimate of Flash-Lag magnitude is 
given as an average between the two PSEs and the standard deviation 
computed as the square root of the sum of the estimated variance from both 
measures.  
Figure 2-11 : Shows estimates of the Flash-Lag effect measured by the Psi function. 
Bars are grouped by speed and coloured to indicate the adaptation condition. Error bars 
show the mean standard deviation calculated by the root of the squared variance estimate 
for each Psi method estimate for each condition 
  
Shown in Figure 2-11, the control condition, the PSI method estimates 
Flash-Lag to be 1.45° for the slow speed and 2.49° for the faster speed. 
Comparing this to the MoC measures (1.5° and 2.0° for slow and fast speed 
respectively) shows that for the slower speed both methods give similar 
estimates, the MoC estimate is within one standard deviation of the Psi 
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estimate. The Psi Flash-Lag estimates scale with speed as expected, so this 
appears to be a good measure of Flash-Lag, despite the slight difference 
with method of constant stimulus estimates.  
The adaptation conditions however, show a different pattern to that 
observed in method of constant stimuli. 20Hz adaptation at the faster speed 
reduces Flash-Lag in line with the MoC estimates but shows the opposite 
trend for the slower speed, indicating an increase in Flash-Lag. However, in 
both the MoC and Psi results the error bars of both the control and 
adaptation conditions overlap indicating there is not much difference 
between the two conditions. Examining the two separate Psi method 
estimates for each condition shows that for the 18.2°s-1 control, 20Hz and 
27.3°s-1 20Hz give quite different estimates (Table 2-2). Such that when 
comparing to the MoC results in Table 2-1, three of the estimate pairs in 
Table 2-2 exceed the largest standard deviation across all conditions for 
both participants in Table 2-1. 
Table 2-2: Shows the estimated Flash-Lag effect for each concurrent run (labelled 1 and 
2) of the psi method for each speed and adaptation condition for a single participant. 
Speed 
18.2°s-1 27.3°s-1 
Psi Measure 1 2 1 2 
Control 1.86° 0.99° 2.62° 2.35° 
5Hz 1.76° 1.97° 2.02° 2.28 
20Hz 2.50° 1.66° 3.61° 0.22° 
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 RANDOMISING FLASH OFFSET WITH THE PSI METHOD 
The results described in the previous section are not due to the Psi 
method failing to converge, although this convergence is less meaningful 
when the two estimates differ greatly. Instead, methodological differences 
between the Psi and MoC might cause this. MoC displays a wider range of 
flash offsets in than the Psi method and in a random order. The Psi 
algorithm uses a greedy search to find local minima in choosing the next 
independent variable. This assumes moving from one local minima to the 
next is a sensible trajectory to find the global minima, which might not be 
true. Selecting the offset of the flash for half the trials at random so it 
samples across the entire search space could help solve this and by 
introducing more randomness into the experimental stimuli this would 
reduce any effect of predictable offsets on the participants’ perception 
and/or responses.  
The stimuli used for this experiment are as before in Section 2.3.5 with 
two speeds and only Flash-Lag in the control condition measured for a 
single participant. The number of trials in each Psi estimate increased to 40 
with half chosen at random from +/- 4° according to a uniform distribution 
and half chosen from the Psi algorithm.  
Figure 2-12: Shows Flash-Lag estimates using the Psi method for two speeds with no 
adaptation with 50% of the Flash offsets chosen at random rather than the PSI algorithm. 
This shows a smaller Flash-Lag with the faster speed, opposite to what is expected. Error 
bars show the mean standard deviation calculated by the root of the summed variance 
estimates for each Psi method estimate for each condition.  
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Figure 2-12 shows for the slower speed both estimates converge on 
similar PSE estimates though, this is larger than the estimate from MoC 
(Psi: 2.8°, Constants: 1.5°). For the faster speed the two estimates do not 
give comparable PSE estimates despite the estimate for each individual Psi 
algorithm estimate converging. One even measures a Flash-Lead as opposed 
to a Flash-Lag effect (Table 2-3).  
This could be due to the non-informative points delaying the conversion 
towards an estimate and can be fixed with more trials though this would 
defeat the point of using the Psi method in the first place. Adding random 
flash offsets does not improve the Psi method for measuring Flash-Lag even 
though the Psi method is probably not drawn to mistaking local points of 
minimum error for the PSE estimate. 
Table 2-3: Shows the estimated Flash-Lag effect for each concurrent run of the psi 
method for two speed conditions for a single participant. 
Speed 
18.2°s-1 27.3°s-1 
Psi Measure 1 2 1 2 
PSE 
estimate 
3.10° 2.57° -0.35° 2.09° 
 MEASURING FLASH-LAG WITH A SIMPLE STAIRCASE 
To test if the inconsistent estimates using the Psi method are an artefact 
of the particular algorithm or something we find with other adaptive 
algorithms,  a simple up/down staircase is tested here. To check if a 
staircase works in theory, two staircases are used to estimate the PSE of 
response from a simulated participant set up before as in Section 2.3.  
Both staircases choose flash offsets from +/- 4° with 1° steps for 30 trials 
each and are randomly interleaved starting at each extreme. PSE and error 
estimates for each staircase are taken as mean and standard deviation of the 
last five reversals. The final PSE estimate is the mean PSE from the two 
staircases and error given as the square root of the sum of the variance from 
each staircase computed from the last five reversals. Figure 2-13 shows that 
both staircases converge upon the MoC data PSE indicating an accurate 
measure of Flash-Lag. 
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Figure 2-13: Flash-Lag magnitude estimate by staircase with simulated responses from 
method of constant stimulus data. x and o show the flash offsets chosen by each staircase 
starting at the minimum and maximum flash offsets respectively. Dark grey line shows the 
PSE as measured using method of constant stimulus while the light grey line shows the 
staircase PSE estimate as taken by the mean of the two staircases estimates. Each staircase 
estimate is computed from the mean of the flash-offsets at the last five reversals. Both 
staircases converge and the PSE estimate closely matches that of MoC. 
 
There were some changes made to the staircase setup for the experiment 
compared to the stimulations. The range was increased from + /- 4° to +/- 5° 
and step sizes reduced to 0.5°, and the number of trials increased to 32 to 
show the same number of trials with each bar position (above or below 
fixation) and direction (left or right motion) combination.  
These results are shown in Figure 2-14 and Table 2-4 for two bar speeds 
(18.2 and 27.3°s-1). The estimated Flash-Lag magnitude for the slower speed 
is 1.9°, larger than the MoC estimate 1.4°, with the faster Flash-Lag estimate 
of 2.0° matching the MoC estimate at 2.0°. There is no real difference 
between the faster and slower speed Flash-Lag estimates. This is not 
expected considering Flash-Lag scales with speed in the literature and is a 
concern. In addition, the staircases for the slower speed do not converge on 
similar estimates, listed in Table 2-1. These experiments are piloting checks 
on the experimental methodology, limiting any interpretation of these 
results. These results show neither Psi nor staircase method provide a 
constant measure of Flash-Lag, comparable with the literature with the 
setup here.  
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Figure 2-14: Shows Flash-Lag estimates using staircases for two speeds with no 
adaptation. There is little difference in Flash-Lag estimate for the two speeds where it is 
expected that Flash-Lag scales with perceived speed. Error bars show the mean standard 
deviation calculated by the root of the squared variance estimate for each staircase estimate 
for each condition 
 
Table 2-4: Shows the estimated Flash-lag effect for each concurrent staircase run 
(labelled 1 and 2) for two speed conditions for a single participant. 
Speed 
18.2°s-1 27.3°s-1 
Staircase 
Measure 
1 2 1 2 
 PSE 
Estimate 
0.90° 2.90° 2.1° 1.8° 
 BOOTSTRAPPING ERRORS FROM A SINGLE 
PSYCHOMETRIC FUNCTION 
The problem of how to reduce effectively the number of trials and 
therefore, time required for this experiment remains. MoC was the only 
method that measured the Flash-Lag effect consistently (in line with the 
literature) and accurately (with approximately similar results from multiple 
estimations) with the setup used here. Instead of four repetitions per 
measure, the procedure is performed once and individual error bars are 
estimated using bootstrapping. 
Bootstrapping takes the fitted psychometric function and generates 
multiple data sets from the function, i.e. simulating multiple experiments 
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based upon the original psychometric function. The PSE is estimated for 
each experiment simulation and a Gaussian function is fitted to the 
distribution of PSEs for all simulations(N=500), with the PSE and slope as 
free variables and error rate fixed at 0%. The standard deviation of the 
Gaussian fit is taken as an indication of the PSE estimate’s accuracy. We test 
the bootstrapped standard deviations by comparing them to those 
computed from running Method of Constant Stimulus four times. These are 
shown in Table 2-5. 
 Overall there is no significant difference between standard deviations 
estimated from bootstrapping (Participant 1; T5 = -2.08, p = 0.092. 
Participant 2; T5 = 0.65, p = 0.545), this means bootstrapped standard 
deviations provide a sensible estimate of error for the Flash-Lag effect. The 
best way to measure Flash-Lag efficiently is collecting data to fit a single 
psychometric function and using bootstrapped standard deviations as 
measures of individual error.  
Table 2-5: Shows the standard deviations of Flash-Lag effect measures from MoC 
compared to bootstrapped estimates (N=500) for two participants.  
Speed 
Adaptation 
condition 
Participant 1 Participant 2 
Bootstrap 
estimate (°) 
MoCs 
estimate 
(°) 
Bootstrap 
estimate (°) 
MoCs 
estimate 
(°) 
 
18.2°s-1 
Control .18 .15 .28 .30 
5Hz .38 .37 .28 .26 
20Hz .34 .50 .29 .23 
 
27.3°s-1 
Control .25 .36 .35 .19 
5Hz .41 .60 .33 .52 
20Hz .46 .52 .28 .10 
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 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This chapter demonstrates how it is possible to measure a Flash-Lag 
effect with a stimulus moving at high speed, and of a magnitude comparable 
with that found in literature with the typically recorded ~80ms time 
component. Initially there were problems, hypothesised as caused by 
adaptation to motion and/or uninstructed eye movements. However, it is 
not possible to confirm this without further measurements. The final 
stimulus design avoids these possible issues by randomly selecting half the 
trials to have the opposite direction of motion and designing the stimuli so 
that fixating upon the central point is the optimum viewing strategy for this 
experiment. It is worth bearing in mind for any experiment requiring visual 
fixation, to, where possible, design the stimuli so that fixating is the sensible 
option to perform the task. Overall, the method of measuring Flash-Lag 
presented here provides a good basis for further experiments in Chapter 3 
investigating the effect of temporal frequency adaptation on the Flash-Lag 
illusion. The two established adaptive methods tested here: a simple 
staircase and Psi method in practice yielded less reliable results. This is 
unexpected as both methods are theoretically able to measure accurately the 
Flash-Lag effect when simulating responses from the MoC data and both 
methods converge as expected on an estimate, but two concurrent staircases 
or Psi algorithms converge on different estimates when used 
experimentally. That the adaptive methods appear to work as expected 
when simulating responses from experimental data might imply that the 
participant responses shown here were affected by the distribution of offsets 
shown. In both adaptive methods, the tendency is to show flash offsets 
across a small range as the estimate converges compared to MoC, which 
shows offsets from a wide range. An explanation for this is the adaptive 
methods affect participant perceptions of Flash-Lag by showing only offsets 
from a small range thus the distance between bar and flash on a particular 
trial is more predictable. This could result in a response bias or it could be 
that the Flash-Lag illusion is affected by the predictable nature of the 
stimuli. There is experimental evidence showing Flash-Lag changes based 
on the predictability of stimulus, (Namba & Baldo ,2004; Krekelberg & 
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Lappe, 2000b; Murakami, 2001) but as the results presented here are 
preliminary at best, this needs to be demonstrated by further experiments. 
Currently, it is more prudent to presume that adaptive methods struggle 
with measuring an accurate Flash-Lag illusion at higher speeds as 
participant responses tend to be more variable, which would provide a more 
straightforward explanation for the results here.  
 CONCLUSION  
It is possible to measure a Flash-Lag illusion with a high object speed 
moving in a linear path reasonably consistently using a method of constants 
stimulus. For stimuli design, it is hypothesised that adaptation to motion 
and unwanted eye movements are factors that might prevent an accurate 
measure of Flash-Lag. We also show that method of constants stimuli 
provides a more consistent measure of Flash-Lag with a high-speed object 
than adaptive techniques for estimating PSE. The stimulus set up developed 
in this chapter can form the basis of future experiments using the Flash-Lag 
illusion with higher speed stimuli than has been typically used in other 
studies. 
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3. CHAPTER THREE - HIGH TEMPORAL 
FREQUENCY ADAPTATION COMPRESSES 
TIME IN THE FLASH-LAG ILLUSION 
 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter details experimental data demonstrating how a 
Flash-Lag effect can be measured, giving consistent results comparable to 
previous findings. This chapter builds upon this work investigating whether 
adapting to visual stimuli shown to compress perceived duration can also 
affect the Flash-Lag illusion. Research shows that the perceived duration of 
visual events is compressed in specific spatial locations after adapting to 
properties of visual stimuli in those locations. Such properties include 
temporal frequency (TF) (Burr et al., 2007; Johnston et al., 2006), contrast 
gain (Bruno & Johnston, 2010) and motion (Curran & Benton, 2012; 
Marinovic & Arnold, 2011). These findings indicate that the visual system 
computes event duration based upon localized low-level visual properties 
and perceived duration is malleable in a spatially specific manner. One 
question that arises from this is does this effect of adaptation on perceived 
duration have other effects or is it simply a pure duration effect.  
Investigating whether this duration mechanism has a functional role 
Marinovic and Arnold, (2011) find compressing perceived visual duration 
does not affect action timing, concluding there must be separate timing 
mechanisms responsible for vision and action. We ask a similar question by 
exploring if duration perception has a functional role in the visual 
perception of space and motion. To do this, the study measures the effect of 
20Hz TF adaptation, shown to compress perceived duration (Johnston et 
al., 2006) on the Flash-Lag illusion where an observer views an object 
moving on a predictable path, perceiving the object displaced further along 
its motion path relative to a spatially localized flash. The Flash-Lag induced 
displacement can be described as increasing in proportion to object speed 
(Nijhawan, 1994). Although Wojtach et al., (2008) found a nonlinear 
relationship when extending the tested range over faster speeds, over the 
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range 10°/s - 40°/s a linear relationship provides a good approximation. 
This linear relationship can be expressed as perceiving the bar advanced by 
a fixed amount of time relative to the flash (Durant & Johnston, 2004), i.e. 
the same time travelled at a higher speed leads to larger displacement.  
Flash-Lag is often explained as an artefact arising from perceptual 
mechanisms compensating for delays in processing position of moving 
objects (Nijhawan, 2002). Delays in visual processing, e.g.: Retina -
(Shapley, Kaplan, & Soodak, 1981) and V1 -(Maunsell & Gibson, 1992) pose 
a problem for estimating positon of objects in motion as by the time object 
position has been computed, the object has moved to a new position, 
meaning the visual representation of the environment is out of date. This 
delay is thought to be approximately 72ms for V1 neurons (Lamme & 
Roelfsema, 2000), so it is proposed that the visual system has developed 
compensatory mechanisms, otherwise interaction with moving objects 
would be prohibitively difficult. For example, a delay of 72ms means an 
object travelling at 30kph would result in a perceived positional error of 
60cm. This is why according to the extrapolation explanation of Flash-Lag 
the flash apparently lags behind the moving object as the position of the 
moving object is shifted along its motion path in the direction of travel by 
the visual system to compensate for delays.  
However there is little consensus as to whether such mechanisms lie 
behind this ‘lag’. Evidence showing Flash-Lag illusion is affected by motion 
after, not before the flash (Brenner & Smeets, 2000) suggests it is not a 
result of motion extrapolation, thus, others have proposed different 
mechanisms. Whitney and Murakami (1998) claim Flash-Lag is down to 
differences in processing speed between the flash and moving object so the 
moving object reaches a perceptual end point earlier than the flash creating 
the misalignment, a specific example of micro-consciousness (Zeki & 
Bartels, 1999). Two other explanations, motion integration (Krekelberg & 
Lappe, 2000a) and postdiction (Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000; Eagleman & 
Sejnowski, 2007), both focus on the fact that motion after the flash 
continues to influence the illusion. Motion integration suggests that the 
position of the moving object is perceived as an average computed over a 
temporal window after the flash, so results in the shift observed in Flash-
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Lag. Eagleman and Sejnowski (2000) apply a postdiction mechanism, 
similar to those used to explain effects such as colour-phi ( a version of 
another motion illusion with a colour change) by Kolers and von Grunau 
(1976) and visual masking (Bachmann, 1989). This posits the visual system 
estimates position based upon expected events and when an unexpected 
event occurs, the visual system resets expectations, discarding information 
before the unexpected event and estimates the position of the bar at the 
time of the flash post-hoc, using motion after the flash only. This biases 
perceived position along the motion path of the moving object, creating the 
perceived offset.  
All these proposed mechanisms use a temporal component. 
Extrapolation; how far ahead in time the moving object position is 
estimated, neural delays; difference in latency between moving and 
stationary objects, integration and postdiction; the size of the temporal 
window used for averaging the object position. Therefore, it is not necessary 
to know or make any claim as to which of these is the best explanation as 
any effect of duration adaptation on Flash-Lag can be accommodated by all 
these explanations.  
One interesting suggestion from the pilot data from the previous chapter 
is that the Flash-Lag effect may be affected by the distribution of the relative 
spatial displacements between flash and moving object experienced over a 
period, such that, to measure reliably a Flash-Lag illusion, a wide range of 
spatial displacements is required across experimental trials. One feature of a 
wider range of displacements, as opposed to a narrow one is that the 
position of the flash is less predictable on a trial-to-trial basis. Stimulus 
predictability has been shown to change perception of time, such that 
predictable events are perceived shorter than unpredictable events 
(Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2007; Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2012; Schindel et 
al., 2011). Flash-Lag is reliably measured only with a wider, random 
distribution of displacements so trial-to-trial predictability is low. An 
unpredictable stimulus is perceived to last longer so one prediction from the 
research showing this is that if the time component of Flash-Lag and 
perceived event duration are linked, it could be that Flash-Lag is easier to 
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observe, the less predictable the stimulus, similar to findings made by 
(Murakami, 2001).  
Hogendoorn et al., (2010) indirectly investigated the same question using 
a paradigm reliant on the presentation of several moving clock faces, one of 
which was cued at a given time point, with participants reporting the 
position of the clock hand at the cued time. The perceived positions were 
compared with and without flicker adaptation. Although they never 
explicitly report the size of the Flash-Lag effect, from their results we can 
infer an increased temporal component – in the opposite direction to what 
we would hypothesize, as high temporal frequency adaptation compresses 
duration (Johnston et al., 2006), so would be expected to reduce the 
temporal component.  
Our work aims to investigate this further by using the simplest form of 
the Flash-Lag effect and reducing it to a purely perceptual question of 
perceived alignment, removing any possible effect of shifting attention to 
the cued clock and reducing reliance on memory to judge position. 
Furthermore, by comparing the effect of adaptation on two speeds we can 
build a fuller description of the specific effect of flicker adaptation on the 
Flash-Lag illusion. High TF adaptation also reduces perceived speed 
(Hammett, Thompson, & Bedingham, 2000; Johnston et al., 2006; Smith & 
Edgar, 1994; Thompson, 1983), which could also reduce the Flash-Lag effect 
if it is dependent on perceived speed, thus the effect of perceived speed must 
be ruled out to infer direct duration adaptation, as in the Hogendoorn et al., 
(2010) study. Therefore, this study contains two main experiments, one 
measuring the effect of low and high TF adaptation on the Flash-Lag 
illusion and a second measuring the effect of low and high TF adaptation on 
the perceived speed of the moving object. Additionally we run a control 
experiment to verify that temporal duration compression has been induced 
in our stimulus set up. We find change in perceived speed cannot fully 
explain the change in Flash-Lag, concluding that TF adaptation compresses 
the Flash-Lag time component. This chapter is adapted from an article by 
Rowland and Durant (2014). 
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 MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 PARTICIPANTS AND EQUIPMENT 
The same six participants (authors ER and SD with four naive 
participants) with normal or corrected to normal visual acuity participated 
in Flash-Lag and speed experiments. An internal ethics board granted 
approval to perform this experiment in accordance with guidelines from the 
British Psychological Society, which follows the declaration of Helsinki. 
Stimuli were displayed on a linearized display Sony Trinitron monitor in a 
darkened room using a resolution of 800600 and refresh rate of 100Hz 
with a Cambridge Research Systems (CRS) ViSaGe system controlled by 
Mathworks MATLAB v7.5.0. Participants viewed stimuli with aid of a 
chinrest at a distance of 57cm from the screen, giving responses on a CRS 
CT6 remote button box with a CRS VET eye tracking system used to check 
fixation. Data analysis was performed using Mathworks MATLAB v7.5.0 
with the Palamedes toolbox (Kingdom & Prins, 2009) used for 
bootstrapping  
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 FLASH-LAG EXPERIMENT PROCEDURE 
Figure 3-1: Stimulus diagrams. Frame a) shows adaptation phase, common to all 
conditions except the Flash-Lag control and duration experiment. Frames b) and c) 
show the Flash-Lag condition. In b) the bar appears at one of four crosses positioned 
10° horizontally and 2° vertically from fixation, marking the points where the bar may 
appear on a particular trial before moving toward the opposite cross and disappearing. 
The appearance and disappearance position is chosen randomly on each trial with a 2° 
horizontal jitter. Frame c) shows the bar below and flash above fixation. The flash 
appears on the opposite side of fixation to the bar randomly jittered 4° horizontally 
about fixation for each trial. The centre of the flash is positioned 2° from the centre of 
fixation. Frames d) and e) show the speed condition with d) showing the positioning 
of the bars where the standard bar appears at one of two points 8° horizontally and 2° 
above from fixation with the comparison bar again appears at one of two points 11° 
below and 8° horizontally from fixation. Similar to Flash-Lag the appearance and 
disappearance of each bar is jittered by 4°. Both bars are shown in e), they appear at 
diagonally opposite locations so move in opposite directions. f) shows the adaptor for 
the duration experiment. g) shows positions of bars, the top two crosses and associated 
arrows give the position and jitter for the standard bar of duration 600ms for the high 
and low speed condition in the form low||high. The bottom two crosses and arrows 
give the position and jitter for the comparison bar, the distances vary depending on 
speed and duration of the comparison in the form min-max. h) shows the two bars 
moving in opposite directions. 
80 
80 
 
The methods for this experiment are similar to those described in 
Chapter 2, section 2.5. Participants fixate on a centrally positioned red circle 
(0.5° diameter) with a mid-grey background (63 cdm-2). In the 5Hz and 
20Hz conditions, an adapting square-wave grating (36.4° x 6°, spatial 
frequency 2 cycles/degree - chosen to lie within a detectable range, allowing 
for many cycles to be displayed and it also approximates bar width) appears 
centred on screen (Figure 3-1a), counter-phase flickering in a sinusoidal 
temporal pattern (Luminance: 41 - 82cdm-2, Michelson contrast: 0.333). 
For the control, no adapting grating was shown. A white (124 cdm-2) 
horizontally moving bar (0.33° x 0.67°) appears in one of four points , either 
2° above/below fixation and 10° left/right of fixation and moves toward 
fixation (all measurements are to the centre of the bar). The bar appeared 
~0.6s after the adaptor with the exact appearance and disappearance 
positions are jittered +/- 1° trial-to-trial (Figure 3-1b). At a point along the 
bar’s trajectory, a white circular flash (diameter: 0.33°) appears (10ms, 1 
frame) vertically on the opposite side to the bar, 2° away from fixation, 
horizontally jittered +/- 2° from fixation (Figure 3-1c) and the bar continues 
to move until reaching the horizontally opposite side of fixation, where it 
disappears. The participant judges if the bar was to the left or the right of 
the flash by button press as a 2AFC. The displacement between bar and 
flash is varied across a range of +/- 5° with 1° steps in a method of constants 
procedure. Each displacement is shown 8 times except for ER where the 
range was +/- 4° with 0.5° steps, shown 12 times. We chose three adaptation 
conditions: a no adaptation control, 5Hz and 20Hz TF adaptation (15s 
initial, 5s top-up) with the two speed (18.2°s-1, 27.3°s-1) conditions, this 
makes six conditions in total. Trials are blocked according to adaptation 
condition. Blocks were carried out in separate sessions. The no adaptation 
block was shown first to confirm the Flash-Lag illusion was apparent at least 
one of the two speed conditions with each adapting condition randomly 
ordered afterwards, with the two speeds and flash displacements randomly 
interleaved.  
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 SPEED EXPERIMENT PROCEDURE 
We measure perceived speed by asking participants to indicate which of 
two bars moving in opposite directions has the greatest speed by button 
press to measure the effect of TF adaptation on perceived speed. One bar 
acting as the standard moves at one of two speeds (18.2° s-1, 27.3°s-1), the 
same as in the Flash-Lag condition. The comparison bar is varied in speed 
trial-by-trial in a range from 9.1° s-1 to 27.3° s-1 for the 18.2°s-1 standard 
condition and 18.2° s-1 to 36.4° s-1 for 27.3°s-1 standard condition, with 
2.3°steps, each shown 8 times in a random order, in a method of constant 
stimulus procedure. As our aim with this experiment is to measure the effect 
of the above TF adaptation on perceived speed of the moving bar, we need 
to make sure the comparison bar is unaffected by adaptation otherwise this 
would underestimate the effect of adaptation. Receptive fields in motion 
sensitive retinotopic maps across the Medial Temporal area are quite large 
(~9° in humans - Amano, Wandell, & Dumoulin, 2009) , so we position the 
comparison bar 11° away from the adapting stimulus, where no adaptation 
will occur, in fact Ayhan et al., (2009) show that the change in speed caused 
by TF adaptation induced duration compression drops off by around 3° 
distance from the adaptor. The difference in the eccentricity of the bars may 
affect relative perceived speed even with no adaptation (baseline), but it is 
change from measured baseline that is of interest. The adaptation 
conditions and adaptation length are the same as Flash-Lag (Figure 3-1a). 
Except, a very low TF (0.1Hz) adaptor is used to equate attentional effects in 
the control condition as, unlike in Flash-Lag the adapter only covers part of 
the stimulus, so without this the adaptor would draw attention to the top 
over the bottom bar in the 5Hz and 20Hz conditions but not the control. 
This control adaptor TF should not affect the perceived speed of the moving 
bar. Comparing this baseline condition to the effect of 5/20Hz flicker 
adaptation is the best, most comparable way of measuring the effect of 
5/20Hz flicker on the perception of the speed of the bar. Particularly when 
considering we are interested in the perceived difference in speed caused by 
adaptation. Participants fixate as in the Flash-Lag experiment. Two bars 
(0.33°x0.67°) appear (Figure 3-1d) on diagonally opposite sides of fixation 
(8° horizontally and 2° above fixation for the standard and 17° below for the 
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comparison bar) and move on a horizontal trajectory to the horizontally 
opposite side of fixation (Figure 3-1e). The appearance and disappearance 
positions of both bars are jittered +/- 4° trial-by-trial as is the onset time 
+/- 35ms for the slower speed and +/-17.5ms for the higher speed, making it 
impossible for the participant to accurately judge which bar is fastest by 
indicating which bar moved across the length of its trajectory first. Separate 
blocks are presented for each adaptation/speed combination each 
adaptation condition was presented in separate sessions and ordered 
randomly with a break given between the speed blocks in the same session 
to avoid carry over effects of speed/temporal frequency adaptation. 
Participants indicated which bar appeared faster with a button press in a 
2AFC. 
 DURATION EXPERIMENT PROCEDURE 
A third experiment is run to test if the adaptor causes a compression of 
perceived duration with our moving bar stimulus. While 20Hz TF 
adaptation causes duration compression with gratings (Burr et al., 2007; 
Johnston et al., 2006) and a high speed adaptor causes duration 
compression with dot texture stimuli (Curran & Benton, 2012) and a moving 
object (Marinovic & Arnold, 2011), no experiment has shown duration 
compression of a moving object with a 20Hz TF flickering grating. 
Therefore, we run this experiment to check if the same effect responsible for 
compression of event duration has an effect on the Flash-Lag time 
component. The equipment is the same as the previous two experiments; 
the display is linearized with mid grey and white as in the previous two 
experiments. Participants fixate on a red fixation point as previously, with 
the same adapting stimulus appearing 3° above fixation covering the length 
of the screen. A white bar, same size as before of 600ms duration appears 3° 
above fixation moving horizontally at one of two speeds (18.2° s-1, 27.3°s-1) 
as in the previous experiments. The duration the bar appears for is defined 
by the distance the bar moves before disappearing (10.92° or 16.38° for 
speeds respectively). Once the first bar has disappeared, there is a short, 
jittered delay (0.2-0.7s) before the comparison bar appears 3° below 
fixation and the adaptor, far enough apart to avoid adapting the comparison 
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bar, as duration effects are spatially specific (Ayhan et al., 2009). The 
comparison bar starts at the opposite side of the screen, moving in the 
opposite direction to the standard. The duration of the comparison is varied 
between 300-900ms in 50ms steps, so the distance travelled varies between 
5.46° and 16.48° with 0.91° steps for the low and 8.19° and 24.57° with 1.37° 
steps for the high speed. The horizontal centre point of each bar path is 
jittered by + or - one third of the total bar path about fixation so the start 
and end points are unpredictable. Once the comparison bar disappears, the 
participant indicates by button press which bar appeared for the longer 
duration. In each block, defined by the adaptation condition (0.1, 5 and 
20Hz TF), each of the two directional combinations (standard moving left to 
right, comparison right to left and vice versa) is shown once for each of the 
four speed combinations (low-low, low-high, high-low, high-high). This 
gives eight measures for each different duration per block and these are 
interleaved within each of the three blocks. One session contained three 
blocks – one for each adaptation condition and participants performed two 
sessions in total on separate days. The control (0.1Hz) condition was always 
shown first so it was possible to check if they were performing the task 
correctly before proceeding onto the 5 and 20Hz blocks. The presentation 
order of the two adapting blocks (5 and 20Hz) was counterbalanced across 
participants. In total four participants took part, including the authors with 
two naïve to the purpose of the study. One possibility in this task is that 
participants use bar path length as a cue to judge duration, as the bar 
duration is defined by distance travelled. However, as the experiment 
requires comparisons between bars with different speeds and directions as 
well as the bars having jittered start and end points, this means that bar 
path length is not always a reliable cue. Therefore, we can take participants 
responses as a measure of perceived duration. In addition, there is enough 
data (eight repetitions per duration) to estimate psychometric functions for 
trials where bars have different and same speeds independently. This allows 
to compare participant performance when the distance cue is more 
informative (when bars are the same speed) or less informative (when the 
bars have different speeds), to show if this cue has a significant effect on 
performance.  
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 PSYCHOPHYSICAL ANALYSIS 
In all experiments, we fit a logistic psychometric function to the 
participant’s response ratios, taking the 50% point on the curve as the point 
of subjective equality (PSE). This is interpreted as where the bar and flash 
are perceived as aligned in the Flash-Lag experiment, at what speed both 
bars are perceived to have the same speed in the speed measurement and 
the duration at which the bars are perceived to persist the same amount of 
time on screen in the duration experiment. In both Flash-Lag and Speed 
experiments ER and SD both repeat each measurement four times with a 
curve fitted to each and the PSE and standard error of the measurement 
calculated. Naïve participants performed each measurement once, a curve is 
fitted and bootstrapping can be used to estimate the standard error for each 
participant. As such, the measurements for the authors are more accurate, 
but can be analysed together with the naïve participants as they measure the 
same thing, but with more trials. For the duration experiment, both the 
naïve participants and authors participate with both viewing two blocks, 
making up a single measurement, to which a curve is fitted. As such, there is 
no difference between them in their analysis. In addition to fitting a curve to 
all trials from each adaptation condition, curves were fitted for trials where 
the bars where of different speeds, discarding trials where the speeds were 
the same and visa-versa where the two bar speeds matched. For each 
participant there were three different measures for each adaptation 
condition: one for different bar speeds, one for the same bar speeds and one 
for all bar speeds combined. 
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 RESULTS 
 THE EFFECT OF TEMPORAL FREQUENCY ADAPTATION 
ON FLASH-LAG 
All participants have a measured Flash-Lag effect in the expected 
direction for the 27.3 °s-1 bar speed, and only one does not for the lower bar 
speed, with a larger Flash-Lag at the higher speed as expected. We compare 
the mean across participants separately for each condition to examine the 
effect of adaptation Figure 3-2a). A repeated measures ANOVA for the 27.3° 
s-1 speed condition shows the change in Flash-Lag caused by adaptation is 
significant (F2,10=4.31, p<0.05) with planned contrasts showing this is 
driven by the difference between control and 20Hz adaptation conditions 
(F5=18.14, p<0.01), not change between 5Hz and control ( F5=0.11, p=0.76). 
There is no significant effect for the 18.2° s-1 speed condition (F2, 10=0.41, p 
=0.68). 
 THE EFFECT OF TEMPORAL FREQUENCY ADAPTATION 
ON PERCEIVED SPEED 
The baseline measure for both speeds is greater than the comparison bar 
speed (Figure 3-2b) and one sample t-tests show this to be significant for 
both speeds (18.2° s-1: t5 = 2.68, p < 0.05. 27.3° s-1: t5 = 4.14, p < 0.01). 
Objects in peripheral vision appear slower (Johnston & Wright, 1986) and 
the adapter may draw attention to the standard bar (Cavanagh, 1992), 
which makes it appear faster so these effects would account for our results, 
however it is the effect that adaptation has on the baseline measure that is 
of interest. As with the Flash-Lag experiment, we average across 
participants’ PSEs to compare the effect of adaptation on perceived speed 
(Figure 3-2b) separately for the two bar speed conditions. Repeated 
measures ANOVA shows that the change in perceived speed is significant at 
the slower speed (F2, 10 = 5.49, p<0.05) but not quite at the faster speed 
(F2,10=2.81, p =0.15, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). At the lower speed, 
planned contrasts show a significant difference between control condition 
and 5Hz adaptation (F2= 16.68, p<0.05) but not 20Hz (F2=0.45, p=0.53). In 
summary 5Hz adaptation has the effect of increasing perceived speed at the 
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slower speed and no effect on Flash-Lag, whereas 20Hz has the effect of 
decreasing Flash-Lag at the higher speed and no effect on perceived speed. 
 
Figure 3-2: Results showing mean and standard error (N=6) for Flash-Lag. (a) where there 
is significant difference between control and 20 Hz adaptation in the faster speed condition, 
and Speed experiments (b) where there is a significant difference between control and 5Hz 
adaptation in the slower speed condition, * indicates significance at the 5% level with solid 
lines showing overall significant ANOVA and dashed lines indicating significant planned 
comparisons. (c) shows the mean of the differences between predicted and measured change 
in Flash-Lag after adaptation, error bars show standard error (N=6). Measured change 
shows a significantly greater reduction than predicted for 20Hz adaptation at the faster speed 
but not for any other, * shows significant effect at the 5% level. (d) Shows differences in 
perceived duration of a moving bar of 600ms where the standard and the comparison are 
moving at the same speed (18.2° s-1 or 27.3° s-1), different speeds (one bar 18.2° s-1, the 
other 27.3° s-1) or both different and same speeds. There is a significant effect of adaptation 
on both and Different conditions (* with solid lines) using ANOVA and a significant 
difference between 20Hz and control for different speeds (* with dashed line) in planned 
comparisons. Error bars show standard error (N=4). 
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 EFFECT OF TEMPORAL FREQUENCY ADAPTATION ON 
PERCEIVED DURATION 
As before, we fit curves for participants individually to estimate PSEs and 
then average the PSEs together to measure the effect. Repeated measures 
ANOVA shows a significant effect of temporal frequency when all trials are 
considered, (F3,6=5.63, p < 0.05) and where only trials with different speeds 
are considered (F3,6=11.61, p < 0.01) but not where only trials with the same 
speed are (F3,6=0.24, p =0.80). Planned contrasts between both 5 and 20Hz 
with the control condition show that where trials with all speed 
combinations and only different bar speed trials are considered the effect at 
5Hz is not significant (All: t3 = 0.489, p = 0.54. Diff: t3 = 2.474, p = 0.21) 
while 20Hz is significant for trials comparing the duration of bars moving at 
different speeds (t3 =13.17, p < 0.05) but not quite when all trials are 
considered (t3 = 7.919, p = 0.067). Overall, this experiment shows that 20Hz 
TF adaptation appears to compress the perceived duration of a moving bar, 
when comparing two bars moving at different speeds, i.e. when the distance 
travelled by the bar cannot be used as a cue. 
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Figure 3-3: A linear relationship between speed and Flash-Lag passing through the origin 
and the baseline measure always predicts a larger change in the Flash-Lag Illusion given an 
observed change in perceived speed than a logarithmic relationship passing through the 
origin and the baseline measure. This means assuming a linear as opposed to logarithmic 
relationship between speeds and Flash-Lag gives the strongest test when compared to the 
duration compression hypothesis.  
 DOES CHANGE IN FLASH-LAG MATCH CHANGE IN 
PERCEIVED SPEED? 
The pattern of the above results demonstrates an apparent dissociation 
between adaptation’s effect on perceived Flash-Lag and perceived speed, 
which would not be the case if change in Flash-Lag was entirely dependent 
on the change in perceived speed caused by TF adaptation. We see in some 
conditions a drop in the size of Flash-Lag, whereas in some conditions 
perceived speed is increased, which should also increase the size of the 
Flash-Lag, if indeed Flash-Lag is dependent on perceived speed. The pattern 
of perceived speed adaptation is as would be expected, where adapting to 
low TF flicker causes a repulsion effect on TF, and hence speed (as spatial 
frequency is constant) causing a perceived increase in object speed and vice 
versa for high TF (Hammett et al., 2000; Smith & Edgar, 1994; Thompson, 
1983). This means we are able to measure an effect on perceived speed and 
an effect of Flash-Lag, but they do not correspond. As Flash-Lag magnitude 
scales with physical speed, we needed to check whether a significant change 
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in perceived speed would result in an equivalent change in Flash-Lag for 
that condition. Since this is not observed, this suggests another factor is 
involved in the observed Flash-Lag change other than a change in perceived 
speed alone. To confirm further that this is not due to lack of power and 
move away from comparing averages, we compared individual Flash-Lag 
measurements against the corresponding Flash-Lag predictions based on 
the change in perceived speed of the bar for each participant, assuming a 
linear relationship between Flash-Lag and perceived speed. We mentioned 
above that whilst the relationship between Flash-Lag and perceived speed is 
mostly linear at lower speeds, in fact it appears to be better described as 
logarithmic over a wider range of speeds (Wojtach et al., 2008). Figure 3-3 
shows a logarithmic relationship would predict for the higher speed (where 
we observe a significant change in Flash-Lag, but not speed), a change in 
perceived speed to have a smaller effect on Flash-Lag than a linear 
relationship. This would make a reduction in perceived speed an even 
weaker explanation for the measured reduction in Flash-Lag. Therefore, by 
assuming a linear as opposed to logarithmic relationship we are pitting the 
hypothesis that 20Hz adaptation changes the time component of Flash-Lag 
against the strongest possible alternative hypothesis where change in speed 
is responsible for observed changes in Flash-Lag. In Figure 3-2c we see the 
change in Flash-Lag magnitude is underestimated if based on change in 
perceived speed after 20Hz adaptation at the high speed. This is not the case 
in any of the other conditions, as is confirmed by a comparison of predicted 
and measured Flash-Lags (2-tailed, paired sample t-tests, 18.2°s-1: 5Hz t5=-
0.211, p=.841, 20Hz t5=0.343, p = 0.746; 27.3° s-1: 5Hz t5=1.061, p =0.337, 
20Hz t5=3.590, p <0.05). However, we only measure a significant difference 
in perceived duration after 20Hz adaptation, not perceived speed, indicating 
duration compression 
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Figure 3-4: Scatter plot of predicted Flash-Lag from change in perceived speed versus 
measured change in Flash-Lag effects after TF adaptation. Different symbols correspond to 
different participants. Red shows slow while blue shows fast speeds with 20Hz results for 
both speeds are in bold and different symbols indicated different participants. Comparing 
results with the line of equality show all but a single participant have a larger than predicted 
drop in Flash-Lag for the 20Hz faster speed indicating change in perceived speed alone 
cannot explain the change in Flash-Lag for five out of six individuals. 
 
effects of 20Hz adaptation have a stronger effect on Flash-Lag. Plotting each 
individual’s data predicted by speed only versus measured Flash-Lag 
(Figure 3-4) shows a weak positive but non-significant correlation between 
these measures across all conditions (2-tailed Pearson’s: r24 = 0.333, p = 
0.11) reinforcing the finding that while perceived speed might have an effect 
on Flash-Lag it cannot fully explain the results collected. Given we show a 
compression of perceived duration an alternative explanation is that the 
time component of Flash-Lag is changing after 20Hz TF adaptation. To 
measure the magnitude of this effect we calculate the time component for 
each individual in each condition by time = Flash-Lag/perceived speed. For 
control and 5Hz adaptation, we found average time component of 54.2ms 
and 56.2ms for the lower and 64.0ms and 59.3ms for the higher speed 
respectively, fitting with previous estimates of Flash-Lag magnitude. At 20 
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Hz we found 50.8ms and 47.1ms time component, consistent with the time 
component shrinking by 8.3% (-3.4ms) in the slower speed condition, and 
32.5% (-16.9ms) in the faster speed condition. This reduction in Flash-Lag 
time component is greater than the reduction in perceived bar duration 
which was 34ms (5.6%) for all trials and 47ms (7.8%) for trials with bars of 
different speeds, but the effect is in the same direction and would predict a 
reduction in Flash-Lag after 20Hz TF adaptation similar to what is 
observed.  
 DISCUSSION 
We show two key findings in this study. The first is that TF adaptation 
changes the magnitude of the Flash-Lag effect and second, the change in 
Flash-Lag is not attributable to a change in perceived speed alone. In 
particular, Flash-Lag is reduced for the 20Hz adaptation condition only, by 
more than would be expected by speed adaptation alone. As 20Hz TF 
adaptation has been previously associated with duration compression 
(Johnston et al., 2006) and this is where we observe a reduction in Flash-
Lag we conclude that 20Hz TF adaptation changes Flash-Lag in a manner 
that is consistent with the compression of the fixed time window associated 
with the Flash-Lag effect. Our estimation puts this compression of time at 
32.5%, close to previous reports of around 22% (Burr et al., 2007; Johnston 
et al., 2006). We further confirm that duration compression does occur in 
our stimulus set-up. This implies that reducing perceived duration has an 
effect on these computations, which implicitly rely on duration based 
calculations. The lack of significant reduction in Flash-Lag at the slower 
speed after 20Hz adaptation may be due to the smaller baseline Flash-Lag 
displacement in this condition, making it harder to measure a reduction in 
perceived offset.  
This effect on Flash-Lag ties in with results showing that both perceived 
time and space are compressed across saccadic eye movements, thought to 
arise from shifts in receptive fields anticipating eye movement, indicating an 
interlinked perception of time and space (Morrone et al., 2005). This is 
similar to what our experiments suggest, in that a compression of time is 
associated with a compression of space – in this case a reduced Flash-Lag 
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offset, i.e. we show the compression with a moving object rather than eye 
movements. The mechanisms behind the effect shown by Morrone et al., 
(2005) are not clear, but saccades suppress magnocellular activity (Ross et 
al., 1996) and the attenuation of the Flash-Lag effect may be linked to the 
adaptation of the magnocellular (M) pathway, which is particularly sensitive 
to high TF flicker, as has been suggested by Johnston et al., (2006). It is 
possible then for computations carried out in the Magnocellular pathway to 
affect both perception of time and space simultaneously. This would also 
link our work in with results showing a reduction in the Flash-Lag effect 
when equiluminant stimuli (to which the M pathway is less sensitive) have 
luminance noise added (Chappell & Mullen, 2010).  
The reduction in Flash-Lag time component can be explained by each of 
the proposed mechanisms underlying the effect. In motion extrapolation 
(Nijhawan, 1994), the position of the bar is extrapolated a shorter duration 
into the immediate future. For latency delay (Whitney & Murakami, 1998); 
either or perhaps both the processing of the flash is sped up or processing of 
the bar is slowed so the difference in their respective arrival at a perceptual 
end-point is reduced. For both integration (Krekelberg & Lappe, 2000a) 
and postdiction (Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000) explanations there is a 
reduction in the size or possibly a shift in the position in time of the 
temporal window where the motion of the bar after the flash affects its 
perceived position.  
One recent study (Bruno, Ayhan & Johnston, 2015) found that a Gaussian 
stimulus flashed in an area of the screen that had been adapted using a 
20Hz temporal frequency stimulus resulted in that flash being perceived to 
appear sooner than a flash displayed in an unadapted area. This suggests a 
potential explanation of the results observed here is that the adaptor is 
causing the flash to appear sooner, therefore reducing the delay between 
perceiving the bar and flash (if such a delay causes the illusion). This results 
in the mitigated Flash-Lag illusion that is unexplained by changes in 
perceived speed observed here, i.e. less directly caused by duration 
compression per se, although the advancement of the flash is tied in with 
the effect of adaptation on time (Bruno et al., 2015). This might indicate 
20Hz adaptation is reducing the relative delay between the static flash and 
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moving bar but does not exclude other explanations. The high-speed flicker 
may prime the internal model of the environment to expect rapid changes in 
the environment, such as a flash, therefore reducing the need to discount 
the motion prior to the Flash. Modifications to this paradigm, most 
obviously adapting only the area covering the moving bar or the flash 
separately could provide further insight into the mechanism responsible for 
Flash-Lag and duration perception. Results of such an experiment would 
show if high TF adaptation affects the bar, flash or is an interaction between 
the two.  
Since Flash-Lag magnitude is affected by prior knowledge regarding the 
distributions of object speed in the environment (Wojtach et al., 2008) and 
the predictability of flash locations (Namba & Baldo, 2004) it may be that 
time perception effects processes based upon expectations in the visual 
system. This provides a link with work on expectation and time perception 
(Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2007; Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2012; Schindel et 
al., 2011). One implication of the finding reported here is that for duration 
to affect other processes the visual system must encode perceived duration 
and this information must be spatially localized as duration compression 
effects of high temporal frequency adaptation are only observed within a 
couple of degrees of the adapting stimulus position (Ayhan et al., 2009).  
There have been some proposed mechanisms for encoding duration such 
as state dependent networks (Karmarkar & Buonomano, 2007) which are 
computationally effective though difficult to conclusively verify, though 
there is evidence that neural systems encode time intrinsically (Goel & 
Buonomano, 2014). The neural energy hypothesis (Eagleman & Pariyadath, 
2009) proposes that time is encoded by the amount of neural activity 
associated with an event. This framework aims to explain a number of 
duration effects including those caused by expectations and adaptation. 
Expected events show a suppression in BOLD, a strong correlate of neural 
activity (Larsson & Smith, 2012; Summerfield, Trittschuh, Monti, Mesulam, 
& Egner, 2008), thus expected events are perceived to be shorter in 
comparison to unexpected events. In this interpretation duration, 
compression occurs after adaptation as adaptation reduces neural activity 
and thus reduces perceived duration. However, this does not explain why it 
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appears only after adaptation to high temporal frequencies, so clearly this 
needs refining. Nevertheless, neural energy does offer a general framework 
to explain how duration is encoded within the brain. This topic is explored 
further in the following chapter.  
Other work (Hogendoorn et al., 2010) has demonstrated that high speed 
TF adaptation causes a moving clock hand to be perceived further around a 
clock face than an un-adapted hand after accounting for change in perceived 
speed - the opposite direction to our finding. Furthermore, in the above 
study Experiment 3 shows that a hand on a clock face, in an area adapted to 
a 20Hz temporal frequency stimulus is perceived ahead of a hand in an 
unadapted area or adapted to 5Hz, when the outer circumference of the 
clock briefly (20ms) changes colour 1-2s after onset of the clock stimulus, 
something that our data apparently contradicts. Hogendoorn et al., (2010) 
explain this as a shift in the representation of the time course of events. Our 
explanation for our results is the Flash-Lag temporal component is 
compressed by high temporal frequency adaptation that reduces the 
(illusory) distance between moving bar and flash. We randomly varied the 
duration of the moving bar (the clocks were always presented for the same 
amount of time), and the relative position of the bar to the flash was not in 
any way connected by the task to the perceived duration of the bar. This 
requires the participants to focus on judging the perceptual offset, not when 
in the time course of the moving bar did the flash appear, so the explanation 
for Hogendoorn et al., (2010) does not quite apply to our results on the 
surface. Rather, by measuring the Flash-Lag explicitly as a relative spatial 
judgment participants are reliant on the fixed temporal component used in 
this calculation and it is this that is compressed. One point that Hogendoorn 
et al., (2010) make is that any mechanism that shifts the time of events 
backwards might also be able to shift it forwards as well. This suggests that 
a measure of duration or the effect of 20Hz temporal frequency adaptation 
on this measure of duration is task dependant so the way the visual system 
uses time is likely to be complex given the results across these experiments, 
this is perhaps an explanation that accounts for the results here and those of 
Hogendoorn et al., (2010).  
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We also find evidence of 20Hz TF flicker adaptation reducing the 
duration of a moving object that has not previously been demonstrated 
before, although this effect is smaller (47ms or a 7.8% perceived reduction 
from the actual duration of 600ms) than other reports that put duration 
compression magnitude at ~20% (Burr et al., 2007; Johnston et al., 2006) 
as well as our estimates of Flash-Lag time component compression. This 
may be due to (as we have seen) the bar trajectory providing an additional 
cue to duration. In addition, our estimate of compression does not allow for 
the fact that the change in perceived speed may have also had some effect. 
Importantly however, we are not claiming that it is the reduction in 
perceived bar duration over its entire presentation per se that reduces the 
size of the Flash-Lag magnitude, as there is still a great deal of debate as to 
what underlies the temporal component of the Flash-Lag illusion. However, 
we can say that the same effect of 20Hz temporal frequency adaptation that 
reduces perceived event duration here and repeatedly in literature (Ayhan et 
al., 2009; Burr et al., 2007; Johnston et al., 2006) also compresses the time 
component in the Flash-Lag illusion.  
 CONCLUSION 
Although we cannot differentiate between the different Flash-Lag 
theories with our data, the main conclusion is that as all these theories rely 
on a fixed averaging/predictive/delay time component, and that component 
is compressed by high TF adaptation, suggesting that duration perception is 
intimately linked with motion and position computations, rather than being 
a separate process. Previously it has been suggested that the Flash-Lag 
illusion may be due to compensatory mechanisms, but interestingly in this 
example as the Flash-Lag magnitude is reduced, this provides a more 
veridical perception of the stimulus, which may be advantageous in an 
environment containing rapid change (signalled by high TF flicker), where 
such compensatory mechanisms may not update speedily enough. 
Specifically, locally malleable time perception may play a key role in 
position calculations. 
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4. CHAPTER FOUR - A MODEL TO 
ESTIMATE DURATION 
 INTRODUCTION 
There has been a general shift from central clock mechanisms, such as 
those discussed in Chapter 1 (Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon, et al., 1984; Treisman 
et al., 1990; Wearden, 1991), leaving a gap in the literature regarding what 
mechanisms might be used to measure event duration in the brain. Recent 
evidence suggests that duration is computed within sensory systems (Ayhan 
et al., 2011; Bruno & Johnston, 2010; Burr et al., 2007; Johnston et al,. 
2006; Marinovic & Arnold, 2011; Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2007; Pariyadath 
& Eagleman, 2012; Schindel et al., 2011), which follow a distributed, 
hierarchical information processing structure. 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how event time can be 
estimated using basic, biologically plausible properties of neural systems, 
then test the limitations of the model with the aim of providing a useful 
'back-pocket' model of a duration encoding mechanism for evaluating 
experimental evidence. The input signal encodes a presence of a sensory 
event, so a value of zero indicates that there is no stimulus and values above 
zero encode the magnitude of a particular stimulus property. For example, 
for encoding luminance, a brighter object provides a higher input 
magnitude. The stimulus lasts for a particular duration, which is 
represented by how long the input magnitude is greater than zero in a step 
on-off function. From this on-off signal, the model estimates how long the 
stimulus persists in the visual field or receptive field of a neuron, encoding 
this duration without employing an oscillator as a timing signal.  
Initially, it may be tempting to encode and compare the onset and offset 
times to provide a measure. However, this does not solve the problem, as it 
requires encoding the time of when onset and offset occur, passing the task 
of measuring duration to another level rather than solving the problem in 
the local process itself. Evidence suggests that onset and offset times can be 
manipulated after TF adaptation (Bruno et al., 2015). However, reported 
changes in duration can be manipulated in a manner that cannot be 
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accounted for by changes in perceived onset and offset time (Johnston et al., 
2006) implying that, to some extent, perceived duration is processed 
separately from perceived onset and offset times. Instead, the model 
presented here will use time variant properties of neural systems to encode 
duration similar to the approaches taken by Goel and Buonomano (2014) 
and Johnston (2010).  
 MODEL OUTLINE 
One fundamental property of neurons is acting as a low pass filter. Low-
pass filters can describe dynamics of many systems within the brain. From 
the scale of ion channels in the Hodgkin-Huxley model (Hodgkin & Huxley, 
1952) neurons and Integrate-and-Fire models (Abbott, 1999), to forming a 
basic requirement of motion-detector circuits, such as Elementary Motion 
Detectors (Borst & Egelhaaf, 1989) and the response of populations of 
neurons to form channels such as those used for coding the temporal 
frequency of a visual stimulus (Hess & Snowden, 1992).  
A low-pass filter can be described by its temporal response function 
(Equation 4-1), and the model makes use of these temporal dynamics to 
estimate duration. The low-pass output monotonically increases over time 
approaching a final value, proportional to the intensity of the input (here 
arbitrarily scaled to unity). This means the stimulus has to persist for a 
minimum duration for the filter output to match the input magnitude at a 
given level. It is crucial to notice that for relatively short durations, as 
compared to the filter time constant, the filter output growth is 
approximately linear. This temporal property of low pass filters, offers a 
method to estimate the input duration.  
A second component of the proposed model is a threshold (T ). The low-
pass output is passed to a threshold switch, so if the low-pass output is 
greater than T,  it activates the switch, causing it to generate an output of 1, 
if it is less than T,  the switch output is 0. Effectively, the non-zero switch 
output indicates if the input stimulus has persisted for a particular duration.  
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This duration estimate is determined by two variables: the low-pass filter 
time constant, τ  and the threshold, T. τ defines the slope of the low-pass 
filter’s response. With a larger τ, the response gradient becomes shallower 
and so the stimulus has to last a longer time for the filter output to reach T. 
For larger values of T, the output has to reach a greater magnitude to 
activate the switch. Thus, the input stimulus has to persist for a longer 
duration. In the proposed model we set the threshold at a constant meaning 
the time that threshold is reached is entirely defined by the filter τ. 
Together, these two components; the low-pass filter outputting to a 
Figure 4-1 Showing the components of a Simple Duration Detector (bottom) with an 
on/off input passed through the low-pass filter, which feeds, into a threshold switch 
where the output state is dependent on whether the input from the low-pass filter 
exceeds a set value (T ) and provides the final output of the detector of 1 or 0. The graph 
(top) shows the output for different components of the Simple Duration Detector with a 
low-pass time constant (τ ) of 100ms and a T of 0.6 in response to a square wave on-off 
stimulus of 500ms duration coloured according the bottom illustration of the 
components. 
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threshold switch gives what is termed a ‘simple duration detector’ or SDD 
and forms the key component of the model. 
 REPRESENTING EVENT DURATION 
 
Figure 4-2: A population of SDDs is shown, receiving an input of duration 1000ms with 5 
different low-pass filter responses to that input (blue, green, red, purple, cyan lines). The 
graph on the left shows a step on/off input (grey) and the low-pass filter response with five 
different values of τ (200,400,600,800 and 1000ms) representing filters in a SDD 
population (right – coloured respectively). Each filter output crosses the threshold (0.632 – 
black dotted line) at a time equal to the filter constant τ (coloured respectively - dotted) 
where the SDD output switches from zero to one. 
 
A single SDD can indicate if the input stimulus has passed a particular 
duration defined by the filter time constant τ and threshold T. Clearly, any 
duration encoding mechanism will need to encode duration across a range, 
so the proposed model uses a population of SDDs with a range of time 
constants to encode the duration of an input signal by a labelled lines 
method (Figure 4-2).  
Labelled lines are the simplest way of thinking of encoding information 
within neural systems across modalities. It is used in models, for example 
detecting motion direction in MT (Maunsell & Van Essen, 1983). Labelled 
lines are also used in representing space in retinotopic maps - where a 
neuron responds to a stimulus at a particular area in the visual field, which 
can be thought of its spatial ‘label’ (Wandell, Brewer, & Dougherty, 2005), 
to representing sensory homunculi in the somatosensory cortex (Kaas, 
Nelson, Sur, Lin, & Merzenich, 1979). Similarly, labels have been used as a 
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basis of reading output from models for the olfactory system (Kauer & 
White, 2001).  
In the present model, the last SDD to reach threshold indicates the most 
recent stimulus duration estimate and is updated every time a detector 
switches on, by the SDD label of the latest detector to switch on. This allows 
a measure of duration whilst still receiving an input signal, as the value 
updates in real time. The low pass filter output does not increase when there 
is no input and decays when input drops to zero, so cannot trigger the 
threshold switch. The last detector to switch on indicates how long the event 
has lasted during the event itself. When an event has ended, the value 
indicated by the last detector to have switched on needs to be stored in 
memory after the event has past, raising the question of how the label is 
stored, but this is less a problem of sensory perception and more of 
memory, so is beyond the scope of the model.  
A key property of this model is that while a final duration estimate 
requires a stimulus to be present for a given time, it is not dependent on the 
absolute time of stimulus onset or offset, and it is explicitly represented in 
the system. To create a labelling scheme, the threshold is fixed at a value of 
0.632. This value is chosen as τ represents the time it takes for the low pass 
filter output to reach 1 – e-1 (~ 0.632) of the input stimulus intensity. This 
value is arbitrary and not crucial to model function but it is chosen for two 
reasons. Firstly, low pass filter response is approximately linear up to this 
point, which means the durations encoded by a population are also linear. 
Secondly, the filter time constant τ corresponds to the time after onset 
where a detector switches on, making the duration encoded by each SDD 
intuitive to interpret and representative of the SDD properties. 
 One possible alternative to this would be instead of a population, to use a 
single low pass filter with a larger τ and multiple thresholds to indicate 
duration. The problem here is the low-pass filter response is non-linear over 
time so such a coding scheme would have to consider this. This would also 
effectively involve directly measuring the duration of a stimulus in terms of 
the duration of response of a single ‘timer’ neuron, which is something we 
are trying to avoid as this becomes too similar to the idea of a more 
centralised timing area. There is one key assumption at this stage in this 
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chosen, single threshold-labelling scheme, that the input level I is always 
equal to 1 when a stimulus is present. Changing this value changes the 
duration estimate from the model. For example, if the input value is 2, the 
filter output gradient will be twice the assumed gradient, causing the 
detector to switch on in half the time (with this fixed rather than 
proportional threshold value).  
This creates a problem, as the model cannot encode duration 
unambiguously without knowing input magnitude itself, thus also encoding 
some property of the stimulus. This will be discussed in Section 4.2.4 and 
resolved in Section 4.3, leading to interesting implications for the model. At 
this stage, however, the model will assume a normalised input intensity of 1, 
so the basic properties of the SDD population can be examined. 
 MATHEMATICAL FORMALISATION OF THE MODEL 
The first stage in the proposed model computes the temporal response of 
a first-order low-pass filter ( 𝑂𝐿𝑃) at duration (d) with time constant (𝜏) in 
an individual SDD to the input stimulus (𝐼), Equation 4-1. In the computer 
program implementing the model, the filter output at a particular duration 
d, 𝑂𝐿𝑃(𝑑), is computed iteratively as a difference function as defined in 
Equation 4-2 where 𝛥𝑑 is defined as the size of the timestep.  
Equation 4-1 
OLP(d) = I (1 − e
−d
τ ) 
 
Equation 4-2 
𝑂𝐿𝑃(𝑑) = 𝐼 (
𝛥𝑑
𝜏 + 𝛥𝑑
)  +  𝑂𝐿𝑃(𝑑 − 1) (
𝜏
𝜏 + 𝛥𝑑
) 
Where 𝑂𝐿𝑃(0) = 0 
The second step calculates the threshold switch output at a particular 
point in time OTS(d) as 
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Equation 4-3 
𝑂𝑇𝑆(𝑑) = {
1, 𝑂𝐿𝑃(𝑑) > 𝑇
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
The duration (D) indicated by the SDD is shown in Equation 4-4 for a 
constant input magnitude(𝐼µ), which with the normalised input amplitude 
of Iµ = 1 reduces to Equation 4-5  
Equation 4-4 
𝐷 =  𝑂𝑇𝑆
𝜏
𝐼µ
 
Equation 4-5 
𝐷 =  𝑂𝑇𝑆𝜏
Computing duration estimates for a population of n SDDs using 
Equation 4-5 generates a set of indicated times (𝑃) as 
Equation 4-6 
𝑃 = [𝐷, … , 𝐷𝑛]
The largest value DI of set 𝑃 finally provides the duration of the input 𝐼 as 
Equation 4-7 
𝐷𝐼 = max (𝑃)
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 MEASURING EVENT DURATION FOR A SIMPLE ON-OFF 
STIMULUS (STEP FUNCTION) 
The model is run to show that the SDD population works across a range of 
durations. The input consists of a step function varying from 0 to 1, then back 
to 0 again, with the duration the step function set at 100, 250, 500 and 
1000ms, with ‘off’ periods of the same duration as the step function before 
the start and after the end of the stimulus. 
 The population consists of 100 SDDs with τ values of 10ms to twice the 
input duration using 10ms steps; this dictates the temporal resolution of 
duration detection. The threshold of 0.632 as in Figure 4-2 is kept constant 
across the population. We show raster plots for the filter and final outputs for 
each duration in Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4, the overall value calculated from 
the population measure of duration is plotted against actual duration in 
Equation 4-5. Figure 4-3 shows that the low-pass output is homogenous if 
the population τ scales with duration output, with aliasing visible at the 
shorter durations as the population τ resolution does not scale with duration, 
if it did the four low pass output graphs would look identical apart from the 
axis numbers. This temporal aliasing is also visible in the duration detector 
output in Figure 4-4 again due to the population τ resolution.  
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Figure 4-3 : The output of the Low-pass filter component in response to the input (top). The 
input graph shows the magnitude of the input (y-axis) and the time (x-axis). The bottom four 
graphs show the low-pass filter output for different stimulus durations. X-axis shows time, y-
axis is the τ of the particular low pass filter and the colour shows the output magnitude given 
by the colour bar. 
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Figure 4-4: Shows the output of the threshold detector with the threshold set at 0.632 in 
response to the input from the low pass filters’ (shown in Figure 4-3) response to the model 
input (top). ). The input graph shows the magnitude of the input (y-axis) and the time (x-axis). 
The output of each detector is shown in the four graphs below x-axis shows time, y-axis is the 
τ of the particular low pass filter, black shows an output of zero, white shows and output of 1. 
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Figure 4-5 Shows duration estimates versus actual durations for 100, 250, 500 and 1000ms. 
The estimates match stimulus duration. 
 EFFECT OF SIGNAL MAGNITUDE ON DURATION 
ESTIMATES  
As stated before and shown in Equation 4-4 and Equation 4-5, the model 
can only be expected to give consistent duration estimates if the input 
magnitude of the model is constant. Estimates for stimuli of differing input 
magnitude are gathered for range from 0.75, to 2 magnitudes with 0.25 steps 
of 200,400,600 800 and 1000ms. Figure 4-6 clearly shows that the duration 
of the stimuli vary according to their input magnitude. This is not a realistic 
model for duration estimation in its current form as the duration estimation 
is as much based on the stimulus properties represented by the input signal 
magnitude as it is on the stimulus duration.  
There is some evidence in literature showing perceived duration increases 
with the magnitude of various stimulus properties such as brightness 
(Brigner, 1986; Terao, Watanabe, Yagi, and Nishida, 2008), speed (Brown, 
1995; Kanai, Paffen, Hogendoorn, & Verstraten, 2006) or temporal frequency 
(Kanai et al., 2006) and size (Xuan et al., 2007). However, these effects show 
fractional relative variations not on the scale of the relationship observed in 
the model. This means the basic SDD model is not feasible without additions 
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to control the input signal magnitude through a form of signal normalisation 
discussed in Section 4.3. 
 
Figure 4-6: Above shows model duration estimates versus actual durations for stimuli of 
varying input intensities (coloured). This shows that duration estimates are as much 
influenced by the input signal magnitude as they are the duration of the stimulus as indicated 
by Equation 4-4.   
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 ESTIMATING DURATION OF AN IMPULSE (δ DIRAC) 
FUNCTION 
An impulse is an input of infinite magnitude over an infinitely small 
period-of-time. It is used to demonstrate the temporal dynamics of a system 
and provides an interesting test for the model to investigate its output. 
It is impossible to use an impulse as input into the model because the low-
pass output is computed iteratively meaning an infinite input over an 
infinitely small period would result in an undefined output. Instead, an input 
of 1ms (a single timestep) with a magnitude of 2000, 1000 times greater than 
the largest magnitude that is used elsewhere, forms a suitable approximation 
of an impulse response. The SDD population has τ of 200-1000ms with 
200ms steps in this example. The output is shown in Figure 4-7. The shape of 
these impulse response functions convolved with the input gives us the 
response to all possible signals at this stage in the model.  
After the threshold stage the SDD population estimates the duration of the 
input to be 1000ms as this is the longest duration the population can encode. 
What this demonstrates is the impulse drives the output of all low pass filters 
Figure 4-7: Impulse response of low pass filters in an SDD population (coloured) to an 
approximated impulse at time = 0 (Black arrow). All filter outputs exceed threshold (black 
dashed), so the model duration judgment is the label of the SDD with the largest τ, in this 
case 1000ms. 
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to exceed threshold. Therefore, the duration indicated by the SDD with the 
largest τ gives the duration of the impulse. 
Another interesting question to ask is what is the smallest possible 
impulse magnitude to drive a detector of time component τ to output a value 
of greater than 0.632, i.e. switch it on? It is possible to show this from 
Equation 4-2. Output 𝑂𝐿𝑃(𝑑) = T or 0.632, and ∆𝑑 is 1, the smallest possible 
duration we can input into the model, which gives Equation 4-8 . This can be 
rearranged in terms of the input I, shown in Equation 4-9 that can be used to 
determine the smallest impulse magnitude to switch a detector on.  
Equation 4-8 
𝑇 = 𝐼 (
1
𝜏 + 1
) 
Equation 4-9 
𝐼 = 𝑇𝜏 + 𝑇 
With our labelling scheme set up so detector τ is the duration indicated by 
the detector it is possible to rearrange Equation 4-9  in terms of τ, taken to be 
the estimated duration of the input D(I) shown in Equation 4-10. 
Equation 4-10 
𝐷(𝐼) =  
𝐼 − 𝑇
𝑇
 
Hence, this shows the relationship between input magnitude I and 
duration estimate D(I) so that with increasing input intensity the duration 
estimate also increases, as shown in Section 4.2.4. In fact, given no limit on 
the maximum duration measurable by the population the model would 
estimate the duration of the impulse with a magnitude of 2000 as ~3163ms, 
depending on the spacing of the time constants of the detectors. However, at 
the other end of the spectrum, given our population of detectors, the size of 
an impulse needs to be of magnitude 6.95 to trigger a shortest duration 
detector with τ=10ms. Compared to the size of our standard input of 
magnitude 1, this is ~7 times larger, so it would need to be a very large 
impulse to trigger any duration detectors. Inputs of less than T would result 
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in negative duration judgements. This is not sensible, instead negative 
durations can be interpreted as have a duration of zero, this makes practical 
sense as the input will not be strong enough to cause any detectors to switch 
on. What does this mean for the model? If the input magnitude represents a 
stimulus property, e.g. luminance, then the input represents an extremely 
short and bright flash. The model predicts the duration of a very bright, very 
short flash to be perceived as lasting a much longer than reality. There is 
some evidence of this with brighter flashes being perceived to last longer, 
although this may be due to photoreceptor properties also (Bowen et al, 
1974). 
 ESTIMATING THE DURATION OF TIME VARIANT 
STIMULI 
So far, the stimulus used here does not change over time between onset 
and offset, whilst many sensory stimuli will do, such as flickering or moving 
stimuli. The next test is to use the model to estimate durations of sine and 
square wave inputs. The mean input intensity is set as 1, as before, so the 
square and sine waves have a peak magnitude of 2 and minimum of 0. The 
SDD population is set up as before with the input stimulus lasting 200,400, 
600, 800 and 1000ms for a 10Hz input varying between 0 and 2 magnitude. 
These durations are chosen so the 10Hz input completes 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 
cycles for each duration respectively, as if the input ends in the middle of a 
cycle the input magnitude would not average 1. Figure 4-8 shows the 
duration estimates.  
There is little difference in duration estimates between the different input 
types, showing the model is robust towards stimulus type, thus can estimate 
durations of time variant stimuli. This appears promising but temporal 
frequency of a stimulus has in fact been empirically found to have an effect 
on perceived duration. Kanai et al., (2006) show that increasing temporal 
frequency increases the perceived stimulus duration which is not observed 
here.  
Square and sine waves exhibit a consistent but minor underestimation. 
This is caused by the nature of the time variant signal. Each oscillation can be 
broken up into two halves, the first 180° of the oscillation where it peaks in 
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magnitude and the second 180° with the trough of the oscillation. 
Immediately preceding offset, the signal passes through the trough phase 
meaning the input to the detector population is reduced through this period 
when compared to an on-off step input despite fixing mean intensity at 1 over 
the duration of the stimulus. As established in Section 4.2.4, a reduced signal 
magnitude means an underestimation of duration that is observed here that 
explains why time variant signals are perceived to be shorter in duration. 
 
Figure 4-8: Shows the stimulus vs estimated duration of sine, square (both 10Hz) and 
continuous inputs (coloured respectively) each with a mean magnitude of 1 across the duration 
of the stimulus. There is little difference between the estimations of time-variant and 
continuous stimuli. 
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 EFFECT OF CONTRAST ON DURATION ESTIMATES OF 
TIME VARIANT STIMULI 
Another stimulus property that varies in the real world is stimulus 
contrast, i.e. the difference between the smallest and largest input magnitude 
of a stimulus varying over time or space. The simplest example of this is 
luminance contrast, though the stimulus could also represent other 
properties such as position or velocity of an object moving in a repetitive, 
back and forth motion. 10Hz sine waves with differing Michelson contrasts 
(Equation 4-11) with the same mean magnitude (Table 4-1 for full values) and 
durations of 200, 400, 600, 800 and 1000ms are input into the model. 
 As shown in Figure 4-9 the input contrast does not affect duration 
estimates, which again shows the model is robust toward differences in 
stimulus properties. This is because low-pass filters integrate the input over 
time effectively blurring the signal, so transient changes in the input do not 
change the model estimations, only the mean input magnitude over time. 
There is slight mismatch in duration estimates of different contrasts, but this 
is due to the differences in peak magnitude of the inputs of differing contrast. 
The direct effect of the contrast on the stimulus’ perceived duration has not 
been reported so far, rather it is the intensity of the stimulus that seems to 
have an effect (e.g. Alards-Tomalin et al., 2014) so this matches with current 
knowledge. Albeit rapid adaptation to high contrast does affect duration 
(Bruno & Johnston, 2010) and this will be investigated later in this chapter. 
Equation 4-11 
𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝐼𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝐼𝑚𝑖𝑛
=   𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡 
Table 4-1: values for the stimulus input in Figure 4-9. 
Max Magnitude Min Magnitude Mean Magnitude Michelson Contrast 
1.1 0.9 1 0.1 
1.5 0.5 1 0.5 
2 0 1 1 
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Figure 4-9: a) Shows the input of three sine waves with values from Table 4-1 varying in 
contrast and shown in b) with respective colours. The stimulus and estimated durations match 
closely as indicated by the line of equality (Black, dashed) and contrast does not appear to 
affect the estimates. 
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 EFFECT OF TEMPORAL FREQUENCY ON DURATION 
ESTIMATES  
 
Figure 4-10 Right shows input of differing frequencies and left shows the estimated verses 
actual durations for the different frequency inputs, coloured respectively. There is a variation 
in the duration estimates depending on the input phase at that point in time, an artefact of 
variations in mean magnitude at that point in time. 
 
One property of time variant stimuli is their temporal frequency, which 
corresponds to speed of a moving periodic stimulus or rate of change in the 
environment. The model is tested for sine-wave inputs of varying temporal 
frequency (2, 10 and 20Hz) for durations of 50ms to 1000ms with 50ms 
steps and magnitude oscillating between 1.5 and 0.5 keeping a mean 
magnitude of 1. Figure 4-10 shows the estimated durations for each stimulus. 
Here, there are variations in the duration estimate depending on the 
stimulus duration and the temporal frequency of the input stimulus. 20Hz 
shows a clear linear relationship between the stimulus and estimated 
duration as observed previously, while both 10 and 2Hz stimuli are under or 
overestimated compared with 20Hz depending on the duration. This is a 
feature of the effect described in 2.2.  
Time variant inputs are underestimated compared to a continuous input 
due to a reduction in input magnitude preceding offset. As a wider variety of 
durations than the previous two sections (50ms, rather than 200ms steps) 
are shown and the input durations have not been selected as to match a 
whole number of oscillations, sometimes the duration is overestimated, and 
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sometimes underestimated depending on the oscillation phase at offset. This 
means the difference between duration estimations of signals with differing 
temporal frequencies is not due to the temporal frequency per se, but the 
variations in mean input magnitude at offset. This could provide a limitation 
for the model as at lower temporal frequencies duration estimations vary, but 
it also shows a potential strength of the model regarding flickering or moving 
stimuli. Time variant stimuli for example: a light switching on and off, 
analogous to the square wave input here, have two durations associated with 
them, the duration the light has been switching on and off for and the 
duration of the on phase.  
A question arising from this is how can the visual system estimate both the 
duration each time the light comes on and how long the light has been 
flickering for at the same time? As we see the duration estimates oscillate as a 
function of the input frequency, this shows oscillation duration affects the 
duration estimate in the model.  
There might be possible ways to extract the information about the 
duration of the input phase, which could reduce the problem of the input 
frequency distorting duration estimates. One is to have separate populations 
of SDDs, encoding different duration ranges, i.e. one for longer and one for 
shorter durations, allowing simultaneous readouts of both the duration of 
each oscillation and the overall stimulus duration. Although this relies on 
prior knowledge about the stimulus frequency to set effective cut-offs. 
Another way would be to separate out the stimulus component frequencies 
and estimate the duration for each using a separate SDD population. What 
also affects the duration estimates is the resolution of the duration detectors. 
The estimates for the 20Hz in Figure 4-10 appear linear as the SDD 
population resolution is such that it coincides with the wavelength of the 
stimulus input so it is not affected by variations in the stimulus magnitude. 
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 NORMALISATION OF THE INPUT SIGNAL 
Section 4.2.4 demonstrates that when the input signal violates the 
constant mean input intensity assumption it creates large errors in duration 
estimates. To correct this issue the input signal can be fed through a 
normalisation stage before passing to the SDD population (Figure 4-11). This 
mechanism controls the mean input to the SDD population so that it 
approximates a set value over time, meaning the constant mean input 
assumption is reasonable. 
The mechanism uses normalisation, a process where the signal intensity 
encodes relative magnitude of a particular property rather than absolute 
magnitude to achieve this. There are many examples of normalisation in the 
visual system, for example; a neuron encoding luminance contrast with a 
particular receptive field will receive inhibitory input summated from other 
neurons encoding luminance contrast in the areas surrounding its receptive 
field (Carandini & Heeger, 2011). The model uses a form of the normalisation 
equation from Carandini and Heeger (2011) to normalise input to the SDD 
population, shown in Equation 4-12.  
Equation 4-12 
𝐼𝐷 =  
𝐼
𝜎 +  𝐼µ
 
Where 𝐼 is stimulus input to the model, 𝐼µ is the normalisation factor, it is 
a running average defined by the temporal window across which the input I 
is averaged. 𝜎 is a normalisation constant acting as free variable to fit 
experimental data as well as avoiding dividing by zero at the instance of 
stimulus onset where 𝐼µ would be 0. Finally, 𝐼𝐷 is the input to the detector 
population.  
The normalisation mechanism in the model normalises the signal over 
time by dividing the input at a particular point in time by a running average 
of the signal intensity by using a low-pass filter (another one, separate to 
those that form part of the SDDs described in Equation 4-1 and Equation 
4-2). Normalisation is often implemented spatially but dynamic 
normalisation, similar to that shown here, has also been used previously to 
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model neural systems (Louie, LoFaro, & Webb, 2014; Wilson & Humanski, 
1993). 
 
Figure 4-11: A circuit diagram of the normalisation process used in this model so that the 
duration detector input (𝐼𝐷) can be assumed to approximate a set value. The input stimulus 
(𝐼) passes through a low-pass filter to compute a running average of the input signal 
magnitude (𝐼µ), given by Equation 4.1 before summing with a constant (𝜎). The instantaneous 
input is divided by the running average plus the constant, to give the input to the SDD 
population (𝐼𝐷). 
 
A low pass filter is used, as previously discussed, it is a good 
approximation of neural function, so is a plausible way of implementing a 
running average in neural systems with the running average being 
exponentially weighted in the case of using the low-pass filter. Thus, the full 
temporal normalisation equation used is shown in Equation 4-13 and the 
input signal is normalised over a temporal window defined by the time 
constant for the normalisation stage (𝜏µ). 
Equation 4-13 
𝐼𝐷 =  
𝐼
𝜎 + 𝐼 (1 − 𝑒
−𝑑
𝜏µ )
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 SETTING NORMALISATION PARAMETERS: THE 
RUNNING AVERAGE TIME CONSTANT (𝜏µ) 
Within the normalisation equation, there are two free parameters, σ and 
the low-pass filter time constant 𝜏µ, which need appropriate values. Here 𝜏µ 
gives the size of the window for the stimulus running average. The time taken 
for the low-pass output to approximate the input magnitude of a continuous, 
time invariant stimulus is 3τµ (the output after 3τµ is 95% of an input step 
change), which gives the temporal window across which the input magnitude 
is integrated. 
 As such, τµ cannot be too large as this would mean the temporal window 
for computing the normalisation factor will exceed the duration of the input 
stimulus, thus the stimulus will not drive the low-pass filter for long enough 
to allow the filter output to approximate the input I . This means the input to 
the SDD population will never be fully normalised. The appropriate value of 
τµ should be set so that 3τµ is sufficiently less than the stimulus duration.  
As the aim of this model is to encode sub second durations, τ should be 
small. However, it cannot be too small as for time variant stimuli it will not 
provide a good estimate of the mean intensity. Ideally, τµ should be set so 
that a single oscillation of the input signal is less than 3τµ. For the moment a 
τ of 100ms will suffice as the filter response will be sufficiently rapid enough 
to normalise sub second durations except those of less than 300ms (< 3τµ). 
The model will not fully normalise inputs of less than this but will not distort 
the waveform of temporal frequency inputs greater than 3.3Hz with 
oscillations of length 300ms or greater.  
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 SETTING NORMALISATION PARAMETERS: 
NORMALISATION CONSTANT (σ)  
The constant σ has two functions, which become apparent when 
considering the effect of normalisation on the input signal. If the 
normalisation stage low pass filter output was zero, without σ  divide-by-zero 
errors would occur. In addition without σ, when the normalised 𝐼µ is very 
small relative to the input 𝐼 (just after signal onset, as there has not been a 
signal to average in the recent past), the input to the detectors, 𝐼𝐷 , becomes 
very large. This means the system gain will be very large. A large gain is 
unwanted for two reasons, the initial amplification of 𝐼𝐷 will unduly distort 
duration estimates (as input magnitude affects duration estimates – Section 
4.2.4) and high gain is unrealistic in neural systems. This suggests a larger σ 
value would be best in this model to reduce the initial amplification of  𝐼𝐷. A 
larger σ also has problems as it means as 𝐼µ approaches 𝐼, the bigger sigma is, 
the less well I D approximates 1 as assumed for the input, causing distortions 
in duration estimates. 
Equation 4-14 
𝐼𝐷 =  
1
𝜎 +  1
 
In Equation 4-14 a large σ will result in ID  << 1  which would violate this 
assumption and result in duration underestimations.  
Therefore, it is important that σ be set to a value giving a balance between 
reducing initial amplification and keeping the input as close to the assumed 
input value as possible. An σ of 0.05-0.25 is reasonable given these 
limitations. For the rest of this chapter a value of σ = 0.15 is used unless 
stated otherwise.  
120 
 
120 
 
 CENTRAL TENDENCY IN TIMING (VIERORDT’S LAW) 
AND THE NORMALISATION CONSTANT (σ) 
One property of time perception the addition of σ appears to capture, is 
referred to as the central tendency effect, which states that relatively short 
durations are perceived to be longer and relatively long durations are 
perceived to be shorter than they are. This is also referred to Vierordt’s law, 
which is named after Karl von Vierordt, the first person to report this effect 
in the 19th century (For an English translation of Vierordt’s early work on this 
see Lejeune & Wearden, 2009).  
This aspect of time perception is robust across sensory modalities where 
no feedback is given (Lejeune & Wearden, 2009); when participants receive 
feedback during duration reproduction tasks on the accuracy of their 
judgements the effect does not occur (Lewis & Miall, 2009). Considering the 
model with a fixed 𝜏µ and σ, this means that events with relatively short 
durations, which have not been completely normalised during the event i.e. 
where the mean of ID > 1  will lead to over estimations in duration as 𝐼𝐷 will 
be greater than the assumed input to the detector population (Section 4.2.4). 
For longer durations where over the course of the event, mean ID < 1 the 
reverse is true, meaning longer durations are underestimated. This is an 
interesting property of adding a normalisation stage to mitigate the effect of 
assuming ID = 1 (section 4.2.2) in the model.  
This demonstrates that adding normalisation, a process that occurs at 
many different levels within the brain improves the model’s plausibility when 
compared to known properties of time perception. 
121 
 
121 
 
 NORMALISING STIMULI OF DIFFERENT MAGNITUDES 
To test the normalisation stage, stimuli with durations of 50-1000ms and 
magnitudes of 0.25-2 are run through the model to output duration 
estimates. An SDD population described in section 4.2.3 was capable of 
estimating the duration to the nearest 10ms (the resolution of the SDDs) and 
for the normalisation stage σ was set to 0.15 and τ to 100ms based upon the 
considerations describe in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. The durations of inputs 
with magnitude 0.25 to 2 are tested with 0.25 steps with results shown in 
Figure 4-12.  
Stimuli without any normalisation vary greatly in estimated duration and 
only where ID = 1 generate accurate estimates of duration. Stimuli where I < T 
are excluded from the non-normalised data, because the model cannot 
estimate durations of this input magnitude as the SDD low-pass filters never 
reach threshold. When normalising the input durations of lower magnitude 
input (0.5) can be estimated accurately except for the lowest intensity input 
(0.25).  
The normalisation stage gives estimates that are more consistent across 
different magnitudes but there is still a clear effect of increased input 
magnitude leading to larger duration estimates corresponding with larger 
input magnitudes. This finding is consistent across the literature with reports 
of increased perceived duration correlating with a number of properties that 
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could be considered as input magnitude. This includes, increased stimulus 
brightness (Brigner, 1986; Terao et al., 2008), speed (Brown, 1995; Kanai et 
al., 2006), temporal frequency (Kanai et al., 2006), size (Alards-Tomalin et 
al., 2014; Ono & Kitazawa, 2007; Xuan et al., 2007), colour saturation 
(Alards-Tomalin et al., 2014), and numerosity (Xuan et al., 2007). See 
Eagleman and Pariyadath, 2009 for a summary of some of this research. 
Figure 4-12: Top panel shows the model’s duration estimates versus stimulus durations 
for a non-normalised input with magnitudes of 0.75-2 with 0.25 unit steps and is the 
same as Figure 4-5. The bottom graph shows the model’s estimates for a normalised input 
using stimulus magnitudes from 0.25 to 2 with 0.25 steps. The normalised estimates are 
far more consistent and show the central tendency effect, where shorter durations are 
overestimated and longer durations underestimated. Note that the model can estimate 
durations for stimulus magnitudes smaller than the fixed SDD threshold when using the 
normalised input demonstrated as the model estimates durations for the 0.5 stimulus 
magnitude only when normalised. 
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 IMPULSE RESPONSE WITH THE NORMALISATION STAGE  
It is also worth considering the effect of an impulse on the model with the 
normalisation stage. We know the response of the low pass filter performing 
the running average to an impulse would show an exponential decay from an 
initial peak in response from Section 4.2.5. The output of the averaging filter 
(𝑂µ) at the instance of the impulse with no prior input is given by Equation 
4-15 from Equation 4-2 with τµ  as the normalisation stage time constant.  
Equation 4-15 
𝑂µ(𝑑=1) = 𝐼 (
1
𝜏µ + 1
) 
This can then be substituted into Equation 4-12 to give the input into the 
detector population from the normalisation stage to give Equation 4-16. σ is 
the normalisation constant and ID is the input into the detector population. 
Equation 4-16 
𝐼𝐷 =
𝐼
𝜎 + 𝐼 (
1
𝜏µ + 1
)
 
When combined with Equation 4-10 for the duration estimate of the 
population to an impulse of magnitude I, this gives Equation 4-17.  
Equation 4-17 
𝐷𝐼 =
(
𝐼
𝜎 + 𝐼 (
1
𝜏µ + 1
)
− 𝑇)
𝑇
 
As after normalization duration is linearly dependent on the normalized 
intensity, if the denominator in Equation 4-176 is greater than 1 this will act 
to reduce duration estimates from the population, if it is less than 1 then this 
will increase the duration estimates compared to the model without 
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normalisation. The value of I above which will result in reduced duration 
estimates is shown in Equation 4-18. 
Equation 4-18 
𝐼 = 𝜏µ − 𝜎𝜏µ + 1 − 𝜎 
Which when substituting the values chosen in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 
gives I as 86, i.e. when input magnitude over one time step produces a large 
enough input averaged over time 𝜏𝜇. Since the impulse magnitude used in 
section 4.2.5 is greater than this, we can conclude that the normalisation 
stage would reduce duration estimates in this case. When calculating the 
estimated duration for this with an input of 2000, the output is a duration 
estimate of ~158ms, much less than 3163ms, the estimate with no 
normalisation stage. From this example, it is clear that with the addition of 
the normalisation stage, the model estimates vary less with the magnitude of 
the input and are therefore more dependent on the duration of the input. 
Interestingly, inputs of a lower intensity, where the denominator is less than 
1 will actually be intensified, meaning they will register a duration at a lower 
intensity. Therefore, with the normalisation stage the model’s ability to 
estimate durations for weaker inputs is increased.  
 COMPARISONS WITH EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS ON 
SPEED AND TEMPORAL FREQUENCY 
It has been established that the model’s duration estimates vary with input 
magnitude and that this is supported by the literature. One particular 
interesting result is from Kanai et al., (2006) who provide a detailed example 
of this magnitude effect, showing that overestimation scales with object 
speed logarithmically (Figure 4-13) similar to previous findings by (Brown, 
1995) and further experiments show this effect is driven by change in 
temporal frequency. This is contrary to some of the results from the model. 
Section 4.2.5 shows the model’s estimates of time do not vary with temporal 
frequency of a time variant input, which would mean the model does not 
predict the results of Kanai et al., (2006) which is shown in Figure 4-14. This 
result is achieved by varying the temporal frequency of a sine wave input 
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(peak: 1.25, trough: 0.75 normalisation parameters: 𝜎 =0.15 and 𝜏µ = 
100ms). 
However, there is another way of representing temporal frequency within 
the model. Instead of modifying the frequency of a time varying input signal, 
temporal frequency can be represented in the magnitude of the input, so a 
greater input magnitude represents an input stimulus with a higher temporal 
frequency. There is evidence showing that cells in V1 and V2 demonstrate a 
reduced response to lower temporal frequencies (Hawken, Shapley, & Grosof, 
1996). Changing input magnitude is also how speed is represented  to get the 
results from the model in Figure 4-13. It has been suggested that speed could 
be encoded as a rate code  in MT as suggested by the high proportion of 
neurons tuned to high speeds (Cheng et al., 1994; Johnston et al., 1999) so 
there is support in the literature to justify encoding speed and/or temporal 
frequency in this way. 
 The SDDs in the model are considered to be receiving input from cells 
such as these that encode speed in terms of their firing rate, in this example. 
Here, we test if the model can account for the findings of Kanai et al., (2006) 
by modifying how temporal frequency is represented in the model. We test 
with a step on/off input of 200-1000ms and normalisation parameters of 𝜎 
=0.15 and 𝜏µ = 100ms with varying input magnitude to represent differing 
speed/temporal frequency. 
 On visual inspection, Figure 4-13 shows the model estimates of duration 
for inputs of differing intensity match the trends observed by Kanai et al., 
(2006) for perceived speed. The results from Kanai et al., (2006) and the 
model for temporal frequency are shown in Figure 4-14. Since the 
normalisation parameters have been set to values based upon general 
guidelines, these results are not a result of precise variable fitting but are an 
emergent property of the model.  
Another finding from Kanai et al., (2006) is a lack of effect for spatial 
frequency on duration. If the model input magnitude is said to encode spatial 
frequency then the model would predict a similar result to the effect of 
temporal frequency on duration running contrary to Kanai et al., (2006). 
This suggests that only neurons that scale their response with temporal 
frequency feed into estimates of duration perception and not spatial 
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frequency. Indeed neurons do not tend to scale their output with SF, but 
rather show tuning for a specific spatial frequency (DeValois & DeValois, 
1988). What can be taken from both the findings of Kanai et al., (2006) and 
the model is an indication of what stimulus properties might or might not 
affect perceived duration based upon how these properties are encoded in 
sensory systems, which could provide avenues in designing experiments to 
validate the model.  
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Figure 4-13: The left graph shows the results from (Kanai et al., 2006) experiment 1 showing 
the speed induced time dilation effect where the greater the velocity, the larger the 
overestimation of event duration according to a logarithmic trend. It also shows Vierordt’s 
law with shorter durations showing a larger overestimation than longer durations. The graph 
on the right shows data from the model using k =0.15 τ = 100ms in the normalisation stage, 
except instead of speed the x-axis shows input signal intensity which in this case is assumed 
to encode speed. The model output reflects the logarithmic trend observed by (Kanai et al., 
2006)  
 
Figure 4-14: The left graph shows results from (Kanai et al., 2006) experiment 4 showing a 
temporal frequency induced time dilation effect following a logarithmic trend with temporal 
frequency and Vierordt’s Law. The model estimating the duration of a sine wave input varying 
between 0.75 and 1.25 intensity does not show the same logarithmic relationship as the 
experimental data. 
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 WEBER’S LAW 
One aspect of duration perception is the scalar property, a manifestation of 
Weber’s Law where errors increase with size of estimates. This is claimed to 
be a robust feature of time perception where the Weber fraction, given by the 
judgement variance over the mean estimate, is approximately constant in 
animal experiments (Gibbon, 1977) and humans (Wearden, 1992). However, 
it should be pointed out that this does not always seem to hold as other 
experiments with humans have found a decrease in Weber fractions with 
duration (Bizo et al., 2006; Grondin, 2010b; Lewis & Miall, 2009). To test 
the model’s compliance with Weber’s law, Gaussian noise is introduced by 
adding noise to the stimulus (𝐼 in Equation 4-12 and Equation 4-13) to 
simulate a noisy stimulus or environment. Alternatively, noise is introduced 
internally by adding it to the output of the low-pass filters within each SDD 
(𝑂𝐿𝑃 in Equation 4-1 and Equation 4-2) to simulate noise in processing the 
input.  
Estimates are computed using a continuous input of durations 250, 500, 
750 and 1000ms with a magnitude of 1, which is normalised using τ = 
100ms, σ = 0.15 as before. The standard deviations of the internal noise were 
set at +/- 0.05, 0.1, 0.15 and 0.2. Initial testing on internal noise 
demonstrated the system to be sensitive to the noise and produces large 
overestimations in duration. Consequently, only the lowest two noise levels 
0.05 and 0.1 were used for internal noise. 100 duration estimates were 
generated for each noise level and duration combination, allowing Weber 
fractions to be computed by dividing the standard deviation by the mean of 
the 100 estimates.  
The results in Figure 4-15 shows that internal noise has a much greater 
effect on model variance, the Weber Fractions show an increase of around an 
order of magnitude compared to external noise. External noise shows Weber 
fractions decreasing with increased duration, to be expected by the law of 
large numbers that states with enough random samples over time the mean 
value of those samples will converge. Noise is added at each time step (1ms) 
in the input, changing the input magnitude at that step and the duration 
estimate is based upon the mean input magnitude (section 4.2.4). 
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Interpreted using the law of large numbers, the input magnitude at each 
time-step is a random event and with a longer duration input, there are a 
greater number of random events, so the average of these events, i.e. the 
input magnitude converges over time resulting in less variance over the 100 
trials for longer inputs and hence reduced Weber fractions. A different trend 
is apparent with internal noise, Weber fractions exhibit less relative change 
across durations, with the lower noise level showing increasing Weber 
fractions and higher noise level demonstrating the opposite. The scalar 
property of timing (Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon et al., 1984; Wearden, 1991) is a 
case of Weber’s law applied to duration perception that states errors in 
duration estimates should increase proportionally to the duration estimate 
itself, meaning the Weber fractions should stay constant across a range of 
durations. 
 Adding external noise does not exhibit this effect; instead, the model 
shows a reduction in Weber Fractions with time, closer to the results of Lewis 
& Miall (2009), who show a reduction relative to Weber’s law with timing. 
Internal noise shows a relatively small reduction or increase in Weber 
fractions depending on noise levels. Since results showing the scalar property 
of time perception do exhibit a large variation (Gibbon, 1977; Wearden, 
1991), the model could still be said to fit with behavioural data despite not 
exhibiting constant Weber fractions. These results also provide a way to 
reconcile the differences in experimental observations, where the scalar 
property of timing is not obeyed (Bizo et al., 2006; Grondin, 2010b; Lewis & 
Miall, 2009). External noise, either from the environment, stimulus or task 
difficulty is the main driver of non-scalar time estimations, where internal 
noise in the model produces variability more closely aligned with the scalar 
property. 
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Figure 4-15: Showing Weber fractions (standard deviation/ mean of duration estimates) for 
external (left) and internal (right) noise. With external noise, Weber fractions are generally 
higher with more noise and decrease with the stimulus duration. Internal noise shows Weber 
Fractions an order of magnitude greater than external noise (right) and do not exhibit the 
same overall trend. Lower noise (blue) shows a slight increase in Weber fractions whilst the 
higher noise (green) shows a slight decrease. 
 NORMALISATION ACCOUNTS FOR ADAPTATION 
INDUCED DURATION COMPRESSION EFFECTS 
There is a body of evidence showing adaptation to high temporal 
frequency and high contrast grating stimuli causes duration compression 
(Bruno & Johnston, 2010; Burr et al., 2007; Johnston et al., 2006). Both high 
contrast and high temporal frequency stimuli cause contrast gain adaptation 
in M, but not P Cells in macaque monkeys (Solomon et al., 2004). It has been 
theorised (Johnston, 2010; Johnston et al., 2006) that the duration 
compression effect is a result of adaptation in M-cells in LGN, implicating a 
low-level mechanism contributing to duration compression.  
The normalisation stage in the model is effectively a form of gain control 
defined by the normalisation factor 𝐼𝜇 and constant σ; as such, it is possible 
to posit that this normalisation stage in the model is analogous to the 
function of M-cells. Solomon et al., (2004) show that adaptation creates a 
shift in the contrast sensitivity function of M-cells so that they are more 
sensitive to higher contrast stimuli, which is a result of a reduction in gain. In 
the normalisation stage, an increase in σ is effectively a decrease in gain. It is 
possible that the long-term suppression in M-cells caused by high contrast or 
high temporal frequency adaptation and the resulting changes to contrast 
sensitivity and suggests the effects on duration compression can be explained 
by variations in σ within the normalisation stage. By increasing σ and 
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simulating the model’s response to a stimulus this can be said to represent 
the change in response of M-cells after adaptation.  
To test the effect of increased σ on duration estimates of step function on-
off inputs with three input intensities (0.5,1,1.5) with a range of durations 
(200-1000ms, 200ms steps) were computed. The model normalisation 
parameters are set to 𝝉µ= 100ms and σ set to 0.15, as before, acting as the 
‘unadapted’ condition as well as σ = 0.2 and 0.25 both acting as 
‘adapted’conditions. Figure 4-16 shows reductions in duration estimations 
when increasing σ to reduce normalisation gain. This reduction is consistent 
across stimulus durations and input magnitudes. Figure 4-17 shows the 
duration compression ratios (unadapted/adapted condition duration 
estimates for the same stimulus duration) for inputs of different intensities, 
showing a compression in perceived duration of around 10-40% (shown in 
Figure 4-17 as compression ratios of 0.9-0.6 respectively) depending on the 
value of σ used. This compares reasonably well to duration compression 
effects of approximately 20% in Johnston et al., (2006); showing that high 
contrast or high temporal frequency adaptation induced duration 
compression could be explained by changes in gain of the model’s 
normalisation stage implemented by increasing the normalisation constant σ.  
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Figure 4-16: Shows the effect of increasing σ (Solid: σ = 0.15, Dashed: σ = 0.20, Dotted σ = 
0.25) on duration estimates for stimuli of different intensities (coloured) this shows a duration 
compression effect for increased σ across different intensities. 
 
Figure 4-17: Shows the duration compression ratios for stimuli of varying magnitudes relative 
to σ = 0.15 (Solid) where the stimulus is considered ‘unadapted’ and the where the stimulus 
has been ‘adapted’ where σ = 0.2 (dashed line) and σ = 0.25 dotted line. Both adapted 
conditions show a reduction in duration across a range of durations for all inputs as observed 
by the compression ratios of less than 1. 
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 NORMALISATION STAGE AS A GAIN CONTROL 
MECHANISM 
We have shown that reduction in the model’s normalisation stage gain 
shows a reduction in duration estimates comparable with adaptation results 
in the literature. This section follows on by investigating whether the 
normalisation stage implemented in the model could be considered 
equivalent to the contrast gain control mechanism in the M pathway 
observed by Solomon et al., (2004) even though this model has not been 
designed to encode contrast.  
It has been mentioned before in Section 4.3.6 that signal magnitude could 
act as a variable to encode stimulus properties. So here the input (𝐼) and 
output (𝐼𝐷) magnitude of the normalisation stage is assumed to encode 
luminance contrast, where 𝐼 is the contrast of the stimulus and(𝐼𝐷) is 
analogous to the neural response to the stimulus i.e. the mean spike rate 
encoding contrast. Although, the normalisation is designed to set 𝐼𝐷 to the 
same level no matter what the magnitude of I. If the output contrast is taken 
as the average intensity across the first 100ms after stimulus onset, where the 
output of the normalisation stage has not fully normalised, we see variation 
in the output intensity, which can be interpreted as the contrast sensitivity 
function of the model. Figure 4-18 shows the change in contrast sensitivity in 
M-Cell spike rates observed by Solomon et al., (2004) and the results from 
the model.  
With increasing gain, the model output shifts rightward along the x-axis 
with increasing contrast, which is the same direction as the contrast 
sensitivity function observed by Solomon et al., (2004). However, there are 
clear differences in the shape of the sensitivity function between the model 
and experimental data. The recorded spike rate function is sinusoidal while 
the model shows an exponential sensitivity function. This might be explained 
as a saturation effect as there are limits in the spiking output frequency of 
neurons. In fact, this limitation makes the contrast gain change perceptually 
desirable as the decrease in gain means higher contrasts are more discernible 
from the cell spike rate, making the visual system more sensitive to subtle 
changes in a high contrast environment.  
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Overall, changing σ to reduce gain means the model approximates data 
from in-vivo cellular recordings and could be made to match them closely 
with the addition of a ceiling effect. This is despite the model not being 
conceived to explain contrast gain adaptation. σ in the normalisation stage is 
equivalent to c50 in contrast gain normalisation equations detailed by 
Solomon et al., (2004) who indicated that the change in contrast gain control 
is the result of inhibitory input to M-cells from retinal ganglion cells that 
persists for several seconds after adaptation to high contrast stimuli. 
 
Figure 4-18: Left shows effect of adaptation to a high contrast grating to the contrast 
sensitivity profile of M-cells from Solomon et al., (2004). Right shows the normalisation stage 
output given the input stimulus contrast represented by the input intensity for different values 
of k where increasing σ is analogous to contrast gain adaptation. Both model and data show a 
shift in the sensitivity profile in the same direction though the model output is not sinusoidal, 
exhibiting a saturation effect like the recorded data. 
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 DISCUSSION 
This chapter shows that a model using varying temporal responses of 
neural systems, represented by low-pass filters, can encode the duration of a 
stimulus whether the input stimulus is continuous or time variant. A feature 
of the model proposed here is that at no point before the final duration value 
from the last-off method is duration explicitly represented in the system. 
Instead, signal magnitude represents a particular property of the stimulus. 
Therefore, the low-pass filters can represent neurons, or populations of 
neurons encoding that particular stimulus property and can be placed 
anywhere in the visual system. This means duration can be encoded in 
addition to other stimulus properties given that the neurons or populations 
of neurons vary in their temporal response to the stimulus.  
When the input magnitude is not known or cannot be determined 
beforehand, a requirement of this model is that the input needs to be 
normalised (a process carried out across multiple systems in the brain 
(Carandini & Heeger, 2011). This fits in with the distributed nature of the 
model in that using normalisation does not limit where in the brain or on 
what level in the sensory processing hierarchy the model might exist. The 
literature shows that the magnitude of a stimulus property does affect 
estimates of duration as has been shown experimentally in many visual 
modalities (stimulus brightness-Brigner, 1986; Terao et al., 2008, speed – 
Brown, 1995; Kanai et al, 2006; temporal frequency - Kanai et al., 2006; size 
– Alards-Tomalin et al 2014; Ono & Kitazawa, 2011; Xuan et al., 2007), 
colour saturation (Alards-Tomalin et al., 2014), and numerosity (Xuan et al., 
2007). These results are matched well by the fact that the normalisation 
stage mitigates the effect of input magnitude on duration estimates.  
Changing the parameters in the model’s normalisation stage explains 
results from experiments showing that adaptation to particular visual stimuli 
changes perceived duration (Ayhan et al., 2011; Bruno & Johnston, 2010; 
Burr et al., 2007; Burr et al., 2011; Johnston, 2010; Johnston et al., 2006). 
This also corresponds to shifts in sensitivity functions of M-cells (Solomon et 
al., 2004) that indicate a possible mechanism for duration compression after 
adaptation. The requirement for a normalisation stage not only describes the 
result of these studies, it can also explain why adaptation and stimulus 
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property magnitude affect perceived duration, which is because the signals in 
the brain coding for these properties are also used in computing event time. 
This corresponds to proposals that duration uses a shared magnitude system 
with properties such as size and numerosity (Walsh, 2003). This may explain 
why properties like size (Alards-Tomalin et al., 2014) and numerosity (Xuan 
et al., 2007) also affect duration as there is a suggestion these are processed 
in the same, broad pathway (Bueti & Walsh, 2009; Walsh, 2003). 
A duration estimation mechanism cannot use the raw signal magnitude to 
estimate event time because this leads to large errors in estimates that are 
untenable. Adaptation is not limited to one system or stage in processing 
within sensory systems, so it is likely that a duration mechanism of this kind 
may use sensory signals that have been fed through several adaptation 
stages. There is some evidence of this with directionally selective adaptation 
also affecting duration (Curran & Benton, 2012; Latimer et al., 2014). High 
concentrations of directionally selective cells are most commonly found in 
extra striate visual areas (Maunsell & Van Essen, 1983), implying adaptation 
stages further up the visual hierarchy affect duration estimates in addition to 
the proposed M-Cell gain change.  
It may be suggested that the simplicity and flexibility of the model leaves it 
somewhat underdetermined and thus unfalsifiable, but there are some 
findings presented here and from literature that might serve to pin down  
mechanisms with the proposed model. The evidence from the adaptation 
studies (Bruno & Johnston, 2010; Johnston et al., 2006) as well as the results 
relating the normalisation stage to contrast gain control in M-cells implicated 
the Magnocellular and not Parvocellular pathway in time perception. A 
finding also supported by the results of Kanai et al., (2006) who find that 
spatial frequency, for which P-Cells are selective (Xu et al., 2001) does not 
affect perceived time. Results showing adaptation to motion has similar 
effects also implicating motion sensitive areas (Curran & Benton, 2012; 
Marinovic & Arnold, 2011).  
This can be tied into another problem with the model, which is that it 
requires the time constant of the duration encoding neurons to be equal to 
the duration being encoded requiring neurons with slow time constants that 
might not be realistic. There are models showing how ramping activity 
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evolving over seconds can be produced with a single cell (Durstewitz, 2003) 
and within a population (Simen, Balci, Cohen, & Holmes, 2011; Standage, 
You, Wang, & Dorris, 2013). There is also neurophysiological evidence 
showing cells in LIP encode time delays in actions using ramping firing rates 
(Janssen & Shadlen, 2005; Leon & Shadlen, 2003). It is not possible to say 
that these neurons act as the low-pass filters in this model, particularly as 
they are involved in action timing, not visual perception but the function of 
the low-pass filters in the model could be performed by neurons exhibiting 
similar temporal properties. The Magnocellular pathway, MT and LIP are all 
considered to make up the dorsal/action pathway in the visual system 
(Goodale & Milner, 1992; Nassi & Callaway, 2009), which has been proposed 
as the where/when pathway (Battelli, Pascual-Leone, & Cavanagh, 2007), 
implicating its involvement in duration perception. This means the most 
likely location of an analogue of the proposed model in the visual system is in 
the dorsal/action pathway as properties that affect perceived duration are 
processed within it and neurons that exhibit properties similar to the low-
pass filters used in the model exist. 
An unresolved problem with the model is if duration is encoded across 
sensory hierarchies, how do sensory systems arrive upon a final duration for 
an event? This is an example in the temporal domain of the generic sensory 
binding problem (Revonsuo & Newman, 1999): when a system processing 
sensory attributes is using different sub-systems, it needs to work out which 
properties need to be bound together to produce a coherent and unique 
object percept. This is an interesting broader issue that is not exclusive to 
duration perception or this model, but is relevant to the study of perception 
as a whole. 
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 SDDS SHARE COMMONALITIES WITH OTHER MODELS  
This model demonstrates that it is possible to estimate event duration by 
using fundamental properties of neural systems. A common theme of this 
model is that changing the input into the SDD population by manipulating 
magnitude either by changing the input stimulus representing the sensory 
event or by manipulating the input gain in the normalisation stage, results in 
changing the duration estimates.  
This approach shares at least some similarities with previously proposed 
explanations for duration. Perhaps the clearest link is the neural energy 
proposal (Eagleman & Pariyadath, 2009) that duration is encoded by the 
amount of neural activity associated with an event. This is similar to the SDD 
model where in a single detector time is represented by whether or not the 
output of a low-pass filter has reached a specified threshold so also depends 
on the amount of neural activity. Neural energy provides only a descriptive 
account of time perception as opposed to the more precise quantitative 
model proposed here. In the SDD model, neural energy may not just relate to 
the input to the model but also to the way duration is encoded using the SDD 
population. The low-pass filter output of an individual SDD increases over 
time and more SDDs switch on in accordance with the event duration. If 
either the low-pass output or the number of detectors switching on is 
analogous to neural activity, such as firing rate of a single or population of 
neurons then this is a direct demonstration of how neural energy can 
represent time.  
The SDD itself is similar to the memory strength model (Staddon & Higa, 
1999) which uses low-pass filters and thresholds to represent duration in the 
strength of an event’s representation in memory that can decay over time. 
The concept of what a memory is and how it is stored is ill defined. The SDD 
model can exist in sensory systems on top of mechanisms encoding sensory 
properties that, depending on the property in question, are reasonably well 
defined in literature so improves upon these shortcomings. 
It also has similarities with pacemaker-accumulator models (Gibbon et al., 
1984; Treisman et al., 1990; Wearden, 1992). The main difference is instead 
of having an accumulator counting inputs from a central pacemaker the 
input signal from the environment acts as a pacemaker, which is normalised 
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to give an approximately constant input. The input then drives low-pass 
filters, which act as accumulators producing a ramped output. The main 
fundamental deviation of the SDD model from internal clock models is that a 
central pacemaker is not responsible for the time sense but it is instead 
sensory systems compute duration according to local input. 
Sensory systems use distributed parallel processing on multiple 
hierarchies so it follows that sensory systems compute duration in a similar 
distributed fashion. The SDD model is completely compatible with this view. 
With the normalisation stage showing evidence that it could map onto 
functions performed by M-cells in LGN and the SDD population occurring as 
a second stage the model shows a hierarchical structure.  
 CONCLUSIONS 
The key conclusion of this chapter is that it is possible to estimate event 
time quantitatively, based upon established, basic, temporal properties of 
neural systems without the need for a central timer, instead being more 
compatible with the neural energy hypothesis. The implication of this is that 
event durations can be computed locally across sensory systems, making use 
of shared mechanisms when required. The perceived duration of a sensory 
event is therefore dependent on the signal properties encoding the event 
duration and on processes, such as adaptation, that affect the encoding of 
these properties.  
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5. CHAPTER FIVE -EVENT PREDICTABILITY 
AND PERCEIVED DURATION: A 
BEHAVIOURAL AND NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL 
STUDY 
 INTRODUCTION 
One proposal is that perceived time and expectation are linked (Pariyadath 
& Eagleman, 2007; Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2012). The classic example often 
given to support this claim is the oddball paradigm originally demonstrated 
by Rose and Summers, (1995) where unexpected objects appear to last 
longer. This is not necessarily an effect of low-level adaptation due to 
stimulus repetition (Schindel et al., 2011), and is likely due to expectation 
(Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2007; Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2012). This is an 
important finding as changes due to expectation affect BOLD signal which 
shows a suppression effect when a stimulus is repeated, not entirely due to 
simple BOLD adaptation to repeated stimuli (Grill-Spector et al., 2006; 
Larsson & Smith, 2012), implying a link between BOLD repetition 
suppression and stimulus expectation in the oddball paradigm of Pariyadath 
and Eagleman (2012). A reduction in BOLD signal due to expectation can be 
considered a signal indicating a mismatch between perceptions and 
predictions i.e. an error signal, which could link duration to theories of 
perceptual learning such as those proposed by Friston (2010).  
The previous two chapters have focused on the effects of sensory 
adaptation based upon previous work (Ayhan et al., 2011; Bruno & Johnston, 
2010; Curran & Benton, 2012; Johnston et al., 2006; Marinovic & Arnold, 
2011; Solomon et al., 2004). To obtain a full understanding of how time is 
perceived, top-down effects such as expectation need to be considered as 
well, since the representation of duration in the visual system may be linked 
to expectation related modulation in the visual system (Pariyadath & 
Eagleman, 2012). It has been suggested that perceived duration is related to 
the amount of neural activity associated with processing an event (Eagleman 
& Pariyadath, 2009; Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2007; Pariyadath & Eagleman, 
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2012). Such a link is also proposed with the model in Chapter 4, where the 
model estimates of duration are correlated with the output magnitude of 
individual low-pass filters or the mean across a population of filters that are 
said to represent the output of individual or populations of neurons. 
Although, the model in its current form does not account for expectation 
effects, similar to how a reduced input to the SDD population because of low-
level adaptation predicts an effect on duration; reduced BOLD might indicate 
a reduction in input due to expectations that would have a similar effect on 
duration estimates. BOLD signal can be broadly interpreted as a correlate of 
input to and processing within a local population of neurons (Logothetis, 
2003; Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath, & Oeltermann, 2001), so this 
proposed link provides a way to relate perceived duration to neural activity. 
As the oddball effect is a result of expectation (Schindel et al., 2011) the 
BOLD correlate must be repetition suppression produced by expectations 
(Summerfield et al., 2008) which Larsson and Smith (2012) show can be 
removed, leaving only the effect of repetition suppression from adaptation. 
The aim here is to do the opposite, removing repetition suppression due to 
adaptation, thus leaving only suppression due to expectation. This would link 
duration estimations to mechanisms involved in predicting future events and 
generating expectations (Friston, 2010; Grill-Spector et al., 2006).  
 DO EXPECTATIONS SUPPRESS BOLD IN EARLY 
VISUAL AREAS? 
Two studies show the effects of expectation on repetition suppression 
(Larsson and Smith, 2012; Summerfield et al., 2008) using face stimuli that 
activate higher visual areas such as the FFA, which respond to complex 
combinations of visual features (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997). 
Some of the work discussed in previous chapters suggests the involvement of 
precortical and/or early cortical areas in duration perception (Ayhan et al., 
2009; Bruno & Johnston, 2010; Johnston et al., 2006). As basic stimuli such 
as Gabor patches or gratings have properties such as orientation, which are 
encoded in early cortical visual areas (i.e. very different orientations are likely 
to cause markedly different patterns of activity in early areas), using these 
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will show if repetition suppression in these areas is also correlated to 
perceived event duration.  
Is there evidence for suppression using stimuli that drive differential 
responses mostly in early visual cortex? Kok, Jehee, and de Lange (2012a) 
used an auditory tone to cue the orientation of two sequentially presented 
grating stimuli. These two gratings had the same broad orientation (both 
were either roughly 45° left or right from vertical) but differed slightly in 
contrast and orientation (so one grating was slightly clockwise or anti-
clockwise of the other). By cueing for broad orientation (the tone signalled 
45° left or right from vertical) and asking participants to determine which of 
the two was either orientated clockwise or had the highest contrast, both an 
expectation is created and task relevance is manipulated. Results show a 
smaller V1 BOLD response in trials for the expected orientation direction for 
both the orientation and contrast discrimination tasks and a larger 
suppression when the cued expectation was relevant to the task. In a control 
experiment they show this relationship cannot be down to stimulus 
repetition (that would imply bottom-up adaptation), so must be due to the 
expectation invoked by the cue.  
This result demonstrates that effects of expectation are not exclusive to 
higher visual areas but propagate down to or are derived locally in lower level 
areas such as V1, according to the expectation of low-level stimulus 
properties encoded in V1. Therefore, expectation is a general mechanism 
across the visual cortex. They also find this expectation enhances differences 
between stimulus properties, as reflected in the information contained in the 
BOLD signal, but as there is no effect of expectation on visual areas V2 and 
V3, this means either expectation only enhances representations in early 
visual areas or that it enhances representation in areas which are most tuned 
to the cued stimulus property.  
What this means for this experiment is it provides a proof-of-concept, 
showing suppression as a result of expectation in early vision using low-level 
stimulus properties. This is of interest as adaptation studies suggest early or 
pre-cortical involvement in visual perception of duration (Ayhan et al., 2009; 
Bruno & Johnston, 2010; Johnston et al., 2006). Using Gabor stimuli of 
different durations will allow not only to investigate the effects of repetition 
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suppression, but also to examine a BOLD correlate of duration perception 
and examine the effects of expectation on the BOLD duration correlate.   
 REPETITION SUPPRESSION: PERCEPTUAL 
EXPECTATION OR ATTENTION?  
Attention has been shown to reduce suppression in BOLD (Larsson & 
Smith, 2012). In addition to investigating the effects of suppression due to 
expectation on early visual areas Kok et al., (2012a) also investigate the 
interaction between goal directed attention and perceptual expectation. They 
find that responses to gratings with the expected orientation are more easily 
discerned using multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) showing an increase in 
stimulus representational clarity despite the corresponding measured drop in 
BOLD. This effect was not dependent on task (orientation or contrast 
discrimination), and was reflected in the behavioural data. As the effect was 
task independent, it was claimed there was no effect of attention to a 
particular feature and so is a result primarily of expectation priming, similar 
to that proposed by Lee and Mumford (2003), rather than feature based 
attention (Maunsell & Treue, 2006). However, Larsson and Smith (2012) 
show that when attention is removed by adding a distractor there is a 
reduction in expectation induced suppression, suggesting for some tasks, 
attention at least helps expectations to form, if not an explanation in itself. 
Summerfield and Egner (2009) hypothesised that attention and expectation 
are two complementary mechanisms that aim to enhance synergistically 
relevant sensory signals, improving the precision of sensory systems in a 
resources efficient manner. Attempts to untangle effects of attention and 
expectation were carried out in a separate study (Kok, Rahnev, Jehee, Lau, & 
de Lange, 2012b), where perceptual expectations and attention were 
manipulated independently so that they were either task relevant or not. 
Suppression of BOLD in response to predictable stimuli was observed for 
unattended stimuli (areas V1, V2 and V3), but there was a reversal in 
suppression when the attention was cued to the same side the stimulus 
appears on, so unexpected stimuli exhibited a reduction in BOLD compared 
to predictable stimuli (areas V1, V2 and V3). The findings are interpreted as 
supporting the hypothesis that attention mitigates the effect of expectation 
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on stimulus response (Feldman & Friston, 2010). This could be considered 
the opposite effect to Larsson and Smith (2012), who found that suppression 
is reduced when using a distractor task to divert attention. This is perhaps 
due to methodological differences, Larsson and Smith (2012) distract 
attention from the stimuli completely while (Kok et al., 2012b) distract 
attention by making the expectation irrelevant to the task but do not distract 
from the stimuli, signifying a difference between spatial and feature based 
attention. A further study (Jiang, Summerfield, & Egner, 2013) sought to 
disentangle between these seemingly contradictory error signal suppression 
and amplification effects of attention. The experiment finds that attention 
increases the ability to distinguish between unexpected and expected stimuli 
using MVPA, across two areas selective for the different stimulus categories, 
the FFA for faces and Parahippocampal place area (PPA) for scenes, thus 
enhances the perceptual error signal. The authors explain differences in this 
finding with Kok et al., (2012a) as a difference in question as in Jiang et al., 
(2013) the question was does attention affect the error signal induced by 
expectation?, whilst the previous study investigates the effect of attention on 
the ability to decode the stimulus response. Jiang et al., (2013) show a similar 
univariate effect of attention and expectation as Kok et al., (2012b), where 
the average BOLD response of FFA or PPA is increased (for the relevant 
area’s preferred category) when the stimulus is expected and attended 
relative to unattended and/or unexpected stimuli. The finding by Jiang et al., 
(2013) also matches Larsson and Smith (2012), who show that removing 
attention reduces repetition suppression. These studies show that attention 
facilitates the computation of prediction errors as evidenced by greater 
suppression, increasing the fidelity of the error signal as shown by improved 
MVPA decoding. This supports theoretical work (Feldman & Friston, 2010; 
Friston, 2005). These studies also show that suppression due to expectations 
in BOLD can be manipulated by both expectations themselves and task 
relevance. 
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 THE HAEMODYNAMIC RESPONSE AND STIMULUS 
DURATION 
fMRI studies often use a linear model (Boynton, Engel, Glover, & Heeger, 
1996; Heeger, Huk, Geisler, & Albrecht, 2000) to estimate the BOLD 
response of a stimulus by convolving the stimulus profile with an impulse 
response function representing the haemodynamic response of the vascular 
system within the brain. As change in BOLD is driven by neural activity, 
deviations from baseline in the estimated BOLD response to a stimulus are 
interpreted as being caused by neuronal activity. Significant deviations from 
baseline estimates of BOLD are considered a result of differences in neuronal 
response to stimulus properties, thought most likely to be spatially localised 
input and processing similar to that measured by LFPs (Logothetis, 2003; 
Logothetis et al., 2001). There are many examples of this with visual 
properties such as orientation (Tootell et al., 1998), luminance contrast 
(Goodyear & Menon, 1998), motion (Smith, Greenlee, Singh, Kraemer, & 
Hennig, 1998) and colour (Engel, Zhang, & Wandell, 1997), where a localised 
change in BOLD is interpreted as neurons responding to that property. This 
provides a cornerstone of neuroimaging in vision science as visual areas can 
be mapped using BOLD response to particular stimulus (DeYoe et al., 1996; 
Engel, Glover, & Wandell, 1997). fMRI studies on timing show evidence of 
multiple areas and brain structures involved in timing such as the 
cerebellum, basal ganglia, frontal cortex and supplementary motor areas 
(Coull, 2004; Coull et al., 2004; Hinton & Meck, 2004; Jueptner et al., 1995; 
Lebedev et al., 2008; Livesey et al., 2007; Mathiak et al., 2004; Rao et al., 
2001), which have been claimed to either be evidence of a central timing 
mechanism or a network of areas contributing to time perception. Trying to 
localise time functions might be misguided if timing is not performed by a 
central mechanism, such as a clock (Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon, et al,. 1984; 
Treisman et al.,1990) and is instead performed across distributed 
mechanisms (Grondin, 2010a; Ivry & Spencer, 2004). Given that the 
temporal resolution of the BOLD response is on the order of seconds due to 
the slow change in blood flow (TRs used in the following experiments are 
2500ms, typical for capturing this change), differences stimulus durations 
that are perceptually easy to distinguish but are both less than a second 
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would not necessarily show differences in BOLD. As such, any significant 
differences in the visual cortex between two distinguishable, sub-second 
durations could be down to their explicit durations encoded in neural firing 
rates and reflected in the BOLD signal. Furthermore, measuring differences 
in the perceived duration of stimuli provides a means for testing the 
relationship between perceptual expectations, BOLD suppression and 
perceived duration. Expectation induced repetition suppression in BOLD is 
localised to areas where neurons exist that respond to the particular stimulus 
(faces – FFA: Summerfield et al., 2008, places- PPA: Jiang et al., 2013 and 
gratings – V1: Kok et al., 2012a Kok et al., 2012b). 
 A demonstrable relationship between BOLD suppression and duration in 
the visual cortex would provide evidence for distributed processing of 
duration in the visual system. V1, MT, MST and MT+ (combined MT and 
MST) are the visual areas targeted by this study. V1 is chosen as neurons in 
this area encode orientation, the stimulus property that is predictable based 
upon the probe where BOLD response changes in accordance with 
expectation using orientation grating stimuli (Kok et al., 2012a Kok et al., 
2012b). MT, MST and MT+ are chosen as these areas have been linked to 
time perception (Curran & Benton, 2012; Sadeghi et al., 2011). 
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 GENERAL METHOD 
The motivation for this study is to test the hypothesis that temporal 
expansion of unexpected stimuli can be a result of repetition suppression 
induced by perceptual expectation. The experiment needs to remove 
confounding effects of bottom-up adaptation, effectively the opposite 
approach to Larsson and Smith (2012) who remove the effect of top-down 
mechanisms on repetition suppression. This is not possible with the standard 
oddball design, as the stimulus is repeated, which induces adaptation, 
therefore another method of creating expectations is required.  
To create an expectation, each trial consists of a pair of stimuli: a prime 
stimulus appearing first, followed by a probe stimulus. The prime is one of 
two different stimuli, labelled A or B. The probe can also be one of two 
stimuli, labelled X or Y. To create expectation, the probability of a particular 
probe stimulus following a particular prime stimulus is manipulated so that 
on presentation of prime A there is a greater chance of probe X appearing 
than probe Y, this probability is reversed for prime B, so probe Y is more 
probable after prime B than probe X (Figure 5-1). Having an equal number of 
Prime A and B trials, randomly interleaved within a block means the probe 
stimuli X and Y are also displayed an equal number of times, given that the 
probabilities of X and Y appearing after B are opposite and equal for 
appearing after A. This factors out any adaptation effects from seeing one 
stimulus more often within a trial block, whilst creating a perceptual 
expectation for more probable pairings.  
The prime stimuli will be Gaussian patches coloured red or green. The 
probe stimuli are Gabor patches orientated left or right. As orientation is 
encoded in V1 by orientation tuned neurons, it is hypothesised that 
expectations of orientation will have an effect in early visual areas as has 
been shown to occur with pre-learnt relationships (Kok et al., 2012a), so the 
experiment can test for duration and suppression effects in early visual areas. 
Another aim of this experiment is to investigate if it is possible to induce 
expectations by unconscious processing (i.e. not pre-learnt pairings) with no 
effect of adaptation taking place and using simple Gabor stimuli to test if 
expectation is an automatic process that occurs in early visual areas. 
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Participants were uninformed of the relationship between prime and 
probe stimuli beforehand in similar experiments (Larsson Smith, 2012; 
Summerfield et al., 2008) and when asked if they spotted a relationship after 
completion of the experiment, they indicated that they were not aware of it. 
Despite this, these studies exhibit significant repetition suppression in face 
processing areas. If BOLD suppression for expected stimuli, outside of 
awareness were found this would provide a link between it and research 
showing the MMN in EEG experiments as MMN is also shown outside of 
awareness (Garrido, Kilner, Stephan, & Friston, 2009).  
This result could pave the way for future studies on BOLD suppression 
with EEG - as it has much greater temporal resolution than fMRI it would 
provide a way to measure population activity in real time. Furthermore, by 
using a variation of the oddball stimulus that does not cause differential 
adaptation in the probes we directly attempt to connect expectation driven 
suppression with this paradigm.  
 
Figure 5-1 Shows the stimuli and their relationship in each experimental condition and the 
procedure for each trial. a) shows the probabilistic relationship between the prime and probe 
stimuli for the experimental condition. Each of the probe stimuli are more likely to appear 
following a particular prime. b) shows the control condition where both probes are equally 
likely to appear after each prime. c) shows the experimental procedure. There is a random 
delay between trials to allow the participant to fixate before the prime stimulus appears, either 
A or B chosen at random. There is another short, randomised delay before the probe stimulus 
appears for between 250 and 1000ms as defined by a staircase procedure. The participant 
indicates by button press, which lasts longer, the prime or probe.  
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 MEASURING DURATION PERCEPTION 
Six participants took part in this experiment (four naïve to the purpose of 
the experiment, three females). Participants sat with their head in a chinrest 
positioned 57cm in front of a linearized Sony Trinitron monitor in a darkened 
room using a resolution of 800x600 and refresh rate of 100Hz. Stimuli were 
displayed using PsychoPy v1.78 (Peirce, 2007). Data analysis performed in 
MATLAB 2011a and SPSS 21.0. Experimental stimuli and procedure are 
shown in Figure 5-1 .  
Participants fixated upon a small (0.1° radius) blue 9.82cdm-2 dot 
positioned in the centre of the screen that was present throughout all the 
trials. The prime stimuli A and B consisted of green and red Gaussian 
patches, coloured respectively (20cdm2), with a width of 2.35° at half 
maximum (1° standard deviation) appearing on a mid-grey (27cdm2) 
background and appeared in the centre of the screen. The probe always 
appeared for a duration of 500ms. After prime offset there was a uniformly 
distributed, random delay of 333-666ms before probe onset. Probe stimuli X 
and Y consisted of a greyscale Gabor patch with a peak luminance of 55cdm-2, 
spatial frequency of 1Hz and a standard deviation of 1°, positioned in the 
centre of the screen. The Gabor patch was orientated 45° clockwise or 
anticlockwise from vertical.  
For half the participants probe X was clockwise and Y anticlockwise and 
the other half this was reversed to compensate for any bias in responses due 
to orientation. The probe stimulus duration varied by a standard staircase 
procedure between 250 and 1000ms. The participant indicated if the probe 
or the prime stimulus appeared for the longer duration by key press on a 
computer keyboard.  
Two different experimental conditions were used for this experiment 
defined by the probabilities of each probe stimulus appearing after the prime. 
In the control, condition both probes X and Y appeared following each prime 
half the time. While in the experimental condition, Probe X had a 75% chance 
and Y a 25% chance of appearing after Probe A while this was reversed for 
Probe B. These ratios were chosen as the same ratios create a repetition 
suppression effect in Larsson and Smith (2012). This means for Probe A, Y 
acts as the oddball stimulus and for B, X is the oddball. Prime-Probe 
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combinations were randomly interleaved for both blocks. Naïve participants 
were not informed of the relationships between stimuli in either the control 
or experimental conditions. All they knew, in addition to the experimental 
task, was simply that the aim of the experiment was to investigate the effects 
of visual event predictability on perceived duration.  
The perceived duration for each probe was measured by concurrent 
standard staircases, one starting at the minimum 250ms duration and the 
other starting at the maximum duration 1000ms (+/- 1 octave of the prime 
duration). Each staircase consisted of a minimum of 30 trials. This means 
that in the control, each prime-probe combination was shown for a total of 
60 repetitions and in the experimental condition oddball combinations 
(Prime A, Probe Y and Prime B, Probe X) appeared 60 times and the 
expected combination (Prime A, Probe X and Prime B, Probe Y) appeared 
180 times. Staircase step size was 160, 80, 80, 40, 40, 20, 20ms for each 
reversal, in order for the first seven reversals and 10ms for any reversal 
thereon. Blocks were run on different days to minimise learning between 
each run and the order was reversed for each participant to counterbalance 
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any remaining learning effects carried over from one block to another. 
 
Figure 5-2: a) shows the mean perceived duration for each experimental condition across 
participants with error bars showing standard deviations (N=6). Shaded points are each 
individual participants’ perceived duration with error bars showing standard deviation (N=4 
for 25% and 75% conditions. N = 8 for 50% condition). There is no overall significant effect of 
stimulus predictability on perceived duration and there is no overall difference with the mean 
perceived duration across participants and actual stimulus duration (500ms) with any 
condition. b) shows each individual participant’s mean for each condition with error bars 
indicating standard deviation (N=4 for 25% and 75% conditions. N = 8 for 50% condition). 
Some individuals show significantly different perceived durations from the 500ms stimulus 
duration (*, p < 0.05. dunn-sidak corrected for multiple comparisons) showing variability in 
perceived event duration and suggesting significant individual differences with stimulus 
timing.  
 
As each stimulus pair had two staircases and each different probability 
condition had two different stimulus pairs (75%: A-X, B-Y, 25%: A-Y B-X), 
this gives four measures for each participant for the 75% and 25% probability 
conditions. These were averaged to give a PSE estimate and standard error. 
For the 50% control condition, there were eight measures as all four stimulus 
pairs have the same probability and each pair has two concurrent staircases. 
These where averaged to get a mean PSE and standard deviation. The 
behavioural results for duration perception are shown in Figure 5-2. The 
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staircases for each participants’ responses converged in all conditions,  four 
typical staircases are show for the participant 2’s unexpected (25%) 
condition, demonstrating that the issues discussed in Chapter 2 (specifically 
2.4) regarding the problems encountered with measuring the Flash-Lag 
illusion with adaptive methods are not present with this paradigm.  
The mean estimate of duration for each condition appears in Figure 5-2 a). 
For each condition there is no significant difference between the judgements 
and the probe duration (500ms) with one-sample t-test (Control: t5= 0.394, 
p = 0.710. Predictable: t5= -0.006, p = 0.995. Unpredictable t5 = -0.36, p = 
0.972), meaning on average participants’ estimates of duration was accurate. 
There is no overall effect of expectation using repeated measures ANOVA (F2, 
10 = 0.25, p = 0.655 – Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) which is visible from 
the graph in Figure 5-2 as there is no clear trend in the results. 
Figure 5-3 This shows staircases (solid) from a typical naïve participant for a single 
condition (25%/ unexpected condition). The four staircases converge on the mean 
stimulus duration estimate (dashed) of 487ms, which approximates the actual stimulus 
duration of 500ms. 
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 BEHAVIOURAL DISCUSSION 
With no result coming remotely close to any significant effect, the 
experiment shows no temporal expansion effect due to expectation in our 
experimental paradigm. The complete lack of trend shown here suggests that 
the issue is not a lack of power, so adding more participants would be 
unlikely to show any significant trends.  
Why is there no difference due to expectation? The most straightforward 
explanation is that temporal expansion effects are not due to differences in 
expectancy. This runs contrary to claims in literature citing expectation as 
creating the perceived increase in event duration (Pariyadath & Eagleman, 
2007; Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2012). The low-level stimuli used might not 
be typically behaviourally relevant so not induce expectations, but oddball 
orientations have demonstrated temporal expansion (Pariyadath & 
Eagleman, 2012). It may be that previous temporal expansion effects have 
been strengthened by adaptation to low-level visual features, a factor we 
deliberately eliminated here, but reliable oddball effects have been found for 
cases where low level feauture adaptation is not happening or happens in a 
manner disassociable with expectation (Schindel et al., 2011; Pariyadath & 
Eagleman 2007). Increased attention to the oddball has been proposed as 
another alternative mechanism (Tse et al., 2004). Manipulating attention by 
using emotionally arousing stimuli does not result in a change in the 
temporal expansion effect (Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2007) suggesting 
attention is not the only factor creating the perceived increase in duration. 
Similarly, perhaps what this experiment shows is that expectation alone is 
not the only factor in the temporal expansion effect. In the paradigm here, 
the ‘oddball’ is defined by a probabilistic conjunction between two stimuli 
and is expected to be learnt whilst performing the task without any explicit 
cue as to the relevance or even existence of the relationship. As this is more 
complex than the standard oddball, it is reasonable to suggest the patterns 
within the experiment were not salient so participants did not learn the 
relationship. The results cannot completely disprove the relationship 
between expectation and perceived duration but since it is probable an 
expectation did not develop that participants were conscious of it might 
mean that participants have to be aware of the expectation before it affects 
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duration estimates. This is confirmed by the fact that when debriefing the 
naïve participants, not one mentioned they were aware of the relationship 
even when prompted. What this suggests is that when expectation is reduced 
by making the relationships between stimuli less overt to the point where 
participants are not aware of it, there is no temporal expansion effect, 
showing differences in expectation alone do not always create differences in 
perceived duration. Adjustments to the paradigm to create more obvious 
conjunctions could allow for experiments to test this hypothesis. Methods 
such as changing the probabilities of stimulus pairs to say 90%/10% instead 
of 75%/25% and/or having an initial learning period where one probe 
stimulus appears after one particular prime stimulus only, giving participants 
time to learn the relationship, could provide straightforward ways to alter the 
approach here.  
The design of this experiment shares similarities with Summerfield et al., 
(2008) who show two faces in sequence which are either the of same or 
different people and creates an expectation as to what the second image will 
be depending on prior trials in the block. So it is interesting that in our 
similar paradigm (albeit with simpler stimuli), there is no difference in 
perceived durations suggesting expectation did not affect duration 
estimations. This would provide a test to see if this paradigm induces BOLD 
suppression using expectation and if apparent, would suggest expectation is 
not the only requirement for changes in duration as shown in the oddball 
paradigm. Since repetition suppression has been associated with various 
encoding mechanisms (Grill-Spector et al., 2006) it would inform thinking 
behind the mechanisms of duration perception.  
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 FMRI METHODS 
 DATA ACQUISITION 
Data were acquired using a 3T Siemens Trio MR scanner with a 32-
channel array head coil. Functional images were acquired with a T2*-
weighted gradient-recalled echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence (35 axial 
slices, TR 2500 ms, TE 31 ms, flip angle 85°, resolution 3 mm isotropic, echo 
spacing: 1.42 ms). Structural data were acquired using a T1-weighted 3-D 
anatomical scan (MPRAGE, Siemens, TR 1830 ms, TE 3.3 ms, flip angle 11°, 
resolution 1 × 1 × 1). 
 MT+ COMPLEX LOCALISER 
The two regions of interest making up MT+ complex, MT and MST are 
defined in each of the participants using methods detailed in Huk, 
Dougherty, and Heeger (2002). The stimuli consisted of two circular dot 
clusters (radius 8°) with the centre positioned 10° from central fixation. The 
dots were ether static or moving divided into alternating 15s blocks. One run, 
consisting of 16 blocks, was presented with the stimuli on the left of fixation 
Figure 5-4: Shows MT (red) and MST (blue) making up MT+ as identified for a single 
participant. 
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and another run with the stimuli on the right. Dot movement consists of 
alternating contracting and expanding motion where dots move inward and 
outward along the radial axes.  
MT is localised as the contiguous voxels continuously active duration 
contralateral stimulation only. While MST is defined as voxels responding to 
both, ipsilateral and contralateral motion stimuli. MST is located anterior to 
MT (Huk et al., 2002), therefore voxels responding to only contralateral 
stimulation further anterior than the median values of MST on the axial plan 
are not included in the final MT ROI. A participant with MT and MST 
localised using this method is shown in Figure 5-4. 
 PRIMARY VISUAL CORTEX (V1) LOCALISER 
A standard retinotopic procedure is used (Sereno et al., 1995). V1 is 
localised using an 8Hz counter-phase flickering checkerboard wedge rotating 
clockwise at 64s/cycle for a total of 8 cycles. Check size is scaled by 
eccentricity according to approximate cortical magnification factor (Radius-
12° 24° Sector). Each voxel’s temporal phase response to the rotating wedge 
is fitted using a model derived from the stimulus time series. Phase of BOLD 
response was superimposed on a segmented and flattened grey matter 
representation and is taken as a visual field position indicator with V1 
boundary identified by eye. 
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 FMRI STIMULI AND TASK 
Seven adult human naive participants (four female) took part in the study. 
The stimuli are as described in the general methods section. Participants 
fixate on a small blue circle and the centre of the screen throughout the 
experiment. Each probe stimulus, X or Y, appears after a particular prime 
stimulus, A or B, 75% of the time respectively (Figure 5-5 a). Procedures for 
both tasks are shown in Figure 5-5 b) and c). 
The prime stimulus always appears for 500ms with a random gap of 0.333 
to 0.666s before the probe stimulus. The probe appears for either 250ms or 
800ms duration (short or long), chosen as behavioural data indicated that 
these durations are judged to be longer or shorter the majority (90%) of the 
time by all participants. Before each trial is a mandatory 4s gap where 
participant response is recorded and a further random Poisson delay between 
trials of  mean 2s and range 0-8s. There are 32 trials per block and eight 
blocks per run,  with two runs, one for each task performed on separate days. 
The probe stimuli differ across two different properties: duration (long or 
short) and expectation/orientation (left or right). Each prime/probe 
combination makes up a single trial that is defined for the analysis as being 
2.5s long, from the onset of the prime stimulus.  
There are two tasks, one where participants respond by button press, 
indicating if the probe lasts a longer or shorter duration than the prime 
stimulus and another where participants indicate if the probe was orientated 
toward the left or right. The duration task will show if there is a relationship 
between BOLD and stimulus duration and if there is a suppression effect for 
more probable prime-probe combinations, which would demonstrate a 
dissociation between suppression and the temporal expansion effect. The 
orientation task is introduced to test if the experiment induces a suppression 
effect when the task is more relevant to the implicit relationship between the 
colour of the prime and orientation of the probe.   
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Figure 5-5: a) shows the stimulus properties and the probabilistic relationships inducing 
expectation. b) shows the duration trial procedure and c) shows the orientation trial 
procedure. In both there is an initial fixation alone period for 2-12s, mean 4s defined by a 
Poisson distribution. Prime is displayed for 500ms with a random delay before the probe 
stimulus appears. There is a period of 4s where responses are recorded. 
 ANALYSIS 
Analysis was performed in Brain Voyager QX 1.4. Experimental effects are 
measured using Region of Interest analysis using a GLM with the two 
experimental tasks analysed separately. Before the data is pre-processed, the 
first four volumes of each block are discarded; three-dimensional motion and 
time slice correction was applied along with filtering the data through a 
0.01Hz High pass filter. Functional and anatomical data is aligned in AC-PC 
space and GLM analysis performed for each individual participant. Each 
stimulus condition (A-X-Short, A-X-Long, A-Y-Short, A-Y-Long B-X-Short, 
B-X-Long, B-Y-Short, B-Y-Long) was modelled separately by convolving a 
haemodynamic response function with the stimulus time course, including 
head motion regressors.  
For each stimulus condition the strength of response is given as mean 
percent signal change of all voxels in a particular ROI. Stimulus conditions 
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are collapsed depending on the effect being measured for a particular 
experimental task, e.g. expectation effects involve contrasts between 
predictable and unpredictable trials given as Predictable: A-X-Short, A-X-
Long, B-Y-Short and B-Y-Long. Unpredictable: A-Y-Short. A-Y-Long B-X-
Short and B-X-Long.  
 RESULTS 
 
Figure 5-6: BOLD Response for different stimuli (rows) for the two experimental tasks 
(columns), error bars show standard errors (n = 7). Left graphs show results from time 
judgement experiments. Right show orientation judgements. Top shows differences in 
duration, bottom shows differences in expectation. All results except V1 short and expected 
durations in the time judgement task and V1 for long stimuli in the orientation task are 
significantly different from baseline. There appear to be consistent differences in medial 
temporal areas between long and short, expected and unexpected stimuli in the time but not 
orientation task. 
Each measured variable for both expectation (expected, unexpected) and 
stimulus duration (long, short) is  measured for each participant by first 
collapsing the appropriate trials and then averaging across all trials in the 
condition. Participants were able to distinguish short and long durations in a 
manner comparable to the behavioural data (~90% correct). These are shown 
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in Figure 5-6. The majority of stimuli in both tasks show significant increases 
compared to the baseline (grey screen) across all areas.  
In the duration task, both longer and unexpected durations show an 
increase in BOLD relative to shorter and expected durations respectively, 
except V1, which shows the opposite trend between longer and shorter 
stimuli. This is not repeated in the orientation task. Figure 5-7 shows this 
trend more clearly by displaying the differences in signal change between the 
two relevant stimuli (Short - Long and Expected – Unexpected) where MT 
and MST areas show the aforementioned trends in the duration task but not 
in the orientation task.  
Two-tailed paired t-tests are used to look for differences in each condition 
across all participants. There are no significant effects in either experimental 
task in V1 for duration (Time: t6 = - 0.19, p = 0.859. Orientation t6 = 0.14, p = 
0.893) or expectation (Time: t6 = - 0.24, p = 0.819. Orientation: t6 = 1.27, p = 
0.251) or MT+ complex for duration (Time: t6 = - 1.58, p = 0.163. 
Orientation: t6 = 0.16, p = 0.877) or expectation (Time: t6 = - 2.08, p = 0.083. 
Orientation: t6 = -0.26, p = 0.805). While there is no significant difference in 
MT for either measure (Duration | Time: t6 = - 1.70, p = 0.141. Orientation: t6 
= 0.60, p = 0.574. Expectation | Time: t6 = - 1.72, p = 0.135. Orientation: t6 = 
-0.415, p = 0.693),  
MST shows a significant difference in activation between predictable and 
unpredictable stimuli in the duration task (t6 = - 3.08, p < 0.05), an effect 
which does not carry over to differences in duration (t6 = - 1.21, p = 0.273) or 
either contrast on the orientation task (Duration: t6 = - 0.28, p < 0.974. 
Prediction: t6 = 0.14, p < 0.987).  
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Figure 5-7 BOLD change in response to predictable and unpredictable stimuli and different 
durations, n = 7. Bars show short – long and expected – unexpected response, as these 
differences are expected to be in the same direction. Error bars show standard errors (N=7). 
a) shows results for the duration task. All visual areas show repetition suppression i.e. a 
reduction in BOLD for expected stimuli, however this effect is only significant in MST. There 
is a reduction across all but V1 with stimuli of different durations, i.e. stimuli that last longer 
show an increased BOLD signal, but again this is not significant. There are no significant 
effects in the orientation task and no non-significant trends either. 
 FMRI DISCUSSION 
The fMRI data shows there is evidence of repetition suppression in MST in 
the duration judgement task, and the direction of the suppression effect is 
consistent across areas, although not significant. That this is not repeated in 
the orientation condition might seem at odds with previous results. Previous 
reports suggest that suppression associated with expectation is increased 
when the expected stimulus pattern is task relevant compared to when it is 
not (Kok et al., 2012a). Therefore, it would be sensible to hypothesise the 
opposite pattern to what is observed here. BOLD change induced by 
expectation would likely be observed in V1, as neurons in V1 encode 
orientation (Kok et al., 2012a). BOLD suppression due to expectation is 
reduced when attention is diverted (Larsson & Smith, 2012) and attention is 
suggested to modulate BOLD response, similar to stimulus onset in the visual 
system (Smith, Cotillion & Williams, 2006). This may provide an explanation 
as to why there is no effect in the orientation condition, despite the task 
relevant prime stimulus. In the duration task participants have to compare 
the duration of the prime to that of the probe stimulus meaning they have to 
attend to the stimulus. However in the orientation task, the participant is 
asked to judge the orientation of the probe with no comparison to the prime 
stimulus, therefore does not have to direct attention toward the prime 
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stimulus (over the whole trial some attention is required, although less than 
for the duration judgment trial). As the duration task places greater 
attentional demands on the participant, there is an effect of expectation on 
BOLD because attention facilitates top-down repetition suppression so this 
result is compatible with previous findings.  
The fact that only one ROI shows a significant effect here could also be 
important. Kok et al., (2012a) show significant repetition suppression in V1 
only when guiding attention to orientation grating stimuli for which there is a 
selective response in V1 neurons. As this repetition suppression effect is 
observed in the duration task only, this suggests differences in duration drive 
MST neurons implicating MST in duration perception, reinforcing other 
findings (Sadeghi et al., 2011).  
What is also apparent is a non-significant effect of stimulus duration in the 
fMRI data here, although there is a trend that longer durations cause greater 
activity in the motion processing visual areas when the task is duration 
specific. Overall, there is little correspondence between perceived duration 
and BOLD observable in this experiment, suggesting differences in event 
time do no relate to differences in BOLD signal in these visual areas. This 
suggests that duration is not encoded in sustained increases of firing in large 
numbers of neurons sufficient to drive changes in BOLD in these areas. There 
did not appear to be any consistent significant differences across participants 
in whole brain analysis. This does not exclude other encoding mechanisms 
using sparse populations, transient changes that are too fast to have any 
effect on BOLD or sub voxel resolution of selective responses to different 
durations.  
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 CONCLUSION 
There are two main effects in this study. First, that there is no temporal 
expansion effect observed with the experimental paradigm used here. 
Secondly, when attention is focussed on judging duration, repetition 
suppression due to expectation in MST occurs, despite the lack of a 
behavioural effect. 
These two findings together suggest that not all forms of expectation 
contribute to the temporal expansion effects. This is problematic for 
proposals that perceived duration is related to expectations (Pariyadath & 
Eagleman, 2007) as with no behavioural effect on the perception of event 
duration it would be expected that their would be no corrisponding effect on 
BOLD signal, which is observed. This does not mean that expectation has no 
effect on perceived duration but does suggest that implicit relationships 
between stimuli are not enough on their own to drive differences in perceived 
duration. Since participants did not appear to notice the relationship 
between different stimuli it may be the case that participants need to be 
aware of the relationships for any effect of expectation on perceived duration 
to arise. 
The lack of correspondence between BOLD signal and duration perception 
is further shown by the fact that a perceived temporal difference does not 
result in a difference in BOLD signal. Therefore, the relationship between 
neural energy, or at least its BOLD correlate and duration is not a 
straightforward one linking visual areas to duration of visual events 
(Eagleman & Pariyadath, 2009). There is also some suggestion that MST in 
particular might play a role in encoding duration, although it might be an 
attentional artefact that is not observed in the orientation task as it does not 
require as much attention to perform. The data exhibits interesting, though 
non-significant trends in the data showing reduction in BOLD of short 
compared to long stimuli in the duration identification task that might be due 
to representations of different stimulus durations but it is difficult to draw 
conclusions from this without further study.  
Although participant numbers were small this is not atypical of tasks 
investigating repetition suppression using a similar analysis, e.g. Larsson and 
Smith (2012) use eight. Task difficulty could be the reason behind the 
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differences in results between the two judgements as in the time judgement 
more attention is directed to the prime stimulus than in the orientation task. 
It is difficult to match exactly task difficulty and therefore attentional 
resources across two different judgments. An alternative method would be to 
introduce an easier duration and harder orientation judgment and see what 
effects are consistent within each task as such task difficulty manipulations 
have been used to show brain areas involved in timing before (Livesey et al., 
2007).  
Differences in expectation and duration might cause changes to stimulus 
representations that are encoded in sparse populations. MVPA has been used 
to show changes of this nature (Jiang et al., 2013; Kok et al., 2012a) so an 
alternative is to use multivariate techniques to investigate how 
representations change with expectation and stimulus duration. The number 
of trials is similar to Kok et al., (2012a) but further post-hoc analysis could be 
considered data peeking and to be avoided and participant numbers in these 
experiments where larger (>16). If MVPA analysis were desired, it would be 
better to redesign the experiment to match more closely other experiments 
that find significant MVPA effects to allow for comparisons between results 
and avoid data peeking.  
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6. CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This final chapter provides a summary of the findings reported in the 
previous chapters regarding how they relate to the literature and the three 
research questions identified in the introduction. These questions are: Do 
changes in perceived duration after adaptation have functional effects? How 
might duration be encoded in sensory systems? What is the relationship 
between repetition suppression, expectation and perceived duration?  
Arising from this it is proposed where and how duration might be encoded 
in the visual system based on the simple model presented in Chapter 4, and 
general themes are expanded upon to suggest a general mechanism for 
encoding time across neural systems. Other models are discussed in relation 
to these claims as well as what this might mean for the conscious perception 
of time. Finally, some avenues for expanding upon the work here are 
detailed. 
 OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS 
With the centralised clock not proving to be an ideal framework for 
interpreting results of duration perception (see Chapter 1) it is difficult to 
advance understanding of duration perception without developing a suitable 
alternative framework. Eagleman and Pariyadath (2009) suggest that the 
amount of neural energy associated with encoding a stimulus is proportional 
to its perceived duration. There are shortcomings with this; neural energy is 
loosely defined and does not provide a quantifiable mechanism meaning, as 
the authors state, this proposal is the starting point rather than a complete 
framework for understanding duration perception.  
Chapter 4 details a model using increases in response to a stimulus to 
encode the duration of that event. This model demonstrates how duration 
can be encoded within neural systems using established properties in a 
manner compatible with the neural energy proposal. The model progresses 
the neural energy hypothesis by providing quantifiable predictions that 
match observations in literature (for more detail on this see sections 4.3.3, 
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4.3.6, 4.3.8, 4.3.9 and 4.4). Others have proposed similar models, showing 
how ramping activity can encode timing of action or the delay between two 
events using a single cell (Durstewitz, 2003) or a network (Reutimann, 
Yakovlev, Fusi, & Senn, 2004; Simen et al., 2011), so this concept is not new 
but the model demonstrates how this could apply to sensory systems. These 
other models also show how neural systems might create the type of response 
required by the SDD model, represented by the low-pass filters, on either a 
single cell or population level. There is also evidence of neurons in LIP 
exhibiting this type of ramping behaviour (Janssen & Shadlen, 2005; Leon & 
Shadlen, 2003).  
Another issue that the model in Chapter 4 demonstrates is the necessity of 
controlling the input magnitude through a normalisation stage to avoid 
errors caused by variations in the input signal. Altering parameters in the 
normalisation stage can be considered analogous to mechanisms responsible 
for sensory adaptation and thus, give a possible explanation regarding why 
adaptation to sensory properties affect perceived duration (Ayhan et al., 
2011; Bruno & Johnston, 2010; Curran & Benton, 2012; Johnston et al., 
2006; Marinovic & Arnold, 2011). Adaptation to ‘tune’ sensory systems to 
encode optimally stimulus properties uses the same normalisation process 
that affects perceived duration, so any changes optimising sensory systems 
also affect duration estimates. While normalisation reduces effects of input 
magnitude on duration estimates, it does not eliminate it. This is in line with 
experimental evidence showing perceived duration of a visual stimulus 
correlates with arithmetic value (Alards-Tomalin et al., 2014), size (Alards-
Tomalin et al., 2014; Ono & Kitazawa, 2011; Xuan et al., 2007), colour 
saturation (Alards-Tomalin et al., 2014) brightness (Brigner, 1986; Terao, 
Watanabe, Yagi, & Nishida, 2008), numerosity (Xuan et al., 2007), speed 
(Brown, 1995) and temporal frequency (Kanai, Paffen, Hogendoorn, & 
Verstraten, 2006).  
We find suggestions of shared mechanisms of time and space in Chapter 3, 
which shows temporal frequency adaptation changes the Flash-Lag illusion 
in a way that is consistent with a reduction in the time component. This 
matches reports in other studies (Ayhan et al., 2009; Burr et al., 2007; 
Johnston et al., 2006) which use a similar adapting stimulus to show a 
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compression of perceived event duration. The work here suggests a 
relationship between the perception of duration and the perception of space 
as this reduction of the time component is measured as a reduction in the 
illusory spatial offset observed in the Flash-Lag illusion. This relationship 
between apparent duration and space provides some advantages in that it 
reduces the Flash-Lag illusion meaning a more veridical perception of the 
stimuli. Sensory systems could be tuning their measure of duration to 
recalibrate sensory percepts to provide more useful information in a rapidly 
changing environment.  
It has been shown that duration adaptation does not affect action timing, 
implying that there are separate timing mechanisms for perception and 
action (Marinovic & Arnold, 2011), so changes in perceived duration may be 
involved in recalibrating perceptual mechanisms only.  
The result in Chapter 3 showing changes in duration appear to affect space 
in Flash-Lag is similar to research showing that both space (Ross, Morrone, 
Goldberg, & Burr, 2001) and time (Morrone et al., 2005) are compressed 
about the time of a saccade. This is significant as stimuli presented at the 
time of saccades show a reduction in contrast sensitivity of low spatial 
frequencies (Volkmann, Riggs, White, & Moore, 1978) suggesting that 
selective suppression of the Magnocellular pathway occurs about the time of 
saccades (Burr, Morrone, & Ross, 1994). A further interesting finding is the 
perisaccadic remapping of receptive fields. Macaque monkeys show this in 
LIP (Duhamel, Colby, & Goldberg, 1992), superior colliculus (Walker, 
Fitzgibbon, & Goldberg, 1995) and frontal eye field (FEF) (Umeno & 
Goldberg, 1997), suggesting common remapping mechanisms in areas 
involved in directing eye movements and attention. Further research shows 
this predictive remapping in the direction of the saccade is a convergence of 
receptive field positions toward the fixation target resulting in a compression 
of space (Zirnsak, Steinmetz, Noudoost, Xu, & Moore, 2014). This is of 
significance as LIP neurons are tuned to durations (Janssen & Shadlen, 
2005; Leon & Shadlen, 2003), meaning LIP contains representations of time 
and space; as these are processed in the same spatial location this might 
mean manipulating one property also affects the other. The fact that neurons 
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in LIP also exhibit predictive changes in their receptive fields further 
suggests that LIP is an area encoding time and space.  
Walsh (2003) proposes a common magnitude system for encoding time, 
space and quantity, which there is some suggestion of in the results in 
Chapter 3, in regards to time and space. A feature of the SDD model is that 
the magnitude of the input, which could be used to encode other stimulus 
properties affect duration judgements. Such a link implies not only the use of 
common optimisation mechanisms, such as those shown by adaptation 
studies and the normalisation stage of the SDD model, but a common 
encoding mechanism as provided by the SDD population. Like neural energy, 
the model presented here could be considered to quantify the proposals 
outlined  by Walsh (2003). 
Results showing that expectancy is linked with perceived duration were 
one of the main findings motivating the neural energy proposal (Eagleman & 
Pariyadath, 2009). Chapter 5 aims to test the relationship between implicit 
expectation and perceived duration, finding no behavioural effect but a 
significant effect of expectation induced suppression in a duration task in 
MST. This suggests that whilst implicitly learnt temporal patterns can cause 
suppression induced by expectation whilst attending to duration, there is no 
corresponding behavioural effect on perceived duration.  
This lack of an effect shows that the relationship between expectation, 
repetition suppression and perceived durations are not straightforward so 
this may have to be reconsidered in future theory. Since participants did not 
appear to be aware of the expectations in either the behavioural or the fMRI 
experiment, it is possible that the participants need to be consciously aware 
of the expectations before they have any effect on the perception of duration 
or that these types of expectation patterns do not drive this effect. As Chapter 
5 shows expectation caused suppression of BOLD signal in MST when 
making a duration judgement, but not an orientation judgement  and 
expectation induced suppression in the visual system is generally found in 
areas that are shown to encode the stimulus being displayed (Larsson & 
Smith, 2012; Jiang et al., 2013; Kok et al., 2012a), this finding hints that MST 
is involved in representing durations as well as areas like LIP. 
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The evidence presented here shows sensory systems appear to be encoding 
duration, using mechanisms common with other sensory properties. This 
evidence also supports the view that duration is encoded across distributed, 
hierarchical mechanisms typical of sensory systems. In particular there is 
evidence suggesting areas MST and LIP are responsible for duration 
perception, which form part of the dorsal/where pathway (Goodale & Milner, 
1992; Goodale, Westwood, & Milner, 2004; Nassi & Callaway, 2009). The 
SDD model shows how measuring event duration could be performed by 
using the temporal response of neurons or populations of neurons and 
provides a candidate mechanism for the perception of duration across the 
brain. The next two sections expand upon these proposals and provide 
pathways for future investigation.  
 IS DURATION PERCEPTION COMPUTED IN THE 
DORSAL PATHWAY? 
The evidence suggests that time perception is computed using 
mechanisms shared with processing other sensory properties which exist at 
multiple levels in the visual hierarchy. It has been proposed that sensory 
information used to measure event duration is initially processed in the 
magnocellular pathway where change in the contrast gain of M-cells 
(Solomon et al., 2004) causes a change in perceived event duration (Ayhan et 
al., 2009; Ayhan et al., 2011; Bruno & Johnston, 2010; Johnston et al., 
2006). The magnocellular pathway makes up a large proportion of the input 
into areas in the dorsal or where pathway, thought of as being responsible for 
spatial vision (Mishkin, Ungerleider, & Macko, 1983) or more recently vision 
for action (Goodale & Milner, 1992; Goodale et al., 2004). The dichotomy 
between the dorsal/where/action and the ventral/what/perception pathway, 
including the degree of independence of the two pathways has been 
questioned (McIntosh & Schenk, 2009; Milner & Goodale, 2008). However, 
the idea that the visual system is organised into two different ways to process 
information for two different purposes provides a framework to understand 
the visual system. It must be recognised that with any individual task 
information is processed in networks within and across both pathways, 
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depending on the demands of the task, i.e. there are no tasks where 
information is processed exclusively in the ventral or dorsal stream. 
Adaptation to motion also can have a direction-specific compression effect 
on perceived duration (Curran & Benton, 2012) showing that adaptation in 
mid-level visual areas in the dorsal pathway that are sensitive to motion 
direction, such as MT (Kohn & Movshon, 2004), can also affect perceived 
time. This, along with Bruno, Ng, and Johnston (2013), provides evidence 
that adaptation at early and mid-level visual processing stages in the dorsal 
pathway changes perceived time. Areas in the dorsal pathway such as MT+ 
project to the parietal lobe (Nassi & Callaway, 2009) containing LIP, where 
neurons respond to event duration (Janssen & Shadlen, 2005; Leon & 
Shadlen, 2003).  
Parietal areas have been theorised to encode various properties including, 
time as well as space and number in a common magnitude encoding system 
(Bueti & Walsh, 2009; Walsh, 2003). The right parietal lobe is implicated 
specifically in time perception, even to the point of being termed a third 
‘when’ pathway (Battelli et al., 2007) in addition to the commonly identified 
what and where pathways.  
The SDD model presented in Chapter 4 provides a quantitative 
mechanism showing how time can be encoded using normalisation and the 
temporal response of neural systems. Normalisation can be considered 
analogous to the adaptation stage(s) while the low-pass filters exhibit similar 
response to neurons in LIP. This means the two crucial components of the 
SDD model exist in the dorsal pathway. The problem with this proposal is 
that M-Cells are band pass (Hess & Snowdon, 1992). Output from M-Cells in 
response to a step function, representing the appearance of an object in vison 
as used in Section 4.2, is rapid increase then  decay in spike rate toward the 
rest output at stimulus onset and a rapid reduction in spike output and decay 
toward rest at offset. At no point does the SDD model perform or require 
such a signal so initially it is difficult to see how the model is compatible with 
the proposal that duration perception is a function of the dorsal pathway. The 
band-pass characteristics of M-Cells mean they are sensitive to temporal 
change, e.g. flicker. In standard motion detection models (Borst & Egelhaff, 
1989) M-Cells are analogous to the function of neurons in the second 
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processing step, inputting to a third step with directionally sensitive neurons. 
In the visual system, cells in V1 are selective for spatial and temporal 
frequency (Priebe, Lisbeger & Mosvhon, 2006) and output to further along 
the dorsal stream, where in MT and MST cells are sensitive to speed and 
direction (Priebe et al, 2006). Output from MT or MST to a moving stimulus 
would more closely resemble the step input to the model. It is possible for 
mechanisms resembling the SDD model to exist along the dorsal stream but 
they need to exist in at the middle or higher visual system, a view that is 
proposed in Kaneko and Murakami (2009). This is compatible with 
aforementioned evidence suggesting MT, MST and LIP are involved in 
duration perception.  
As a result, the SDD model explains experimental data using known neural 
properties, provides a quantitative model in line with current theories, and 
could plausibly exist along the dorsal pathway. This does not mean duration 
computed in the dorsal/action pathway of the visual system is used by 
actions directly and always, as Marinovic and Arnold (2011) show duration 
for perception and action are separable, but that visual duration is computed 
within the dorsal/action pathway regardless of if it is used for actions or not.  
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 TEMPORAL RESPONSE OF NEURAL SYSTEMS 
PROVIDES A GENERAL MECHANISM FOR 
DISTRIBUTED ENCODING OF TIME IN THE BRAIN. 
Visual perception is not the only system where duration may be useful. For 
example in timing an action, a duration estimate can also be crucial or in 
memory for recalling when, or how long for an event may occur. 
Neuroimaging evidence suggests that duration representation is distributed 
across the brain. The cerebellum (Jueptner et al., 1995; Mathiak et al., 2004), 
pre-supplementary motor and prefrontal areas (Coull et al., 2004; Macar, et 
al., 2006), basal ganglia and inferior parietal and pre-motor areas (Livesey et 
al., 2007; Rao et al., 2001) have all shown to be activated at various stages for 
tasks involving duration perception.  
The SDD model uses the temporal response of neural systems to encode 
duration of a sensory event so there is no reason why similar mechanisms 
could not exist in other systems. In section 6.2 it is mentioned that neurons 
in LIP show ramping activity in response to durations. There is evidence of 
neurons in other areas varying firing rate according to durations such as 
decaying activity, opposite to ramping, shown in prefrontal neurons (Kojima 
& Goldman-Rakic, 1982). Other pre-frontal neurons also show ramping 
response to the duration of a stimulus (Brody, Hernández, Zainos, & Romo, 
2003). Neurons within regions of the thalamus (lateral posterior nucleus and 
suprageniculate nucleus for visual cues, medial geniculate nucleus and the 
posterior intralaminar nucleus for auditory cues) show ramping increases in 
firing rate according to the expected time of reward (Komura et al., 2001). 
This evidence shows that in multiple areas there are neurons that vary their 
firing rate in either a monotonically increasing (ramping or climbing) or 
decreasing (decaying) in tasks that require a measure of duration. 
Essentially, the temporal dynamics of firing rates are used to measure time in 
multiple different areas and during different tasks, providing evidence that 
this is a potential common mechanism neural systems use to represent 
duration across the brain. Other models use the temporal response of neural 
systems in similar mechanisms to the SDD model here (Simen, Balci, 
deSouza, Cohen, & Holmes, 2011b; Zandbelt, Purcell, Palmeri, Logan, & 
Schall, 2014).  
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One interesting property of such mechanisms is that the neuron or 
population of neurons’ output can perform another function as well as 
duration perception, such as encode a particular stimulus property or action 
so mechanisms that encode time in the brain can exist in parallel to other 
coding mechanisms within the same neural populations. Standage et al., 
(2013) provide an excellent example of how a population of neurons might do 
this using a population model of a type that is considered to represent 
cortical columns (Douglas & Martin, 2004; Wilson & Cowan, 1973). In this 
model, the firing rate of pyramidal cells in a population of pyramidal and 
inhibitory interneurons was used to encode time. This was achieved by 
varying the NMDA receptor conductance, which caused the excitatory 
population firing rate to increase with NMDA conductance, reaching 
threshold sooner. Thus, in this model NMDA concentration is inversely 
proportional to the duration encoded in the population. 
 This model holds many similarities (ramping outputs, thresholds) with 
the SDD model. What make it interesting is that the mean firing rate of the 
population is driven by the rapid spiking of a relatively small number of 
excitatory neurons. This mirrors how populations encode information, for 
example, a population encoding a motion direction for any particular motion 
direction, a small subset of the population will fire rapidly, but which 
neurons in the population that are firing rapidly will change depending on 
the direction of motion (Pouget, Dayan, & Zemel, 2000). By taking the mean 
firing rate across the population, the model presented by Standage et al., 
(2013) can encode time simultaneously with a particular stimulus property. 
As this is a standard population model, this means that such mechanisms can 
exist across the brain meaning that whenever ‘something’ is represented in 
the brain, be it a percept or action the duration associated with ‘it’ can be 
encoded within the same population providing a mechanism for a distributed 
sense of time.  
Further evidence for distributed mechanisms comes from Critchley (1953), 
as reported in Walsh (2003), who notes that temporal abnormalities in 
perception occur with a corresponding spatial abnormality. Two more recent 
studies show that a patient suffering from hemispatial neglect in the left 
visual field reports overestimations of duration for stimuli presented in the 
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afflicted part of the visual field compared to the other areas (Basso, Nichelli, 
Frassinetti, & di Pellegrino, 1996; Calabria et al., 2011). With a distributed 
mechanism, this can be explained  as with a lesion there are fewer neurons 
processing stimuli in the left areas, this results in either a reduced stimulus 
drive associated with that event which would result in a reduced input to the 
integrating neurons (low-pass filters in the SDD model) that ramp-on slower, 
resulting in this reduced duration estimate.  
A distributed mechanism has the benefit of being a highly efficient way to 
encode time as wherever a property is represented, its duration can be 
encoded without any additional metabolic cost. Having a distributed rather 
than a centralised timing mechanism also provides redundancies so that a 
complete loss of time perception across all modalities does not occur. But it 
does have inherent problems such as if the temporal response properties of 
the neurons are not known how is it possible to compare inputs from 
separate sources without errors?  
There is some evidence for such errors occurring. Auditory durations are 
commonly reported to last longer than visual durations (Goldstone & 
Lhamon, 1974; Wearden et al., 1998; Wearden, Todd, & Jones, 2006), 
showing evidence of systematic errors, which could be due to a mismatch 
between modality specific coding mechanisms.  
Another systematic bias is the central tendency effect (Vierordt’s Law), 
where short durations are overestimated and longer durations are 
underestimated. This is discussed in Chapter 4 where, in the model the effect 
materialised because of the initially high normalised input causing detectors 
with fast filter time constants to ramp-on quickly causing the overestimation. 
Central tendency in the model is a problem of inaccurate labelling of 
detectors with slower or faster time constants. Lewis and Miall (2009) show 
that central tendency reduces with environmental feedback. Cicchini, Arrighi, 
Cecchetti, Giusti, and Burr (2012) find musicians show a more veridical 
perception of auditory time, i.e. a reduced central tendency, with 
percussionists showing this trend in the visual as well as auditory modalities. 
This shows that biases in duration estimates are reduced with feedback and 
learning, so it is possible that adjustments between independent timing 
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mechanisms are made, and can be updated based upon environmental 
feedback and experience. 
 THE CONSCIOUS PERCEPTION OF TIME  
In the previous section it has been argued that researchers in different 
areas are converging on a common mechanism using the temporal response 
of neurons that can be approximated as a linear slope function or low-pass 
filter to encode duration in a distributed fashion across the brain. A 
distributed mechanism reflects the multiple drafts (Dennett & Kinsbourne, 
1992) or fame in the brain (Dennett, 2001). Time in the brain is perceived 
using different mechanisms in parallel that do not reflect a single frame of 
reference but one that is interpreted from multiple mechanisms and 
continuously revised. Under this framework, multiple representations of 
event time are computed in parallel as described in section 6.4, which 
produce multiple drafts that may be incompatible with one another and 
fluctuate over time in response to processes like attention and input from 
sensory organs. Each draft is competing with the others to become the 
‘strongest’ or final draft that can change over time. This is in distinct 
opposition to the centralised timer measuring durations of all events and 
actions across modalities.  
The centralised timer can be interpreted as a Cartesian approach to the 
problem of time perception (Section 1.2.5). So not only does the approach 
detailed in sections 6.3 and 6.4 argue that duration is measured using 
particular mechanisms it argues for a particular philosophical school of 
thought. This view has implications for some of the work presented. In 
Chapter 4, the SDD model uses a labelled line coding system to represent 
duration. To decode, or read out the information processed by the 
population, knowledge about each SDD’s (the labelled line in the model) 
label needs is required. This is dangerously close to invoking a homunculus 
and a Cartesian explanation of duration. In the model, the labelled line 
coding system fulfils the purpose of demonstrating that information about 
event duration can exist in the system. Therefore, the purpose of the 
decoding scheme is to provide a proof of concept and is not deemed and 
176 
 
176 
 
essential property of the model. Alternatives to this coding scheme are 
discussed in Section 6.7.2 with the aim of reducing this problem.  
 OTHER MODELS OF DURATION PERCEPTION 
 CENTRAL CLOCK MODELS 
There are two key differences where the proposals here differ from central 
clock modes. Firstly, there is a shift from a centralised, top down timing to a 
distributed, bottom up system, which it is argued more accurately represents 
the organisation of the brain, sensory systems in particular. Secondly the 
removal of a centralised timer, which is replaced by an input signal to the 
accumulator(s). The signal can be an external input such as in the SDD 
model or it could be an internal signal, such as preparatory activity encoding 
a motor plan for an action to be performed with a delay. This signal is passed 
through a neural system acting as an integrator that takes a specific time to 
reach threshold to delay the action and when threshold is reached the action 
performed.  
Attention and arousal effects on timing have been a common topic of 
research providing evidence used to justify central clocks (Treisman et al., 
1990), commonly showing an increase in perceived time with attention and 
arousal. Although little has been said on this topic in this work, these 
behavioural effects observed are compatible with the proposals here if 
attention and arousal are said to act as gain changes in a signal. An example 
of changing gain is described in Chapter 4, where it is demonstrated that a 
reduction in gain of the normalisation stage is shown to reduce duration 
estimates, therefore the reverse should increase duration estimates. Although 
the normalisation stage is not claimed to represent attention it shows that 
duration estimates should act in a way expected of them from literature. A 
possible extension to incorporate attention in the SDD model is described in 
section 6.7.2 
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 CHANNEL CODING 
Adaptation to duration, where a visual or audio stimulus of a particular 
duration is presented repeatedly, has been shown to have a repellent effect 
on duration estimates when the stimulus is shown for a different durations 
(Heron et al., 2012). This results in an effect where, after duration 
adaptation, longer or shorter stimulus durations than the adapting duration 
are perceived to be even shorter or longer. This effect is explained using a 
population model with neuronal output being described by  Gaussian curves 
tuned to a peak duration (Heron et al., 2012). Adaptation is represented as a 
reduction in gain of a sub population resulting in a reduction of the peak in 
these neurons’ tuning curves, resulting in the repellent effect on estimates.  
In a further study (Heron, Hotchkiss, Aaen-Stockdale, Roach, & Whitaker, 
2013) the duration of a visual test stimulus was distorted by an auditory 
distracting stimulus of a different duration presented at a time overlapping 
the test stimulus, causing distortions in duration estimation compared to 
estimates without the distractor. The duration adaptation effect was found to 
repel about a duration consistent with channel model estimates even when a 
distractor was presented showing that this cross-modal adaptation effect 
occurs before multisensory integration thus it is claimed it is an effect of 
sensory processing.  
As has been mentioned previously, firing rate of LIP neurons increases as 
a function of elapsed time. However, this implies a summation, rather than 
channel based coding system proposed by Heron et al., (2012). There is 
neurophysiological evidence of duration-tuned neurons existing in a number 
of vertebrate species (Sayegh, Aubie, and Faure, 2011). Initially thought to be 
used for echolocation in the auditory system in species like bats and 
dolphins, neurons that perform similar functions have been found in the cat 
primary and secondary visual cortex (Duysens, Schaafsma, & Orban, 1996) so 
they exist in different modalities in species that do not echolocate. So there is 
evidence for such a duration channel coding scheme but the location and how 
these channels would select which event(s) to encode the duration of and 
what range(s) they might exist over is an open question.  
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 STATE DEPENDENT NETWORKS 
Recurrent neural networks can encode event duration (Buonomano & 
Maass, 2009; Karmarkar & Buonomano, 2007). Within such a mechanism, 
time is encoded intrinsically because of neural dynamics that encode 
duration in the network state that evolves over time. As these networks can 
exist across the brain it means time can be encoded using this type of 
network in a distributed fashion. State dependent networks share 
commonalities with the proposals outlined in section 6.4. The main different 
between state dependent networks and using temporal dynamics (ramping or 
decaying neural activity) described earlier to encode time is that it is easier to 
conceptualise how duration can be encoded using temporal dynamics and a 
threshold and the simple model is more firmly rooted in a specific type of 
neural response to stimulus.  
Ramping or decaying neural response provides an explicit encoding of 
duration and it provides clear predictions regarding what activity should be 
observed in neurons or networks when encoding duration. Whereas state 
dependent networks would produce complex, dynamic patterns of activity 
that would be harder to detect, though there is some evidence of this (Goel & 
Buonomano, 2014). Due to state dependent networks’ ability to create and 
reproduce complex patterns, they are suited to encode complex temporal 
relationships. It is plausible that state dependent networks might exist as a 
separate encoding mechanism to that proposed in section 6.4 for encoding 
complex action that require precise timing, such as speech, playing a musical 
instrument or storing complex sequences of events. While the comparatively 
simpler temporal responses are used for encoding event durations, time to 
action could be encoded by ramping or decaying activity which is a view 
shared by Goel and Buonomano (2014). 
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 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 FLASH-LAG 
ADAPT BAR AND FLASH INDEPENDENTLY 
The most obvious modification to the Flash-Lag experiments in Chapters 2 
and 3 is modifying the stimulus so that only the area over bar or flash is 
adapted and measure the effect on the Flash-Lag illusion. Since high 
temporal frequency adaptation does appear to reduce the time component of 
Flash-Lag the results of such an experiment will provide insight as to what 
mechanisms are behind both duration processing and the Flash-Lag illusion.  
Such a study could inform current thinking on the mechanisms behind 
Flash-Lag. Temporal integration (Krekelberg & Lappe, 2000a) relies on 
averaging the position of the moving object over a temporal window. This 
would predict that adapting the bar, not the flash would shrink the time 
component of the Flash-Lag. Latency delay (Whitney & Murakami, 1998) 
explains Flash-Lag in terms of a relative delay between processing the 
moving bar and flash as such makes no clear predictions regarding whether 
adapting the flash, bar or just both would change the Flash-Lag illusion, as all 
of these would fit in with latency delay.  
Similar to latency delay, postdiction (Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000) does 
not make any clear predictions regarding if the adapting the bar, flash or only 
adapting both would have an effect. If adapting the bar has an effect, 
postdiction would explain this in the same way as temporal integration. An 
effect of adapting the flash can be explained by the Flash occurring in an area 
of the visual field where rapid changes are to be expected, thus could be 
assumed to not cause the resetting of internal model that postdiction uses to 
explain Flash-Lag. Temporal integration makes a different prediction to the 
two other commonly used explanations for Flash-Lag so this experiment 
provides a test of the temporal integration hypothesis of Flash-Lag and would 
also reveal if the Flash is being advanced as the results of Bruno et al.,(2015) 
might suggest. 
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OCCLUDER TO HIDE BAR 
In an experiment where a moving object is occluded for a portion of its 
trajectory and participants have to indicate if the object appears earlier or 
later than expected shows that when the moving object is delayed behind the 
occluder over time, healthy participants can adjust their expectations and no 
longer report the delayed objects as late (Roth, Synofzik, & Lindner, 2013). It 
is possible to apply this paradigm in a similar set-up to the Flash-Lag 
illusion. Instead of having the bar visible throughout the trial, the bar is 
occluded about the position of the flash. Participants are judging where they 
think the bar would be at the time of the flash. If Flash-Lag were observed, 
this would indicate the Flash-Lag effect is due, at least in part to non-
perceptual mechanisms, i.e. not directly a result of visual input, but that 
perceived duration can be adapted in the absence of visual input and this can 
affect prediction judgments. Regardless of whether or not there is an 
observed Flash-Lag effect with this paradigm, further experiments could be 
run with an adapting stimulus of 5 or 20Hz temporal frequency where the 
bar is occluded. This would have little effect on perceptual mechanisms of 
motion and position over these areas, as there is no stimulus to adapt. Any 
changes from participants’ judgements observed in the 20Hz adaptation 
condition would be indicative of an effect on time and provide evidence 
suggesting a measure of duration is used in predictive perceptual models in 
the brain and that perceived duration can be adapted in a visual area where 
no visual stimulus is presented. This would require extending our model, 
which now only describes ways of detecting the duration of visual objects.  
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 MODEL 
ALTERNATIVE ENCODING METHODS TO LABELLED LINES 
In section 6.5 some of the problems involved with using a labelled line 
coding are discussed. In the current scheme, the duration of the event is 
encoded by taking the label of the most recent detector to switch on. One 
alternative way to decode the event duration without changing the model, 
just the way it is decoded would be to take the number of on detectors as a 
measure of duration. This is effectively a switch between using a labelled line 
to a summation-coding scheme. This would preserve the properties of the 
model, as the components are the same, while reducing the prerequisite 
information required to estimate event duration and reduce the dependence 
on a homunculus. The parameters of the SDD population, such as the filter 
time constant (τ ) and the threshold (T ) do not have to be fixed as precisely 
as they are and these variables could vary within the population. This would 
still produce accurate duration estimates with a suitably large SDD 
population, as it does not matter which SDDs are on, just as long as there is 
variability as to when they switch on. Such a coding scheme would be more 
robust regarding internal noise in the detector population as a roughly equal 
number of faster (short labelled) SDDs would switch off as slower (longer 
labelled) would switch on. However, to know the exact effects this would 
have to be modelled and may depend on properties like the event duration 
and the distribution of τ and T values in the population.  
MODELLING EFFECTS OF ATTENTION  
The effect of attention on time perception has often been a subject of study 
(Coull, 2004; Mangels et al., 1998; Treisman et al., 1990; Tse et al., 2004). 
Currently the model does not incorporate attentional effects, so cannot make 
predictions regarding such experiments. Since the model already uses 
normalisation, one method to incorporate attention into this model would be 
to add an additional stage with multiplicative gain change before the 
normalisation stage in line with Reynolds and Heeger, (2009) so the model 
could then make predictions regarding attention. As attention would be 
modelled as a multiplicative gain on the input signal prior to normalisation, 
this means that its effects will likely be similar to changes in input 
magnitude. As the normalisation stage takes some time to normalise the 
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signal fully this would mean the effects of attention would be more 
pronounced for shorter durations, which could provide some interesting 
experimental predictions. 
 INVESTIGATING THE EFFECTS OF EXPECTATION ON 
PERCEIVED DURATION 
BEHAVIOURAL PARADIGM MODIFICATIONS  
The paradigm used in Chapter 5 did not produce a behavioural effect of 
expectation on perceived duration whereas other paradigms do (Pariyadath 
& Eagleman, 2012; Schindel et al., 2011). One reason for this may be that the 
paradigm did not create salient relationships between the stimulus pairs. 
Modifications could make this stronger; the first would be simply to increase 
the ratios from 75%/25% to 90%/10%, making the unexpected conjunctions 
more surprising. Another method could be to split the experiment into two 
blocks: a training block where only the expected conjunction pairs are shown 
to build up expectations, then have a second test block where stimulus pairs 
are shown as before to include the unexpected conjunctions. Other changes 
could involve modifications of the stimuli themselves. While the Gabor 
patterns used here vary in orientation, which is a low-level stimulus property, 
they could be perceived as abstract. Stimuli like faces or places which have 
been used in previous studies to show the effect of repetition suppression on 
BOLD (Jiang et al., 2013; Summerfield et al., 2008) are more 
environmentally relevant and attract attention more. Thus, these could be 
more susceptible to learning effects. This would mean a shift away from 
investigating the effects of expectations in early cortical areas to higher areas 
in the hierarchy of the visual system, but the principle of learning another 
pattern than that of probability of repetition remains. It would be interesting 
to see if a behavioural effect emerges and if MST remains implicated.  
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A FURTHER STUDY USING MULTI-VOXEL PATTERN ANALYSIS OF FMRI 
DATA 
The analysis carried out in Chapter 5 used a GLM applied to the mean 
BOLD response of voxels identified to be within a defined region of interest. 
While this is useful for identifying significant differences in average BOLD 
signal changes across regions this comes at the expense of spatial resolution 
that might contain fine activation patterns that are otherwise removed along 
with noise in the data. These patterns can contain relevant information 
produced by sparse population encoding that is a common mechanism for 
encoding information across the brain (Pouget et al., 2000). If duration 
information were represented in sparse population codes rather than in 
mean activations across a functionally derived ROI, then this would have 
been missed in the GLM. Using multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA) can 
detect such patterns (Haynes & Rees, 2006). Support Vector Machines 
(SVM) are a commonly used classifier (Mitchell et al., 2004) and could be 
used in a within-subjects analysis, similar to the ROI GLM analysis 
performed. SVMs would perform a binary classification between two 
stimulus properties (long and short, unexpected and expected) in each ROI 
independently. If the classifier can reliably distinguish between the two 
different stimulus properties across participants it provides evidence 
suggesting that particular stimulus is encoded in a ROI.  
MVPA classifications within a particular ROI are dependent on BOLD 
amplitude within the ROI (Smith, Kosillo & Williams, 2011), leading to 
potential issues with quantitatively comparing MVPA results from one ROI 
to another ROI and with the same ROI with different experimental designs. 
While Smith et al., (2011) do demonstrate how the MVPA results might be 
corrected using a BOLD amplitude measure any experiment where this is 
performed needs to be designed to do so from conception, so it lends itself to 
both univariate and multivariate analysis. One of the aims of the experiment 
in Chapter 5 was to investigate the link between duration perception and 
stimulus predictability by comparing results here to those found previously. 
This would also give the opportunity to change the paradigm to more closely 
follow similar studies (e.g. Kok et al., 2012a; Jiang et al., 2013) to allow for 
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more direct comparisons or perhaps informed by further behavioural 
experiments discussed previously in this section.  
 SUMMARY 
It is argued that duration perception is encoded in sensory systems as any 
other stimulus property and this measure of duration has functional roles in 
sensory systems. Duration is estimated using common systems shared by 
other perceptual mechanisms such as normalisation, explaining why 
adaptation to visual properties changes perceived duration. It is proposed 
duration is encoded using the temporal properties of neural systems 
responding to an input proposed to exist in the visual system along the dorsal 
pathway. This also provides a starting point for a framework of perceived 
duration across the brain that shows how duration might be encoded without 
using a centralised mechanism.  
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